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ABSTRACT 
 
IGOR FEDYUKIN: Learning To Be Nobles: The Elite and Education in post-
Petrine Russia 
(Under the direction of David M. Griffiths) 
 
 
This dissertation explores the relationship between the state and the nobility in 
post-Petrine Russia (1730s-1750s). It focuses on educational policies pursued by the 
state: specifically, on the establishment and operations of the Noble Cadet Corps and 
on the reform of noble service in 1736-1737; it also explores the reaction of the 
nobility to these policies. Traditionally, historians have viewed these measures as 
concessions granted by the state to the nobility in the aftermath of the succession 
crisis of 1730. Using a large body of unpublished sources from the archive of the 
Noble Cadet Corps and the records of the Heraldry Department, this dissertation 
argues that in the 1730s the government of Empress Anna conducted a campaign of 
social disciplining with the goal of fashioning a “true nobility” out of the existing 
elite. Specific changes in the system of noble service, such as allowing the nobles 
some say in choosing their career path and mode of schooling, were not a result of any 
political pressure from the nobility, but rather were motivated by the changing 
theoretical notions of human governability. The leading ministers of the reign 
believed that the best way to govern was to “encourage” nobles to perform more 
“diligently” by allowing them to follow their “natural inclinations.” The vast majority 
of the nobles were not interested in the educational opportunities given them by 
Anna’s government. At the same time, by 1730 there already existed a small, but
iv 
 
important stratum of the elite which was willing to actively embrace these 
opportunities. This dissertation argues, therefore, that the elite in the 1730s did not 
have any residual influence over the governmental policies, nor was there any room 
for a negotiated or consultative relationship. At the same time, whatever success the 
government’s campaign of social disciplining enjoyed, was due to the willingness of 
some nobles to cooperate with it.
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 18, 1730, on the eve of his own wedding, Peter II, the nineteen-year 
old grandson of Peter I, died of smallpox in Moscow’s Lefort Mansion. The teenage 
emperor did not leave behind either a designated heir, as he was entitled to do under 
Petrine legislation, or any direct issue, or even a lawful consort. In fact, he was the 
last male member of the ruling dynasty. On that fateful night the Supreme Privy 
Council, a body that had governed the empire during the past few years and consisted 
of half a dozen leading dignitaries of the realm (represented mostly by the Golitsyn 
and Dolgorukov princes, two of the most illustrious aristocratic clans) choose  as the 
next sovereign of Russia the widowed Duchess Anna of Kurland, the niece of Peter I 
and the daughter of Ivan V, his brother and co-ruler from 1682 to 1696.1       
In the course of the Council’s deliberations Prince D.M. Golitsyn suggested to 
his colleagues that they use the occasion to “gain some freedom for ourselves” (voli 
sebe pribavit’).2 “We might start [this enterprise], yet we will fail to see it through,” 
his colleague, Prince V.L. Dolgorukov, remarked. Still, during their day-long meeting 
on January 19, the Council members composed a set of eight “Conditions” to be 
signed by the new empress. These deprived her of powers to declare war, to make 
peace, impose new taxes, elevate officers to the highest ranks, deprive nobles of their 
                                                     
1 That selection was far from obvious: other potential “candidates” included Tsarevna 
Elizabeth, Peter’s daughter; Duke Karl Peter Ulrich of Holstein, Peter’s grandson; Duchess Catherine 
of Mecklenburg, Anna’s elder sister; Evdokia Lopukhin, Peter’s divorced first wife; and even Princess 
Catherine Dolgorukov, Peter II’s betrothed bride. D.A. Korsakov, Votsarenie imperatritsy Anny 
Ioannovny (Kazan', 1880), 94-101. 
 
2 According to an alternative account, the idea was first suggested by Pavel Iaguzhinskii, the 
procurator-general of the Senate. On Prince D.M. Golitsyn see, in particular, Isabel de Madariaga, 
"Portrait of an Eighteenth-Century Russian Statesman: Prince Dmitry Mikhailovitch Golitsyn," 
Slavonic and East European Review 62 (1984): 36-60. 
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landed estates and “honor” without trial, grant landed estates, appoint foreigners to 
court positions, and spend state revenues on her own. Anna’s failure to observe the 
“Conditions,” or Konditsii, would result in her loss of the “Russian crown.” A 
delegation was sent to Anna, who duly accepted the “Conditions” and began her 
journey from Kurland to Moscow.  
Meanwhile, the rumors of the new arrangements spread throughout the old 
capital, where the top of the Russian elite assembled in anticipation of Peter II’s 
planned wedding. Discussions of the constitutional innovations initiated by the 
Council resulted in a dozen or so proposals being submitted by about four hundred 
senior officers and civil servants. These proposals addressed both the constitutional 
arrangements, suggested by the Council, and the most pressing needs and desires of 
their authors in general. The subsequent events are somewhat murky and open to 
interpretation: the apprehensions of the nobility that the “Conditions” represented the 
onset of a ruinous oligarchy were only amplified by the Council’s secretive and 
arrogant way of doing business. In any case, the Council and the rest of the elite could 
not find common ground. Finally, a large group of nobles declared to Anna that the 
“Conditions” did not represent the views of the nobility at large and asked her to 
assume the absolute authority enjoyed by her illustrious forebears. This gave Anna a 
pretext to publicly tear up the document and to restore the autocracy in Russia.3       
                                                     
3 The standard account of the crisis is now I.V. Kurukin, Epokha "dvorskikh bur'": Ocherki 
politicheskoi istorii poslepetrovskoi Rossii, 1725-1762 gg. (Riazan', 2003), 165-224, which finally 
superseded D.A. Korsakov’s classical (and often incorrect) Votsarenie imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny. A 
useful analysis of the crisis and its aftermath is also found in N.N. Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie Anny 
Ioannovny: formirovanie vnutripoliticheskogo kursa i sud’by armii i flota 1730-1735 g. (St.Petersburg, 
2001), 37-65. The standard analysis of the key documents of the crisis is found in a series of articles by 
G.A. Protasov: "‘Konditsii’ 1730 g. i ikh prodolzhenie," Uchenyie zapiski Tambovskogo 
pedagogichekogo instituta, 15 (1957): 215-231; idem,  “Zapiska V.N. Tatishcheva o ‘Proizvol’nom 
rassuzhdenii dvorianstva’ v sobytiiakh 1730 g.," in Problemy istochnikovedeniia. Vol. 11 (Moscow, 
1963), 246-253; idem, "Verkhovnyi Tainyi sovet i ego proekty 1730 goda (istochnikovedcheskoe 
izuchenie)," Istochnikovedcheskie raboty, 1 (1970): 65-103; idem, "Dvorianskie proekty 1730 g. 
(istochnikovedcheskoe izuchenie)," Istochnikovedcheskie raboty, 2 (1972): 61-102; idem, 
"Sushchestvoval li ‘politicheskii plan’ D.M. Golitsyna," Istochnikovedcheskie raboty, 3 (1973): 90-
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The meaning of these events has been debated by historians and polemicists 
ever since.4 The crisis of 1730 looks especially intriguing, of course, against the 
backdrop of Petrine heavy-handed autocratic arbitrariness. Indeed, only five years 
after the death of the oppressive “Father of the Fatherland,” the Russian elite suddenly 
became an important political actor and played a decisive role in a major “revolution,” 
actively expressing its views and preferences regarding the system of government. 
When the crisis was over, however, the elite fell silent again. Was it indeed Russia’s 
missed opportunity to radically alter its historical trajectory, as the 19th-century liberal 
historians would suggest, to step away from the path of eternal autocracy towards 
some sort of limited government? Or was it just a squabble between feuding clans?5  
Did the proposals of 1730 really reflect the views of the nobility at large?6  Did they 
                                                                                                                                                        
107; idem, "Dvor’anskie prosheniia 1730 g." Istochnikovedcheskie raboty, 4 (1975): 87-106. Much is 
to be expected from I.V. Kurukin’s work in progress: a complete collection of the documents of the 
1730 crisis with an index of their signatories. I would like to use this opportunity to thank him for 
sharing with me some of his data.  
 
4 On the mythology of  the “constitutional crisis” of 1730 as an expression of the 
contemporary political concerns, see Kurukin, Epokha, 164-169. For recent assessments of the crisis in 
English, see: James Cracraft, “The Succession Crisis of 1730: A View from Inside,” Canadian-
American Slavic Studies 12 (1978); David L. Ransel, “Political Perceptions of the Russian Nobility: 
The Constitutional Crisis of 1730,” Laurentian University Review 3 (1972): 32-33; idem, “The 
Government Crisis of 1730,” in Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, ed. Robert O. 
Crummey (Chicago, 1989); Valerie A. Kivelson, “Kinship Politics / Autocratic Politics: A 
Reconsideration of Early-Eighteenth Century Political Culture,” in Imperial Russia: New Histories for 
the Empire, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington and Indiana, 1989), 5-31.  
5 For a recent exposition of this view, including the critical review of works by E.V. 
Anisimov, A.B. Kamenskii, and P.P. Petrukhintsev, see Paul Bushkovitch, "The Monarch and the State 
in 18th-Century Russia," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 
931-941. See also his Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671-1725 (Cambridge, 2001), 2-4. 
Also see John LeDonne, Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 
1700-1825 (New York, 1991); idem, "Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order 1689-1825," 
Cahiers du monde russe et sovetique 28, no. 3-4 (July-December 1987): 233-322. For a classic analysis 
of Catherinian politics through the prism of clan competition, see David L. Ransel, The Politics of 
Catherinian Russia: The Panin Party, (New Haven and London, 1975). On the crisis of 1730 
specifically, see Kivelson, “Kinship Politics / Autocratic Politics.”  
6 For a study that focuses on the rank-and-file nobility, as opposed to the great clans at the 
court, see Valerie A. Kivelson, Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political 
Culture in the Seventeenth Century (Stanford, 1996). For recent attempts to study the eighteenth-
century rank-and-file nobility on the basis of large volumes of service records, see  I. V. Faizova, 
"Manifest o vol’nosti" i sluzhba dvor’anstva v XVIII stoletii (Moscow , 1999); G.V. Kalashnikov, 
“Ofitserskii korpus russkoi armii v 1725-45 gg.” Candidate of Science Diss., St.Petersburg, 1999.  
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represent any sort of corporate political platform of the nobility? Was the elite / the 
nobility a force to be reckoned with? What was the relationship between the early 
modern Russian state and the elite in general, that is, was the elite a political actor at 
all, and was it able to somehow constrain the autocrat and autocracy?7  
*    *    * 
Indeed, the events of 1730 have long served as a “testing ground for theories 
about the political culture of the Russian nobility,” this crisis being an event 
“ambiguous enough to prove the validity of everyone’s favorite theories.”8  One 
problem with the vast majority of recent interpretations, though, is their exclusive 
focus on the crisis itself and on the dozen proposals produced in the early February of 
1730. It would be reasonable to suggest, however, that any theories regarding the 
political culture of the post-Petrine Russian nobility and the meaning of the crisis 
itself would be of somewhat limited validity, if the nature of the post-1730 regime is 
not also taken into account. It is  all the more relevant, since the reign of Empress 
                                                     
7 In a number of works competing aristocratic clans, bound by matrimonial ties, are portrayed 
as strong enough to effectively limit the monarch’s power. It might be, indeed, the case that, as Donald 
Ostrowski puts it, "within the upper echelons, members of the ruling class exchanged some of the 
power they acquired as a result of their patronage networks with the ruler for the authority of that ruler 
to maintain those same patronage networks." Donald Ostrowski, "The Facade of Legitimacy: Exchange 
of Power and Authority in Early Modern Russia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 3 
(July 2002): 562. Ostrowski refers, in particular, to recent works questioning the reality of “absolutism” 
in Western Europe. In the Russian case, however, historians have yet to demonstrate that these 
patronage networks went beyond the court circles and central bureaucracy. In particular, there is no 
evidence so far that these great clans had any independent power base in the provinces, as was the case 
in France and elsewhere. This approach becomes especially problematic when it is extended to assert 
also that these patronage networks resulted in “traditional informal restraints between both the monarch 
and nobility.” Ostrowski, “The Facade of Legitimacy,” 562. See also Edward L. Keenan, "Muscovite 
Political Folkways," Russian Review 45 (1986). See, in particular, Nancy Shields Kollmann, By Honor 
Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca, NY, 1999); idem, Kinship and Politics: The 
Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547 (Stanford, 1987); For a sharp and, perhaps, too 
radical critique of this trend see Richard Hellie, “Thoughts on the Absence of Elite Resistance in 
Muscovy,” in The Resistance Debate in Russian and Soviet History, eds. Michael David-Fox, Marshall 
Poe, and Peter Holquist. (Bloomington, IN, 2003), 15-36. Hellie goes as far as to remind the readers 
Chekhov’s saying to the effect that “Russia isn’t England, you know.” He argues that “the elite was 
created by and exusted for the state, not the other way around.” For a recent treament of the early-
modern Russian elite as a “ruling class,” see John P. LeDonne, "The Ruling Class: Tsarist Russia as the 
Perfect Model,” International Social Science Journal 136 (May 1993): 285-300.  
 
8 Kivelson, “Kinship Politics / Autocratic Politics,” 7. 
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Anna (1730-1740) is generally viewed as the first stage of gradual “demobilization” 
of the elite, exhausted by the Petrine revolution. The overall history of the Russian 
elite in the eighteenth century is presented, probably correctly, as a story of the 
“emancipation of the nobility,” which would eventually lead to the transformation of 
Petrine servitors into a refined nobility of the classical Imperial age and to the 
emergence of “society” increasingly distinguishable from the state. Indeed, despite 
considerable repressions against the aristocratic clans implicated in the attempt of 
1730, Anna’s government limited the term of obligatory noble service to 25 years; 
abolished the widely resented (and widely circumvented) “law of single inheritance”; 
and established in 1731 the Noble Cadet Corps – a school that gave young nobles an 
opportunity to get an appropriate education and to avoid starting their service as 
privates in the regiments, rubbing shoulders with their own former serfs. However, the 
meaning of these reforms and the government’s intent in implementing them has 
never been studied in any detail.9 
 This dissertation focuses on one of these measures, the establishment of the 
Noble Cadet Corps. In doing so it seeks to illuminate the relationship between the 
                                                     
9 Overall, a modern author only slightly exaggerates when stating that to enter this period is to 
“stumble into a historiographical black hole.” Simon Dixon, The Modernization of Russia, 1676-1825 
(Cambridge, 1999), 25. The existing historiography of the period is analyzed in considerable detail in 
recent works by A.B. Kamenskii and P.P. Petrukhintsev, so a title-by-title discussion of works by pre-
revolutionary and Soviet historians would be redundant. A.B. Kamenskii, Ot Petra I k Pavlu I. Reformy 
v Rossii XVIII v.: opyt tselostnogo analiza (Moscow, 1999); Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie, 5-28. For the 
first systematic overview of the 1730s-1750s as a period, since Soloviev in the nineteenth century, see 
E.V. Anisimov, Rossia bez Petra, 1725-1740 (St.Petersburg, 1994), 289-290, 356. On individual 
aspects of Anna’s policies see also, besides Petrukhintsev’s book, older, but still useful works: A.K. 
Baiov, Russkaia armiia v tsarstvovaniie imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny: Voina Rossii s Turtsiei v 1736-
1739 gg. 2 vols. (St.Petersburg, 1906); B.N. Bondarenko, Ocherki finansovoi politiki kabineta 
ministrov Anny Ioannovny (Moscow, 1913); V.N. Stroev, Bironovshchina i Kabinet ministrov (Ocherki 
vnutrennei politiki imperatritsy Anny) (Moscow, 1909); B.B. Titlinov, Pravitel'stvo imperatritsy Anny 
Ioannovny v ego otnosheniakh k delam pravoslavnoi tserkvi (Vil’na, 1905). On the composition of the 
elite see Brenda Meehan-Waters, Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite of 1730 
(Brunswick, NJ, 1982); Kurukin, Epokha, 183-202. The best study so far of the Cadet Corps as an 
institution is still P. Luzanov, Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus (nyne 1-I kadetskii korpus) pri grafe 
Minikhe (St.Petersburg, 1907). For a recent overview, see Vladimir Danchenko and Gleb Kalashnikov, 
Kadetskii korpus. Shkola russkoi voennoi elity (Moscow, 2007). A number of documents from the 
Corps’ archive has been published in K.V. Tatarnikov, E.I. Iurkevich, Sukhoputnyi shliakhetnyi 
kadetskii korpus. 1732-1762. Obmundirovanie i snariazhenie (Moscow, 2009). 
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state and the elite in the 1730s and, by extension, the nature of the post-Petrine 
political regime in general. Indeed, the need for some educational arrangements of 
that sort was mentioned in the proposals of 1730, as was the demand to “relieve the 
nobility from service in low and degrading ranks.” Does it mean, then, that even as it 
repressed the Dolgorukovs and the Golitsyns, the government of Anna felt a need to 
placate the nobility at large by, essentially, conceding to the demands presented in 
1730? Throughout much of the eighteenth century the elite staged coups, exercising 
its power, borrowing the memorable phrase, to “limit the autocracy by strangulation.” 
Its ability to retain residual influence over autocratic policy-making, once the coup 
was over, is less than obvious. Thus, the issue at stake here is the validity of the two 
competing models of autocracy, one of which presents it as more or less “absolute,” 
while the other portrays the elite as able to “restrain” the autocracy.10  
There exist no studies addressing either the motives of the government in 
establishing the Cadet Corps, or the reaction of the nobility to this measure. Typically 
uncertain in this respect is Marc Raeff. According to him, “the crisis ended with 
Anne’s resumption of absolute and unlimited autocratic powers,” and her reign was 
“quite tyrannical and arbitrary.” Yet, somehow, at the same time, “in the long run, 
members of the nobility were given a measure of satisfaction of their aspirations,” 
those aspirations including “more opportunities for the education of their children” 
and liberalization of rules of service.”11 Valerie A. Kivelson in her influential recent 
                                                     
10 Attempts to present the Russian autocracy as “restrained” by the elites get their inspiration, 
it seems, from the revisionist analysis of absolutism in Western Europe. For a review of the latest 
developments on this front, though, see William Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social 
Collaboration," Past and Present, no. 188 (August 2005): 195-224. To a significant extent, this new 
paradigm of studying eighteenth-century Russian politics grew also out of an old and established 
tradition of prosopographic study of the pre-Petrine elite. For an overview, see Robert O. Crummey, 
“The Latest From Muscovy,” The Russian Review 60 (October 2001): 474-486. 
11 “Introduction to Plans for Political Reforms in Imperial Russia, 1730-1905,” in Marc Raeff, 
Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia (Boulder, CO, 1994), 101. In his classic work on the 
eighteenth-century elite Raeff mentions briefly that the establishment of the Cadet Corps was a 
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account asserts that by establishing the Cadet Corps Anna “conspicuously 
demonstrated that she listened attentively to the voice of ‘all the land’,” i.e. fulfilled 
the demand of the nobility.12   
This interpretation begs for some further explanation, however, for did not 
Peter himself, only few years earlier, have to actually force the nobles to study? Why, 
then, in 1731 does the right to study suddenly become a concession to the nobility? In 
this dissertation I argue instead that Anna’s government, and specifically such leading 
ministers as Field-Marshal B. C. von Münnich and Vice-Chancellor A.I. Ostermann, 
pursued a coherent policy of social engineering with the  goal of moral reformation of 
the elite and creation of a “true nobility.” I maintain that in the 1730s Russia saw the 
arrival of assumptions and practices associated with the “disciplinary revolution” 
unfolding at that time in Western Europe.13 The central element of this revolution 
was, to borrow a definition from a modern scholar, “a shift from external coercion to 
self discipline as mechanisms for regulating social behavior,” which was “critical to 
                                                                                                                                                        
“response to the need for giving privileged service status to the nobility.” Marc Raeff, Origins of the 
Russia Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York, 1966), 68.      
 
12 Kivelson, “Kinship Politics / Autocratic Politics,” 25-26. For a fuller discussion of recent 
interpretations of Anna’s policies towards the nobility, see the introduction to Part II of this 
dissertation. 
 
13 On social disciplining see, most famously, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison (New York, 1975; reprint, New York, 1995). My understanding of the early-modern 
disciplinary revolution is also shaped by Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Moden State 
(Cambridge, 1982; 2008); Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change 
through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven, 1983); idem, "Transfiguration and 
Modernization: The Paradoxes of Social Disciplining, Paedagogical Leadership, and the Enlightenment 
in the eighteenth Century Russia," in Marc Raeff, Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia 
(Boulder, CO, 1994): 334-347; R. Po-Chia Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 
1550-1750 (London, 1989); and Philip S. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise 
of the State in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 2003). Victor Zhivov’s article on disciplinry revolution 
in Russia, which also uses Gorski’s books as a reference point, appeared too late to be considered in 
this dissertation. See Victor Zhivov, “Disciplinarnaia revolutsiia i bor’ba s sueveriem v Rossii XVIII 
v.: ‘provaly’ i ikh posledstviia,” in Atropologiia revolutsii (Moscow, 2009), 327-360. See also a forum 
on Foucault in Russia in Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie 49 (2001). My understanding of early-modern 
notions of rulership and human nature is influenced decisively by Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: 
Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789 (Ann Arbor, 
1996).  
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the development of modernity in the West.”14 This shift meant a vast expansion of the 
state’s ambition – expansion not so much in the breadth of its functions (although in 
that too, necessarily so), but in its understanding of the depth of obedience to be 
expected from its subjects. Such measures as the creation of the Cadet Corps and the 
reform of the noble service in 1736-1737 should be viewed in light of these changing 
notions of governing. Rather than a “concession” to the elite, these measures 
represented an attempt to use modern techniques of social disciplining for the creation 
of a “true nobility.”  
This assertion questions the conventional history of the relationship between 
the state and the elite in eighteenth-century Russia as that of a gradual “emancipation” 
of the nobility, which was allegedly wresting, little by little, its rights and privileges 
from the hands of weak monarchs. There is simply no evidence whatsoever that the 
need to take into account the demands and desires of the nobility ever entered the 
policy-makers’s minds. This assertion also serves to refine the extremely broad 
picture of the arrival of the “well-ordered police state” in Russia presented in Marc 
Raeff’s eponymous work by positing a sharp divide between Peter and his successors 
in terms of their “governmentality.” Peter, in particular, is presented here as an 
essentially seventeenth-century ruler in terms of his understanding of governing. 
*    *    * 
The second major theme of this dissertation is the mechanism of societal and 
cultural change. The fate of the Petrine project – both cultural Westernization15 and 
                                                     
14 James Van Horn Melton, Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory 
Schooling in Prussia and Austria (Cambridge, 1988): xx. 
 
15 Westernization is clearly a very imprecise term. Its meaning, in a way, is self-evident: the 
term broadly invokes the idea of “making Russia more like the Western Europe” and refers to the 
borrowing of European institutions, technologies, cultural and social norms and practices by Peter, his 
successors and, it becomes increasingly clear, his predecessors. I am aware that the use of the term is 
problematic. To begin with, there was no single homogenous West from which to borrow in the early 
eighteenth century. Rather, there was a number of “Wests,” that is, competing social, political, and 
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institutional restructuring – was major concern for historians since the emperor’s 
death. As Sergei Soloviev put it in the nineteenth century, “Now the reformer was in 
his grave, so the time came to test how stable the order established by him was.”16 
Peter himself was not entirely sure if his project would outlive him; neither was its 
survival obvious for the contemporaries, including foreign ambassadors, who 
speculated about the possibility of Russia’s return to her old ways. Historians argued 
whether there had been any revision of Peter’s reforms after his death, and if yes, how 
one is to assess this revision.17 While some, including Soloviev himself, believed that 
Petrine innovations had indeed been corrupted by the emperor’s unworthy and weak 
successors, others, beginning with liberal historian and politician P.N. Miliukov, 
maintained that whatever revision actually took place was limited, required by 
Russia’s circumstances, and, perhaps, even beneficial.18 Today the consensus picture 
                                                                                                                                                        
cultural models. Another question is whether indeed Petrine borrowings meant “Westernizing” Russia, 
or the imported norms and institutions were twisted and adapted, while the essence of the “Russian 
model,” whatever it might be, remained the same. A related question is whether the borrowing of social 
and cultural practices by the elite lead to internalization of some, or any, “Western” values. All of these 
issues are important, and this dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of some of them. At 
the same time, I reserve a right here to use this term, despite all its imperfections, as a way of referring 
to institutions and practices introduced by Peter and sufficiently novel and alien for the contemporaries 
to entail radical and stressful changes in their patterns of life; to avoid further terminological disputes 
Westernization might as well be called “Petrinization.” For a classic discussion of “Westernization,” 
see Arcadius Kahan, “The Costs of Westernization in Russia: The Gentry and the Economy in 
Eighteenth-Century Russia,” Slavic Review 25, no.1 (March 1966).  
 
16 S.M. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen. Kniga X (Moscow, 1993), 538-539. 
 
17 To some extent, these debates can often be traced back directly to the propaganda 
campaigns launched by the mid-eighteenth century rulers against their predecessors, notably by 
Empress Elizabeth against the ministers Empress Anna and her short-reigning heir, and by Catherine II 
– against Peter III. Having occupied the throne as a result of a coup, these sovereigns felt a need to 
legitimize their actions by delegitimizing those of previous rulers. The traditional way to do it was to 
claim to be the “true heirs” of the first emperor and to be putting Russia back on the Petrine course. 
The previous ruler was, thus, implicitly presented as a dangerous revisionist. On competition for the 
mantle of Peter’s true heir, see N. Riazanovsky, The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and 
Thought (Oxford, 1985), 23 passim; E. Shmurlo, Petr Velikii v otsenke sovremennikov i potomstva. 
Vol. 1.(St.Peterburg, 1912), 31 passim; Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony 
in Russian Monarchy From Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 40 passim. 
 
18 P.N. Miliukov, Gosudarstvennoe khoz'aistvo v Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII v. i reforma 
Petra Velikogo (St.Petersburg, 1892). 
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seems to be that of extremely pragmatic, and even opportunistic, government. 
According to N.N. Petrukhintsev, policymakers of Anna’s reign intended to “bring 
Peter’s domestic program to completion.” Yet their actions were determined by the 
severity of fiscal constraints produced by the overextension of Petrine years.19  
If one argues, however, as I do, that the government of Anna pursued a coherent 
policy of social engineering, then the question regarding the moving forces behind 
this policy emerges. One problem with the works focusing on competition between 
rival aristocratic clans / patronage networks is that they leave out the conceptual 
dimension of eighteenth-century politics. Indeed, if elite politics were solely about the 
struggle for opportunities to exercise patronage, the only way to explain purposeful, 
ideologically driven change is to have a strong monarch acting as a deus ex machina. 
In the absence of such a monarch, as was the case in the 1730s,20 the ability of the 
government to pursue such a policy is harder to explain. 
In this dissertation I propose to bring ideas back as one of the important factors 
in eighteenth-century politics. In their actions the leading dignitaries were in a very 
real sense motivated by their understanding of a proper government and way of 
governing, by their ideas regarding the need for a moral reform of the elite, etc. I do 
not attempt, however, to impose undue coherence on these notions. Most importantly, 
I do not attempt to exclude court politics from consideration. On the contrary, I view 
                                                     
19 Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie, 66.  
20 The actual degree of Anna’s involvement in policymaking is yet to be investigated 
seriously. Our traditional picture of her is shaped by the overall perception of the years from 1725 to 
1762 as lacking any long-lasting significance, and as a mere interregnum thwarted by the cataclysmic 
transformation of the Petrine era and the imperial grandeur of Catherine’s reign. To a large extent, this 
“era of palace revolutions” was defined traditionally by its political instability, i.e. brevity of reigns and 
unpredictability of succession, while the ruling monarchs were perceived as weak and incompetent, 
either because they were women, or children, or “unbalanced,” or because their reigns (and lives) had 
been cut short by coups. The two existing semi-popular biographies of Anna go some distance towards 
questioning this picture, but do not provide any definitive answer. E.V. Anisimov, Anna Ioannovna 
(Moscow, 2002); Mina Kirstein Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress: Anna Ivanovna and Her Era, 1730-
1740 (New York, 1974). Anna seems to have been by far not as aloof and incompetent as traditionally 
portrayed; nor was she, however, comparable in her role in government to Catherine II and Peter I.    
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court politics as an important moving force behind cultural change. In practice the 
shift to the new notion of governing took the form of discreet policy measures. Each 
of them was, simultaneously, both an ideological project and a move made by a 
specific dignitary in the turf war of court politics. Ideas and policies were formulated 
within the context of power struggle; their implementation (establishment of the Cadet 
Corps, for example) was also a way of expanding one’s sphere of authority.    
This dissertation is not limited, however, to the domain of court politics and 
Imperial decision-making. Although the attempt to discipline the nobility in the 1730s 
was, most unequivocally a “revolution from above,” whatever success it enjoyed was 
due to voluntary participation of certain strata of the elite. I am skeptical, though, of 
the traditional picture of gradual “awakening” of mentalité de noblesse Russe - 
mentalité that appears to be presented as somehow immanent to the elite. In my 
analysis I show that the participation of the wider nobility in the Cadet Corps was 
driven not necessarily by noble sentiment or by any sort of ideological commitment to 
the cause of Westernization, but rather by extremely pragmatic and mundane 
concerns, incentives, and availability of resources. It was this interplay of competing 
agendas pursued by competing, adapting, and maneuvering individuals that drove the 
Westernization project forward.   
*      *     * 
I would also point out a number of other ways in which this dissertation 
contributes to our understanding of Russia’s eighteenth century. In the narrow sense, 
this is a study of the Noble Cadet Corps as an educational institution filling a gap in 
the historiography of early eighteenth-century Russian education. This school 
occupied a central place in Russian cultural life of the 1740s-1750s as the home to 
groundbreaking theatrical and literary activities. Its graduates included such leading 
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authors of the day as Aleksandr Sumarokov and Mikhail Kheraskov, not to mention 
dozens of lesser writers, translators, and educators. A study of the cultural 
environment at this institution would enhance our understanding of their ideas and 
works, especially as these writings, for lack of other sources, are often used as a 
window into the thinking of the mid-eighteenth century elite in general.21 In the late 
1750s the Corps was also notable for its connections to the court of Grand Duke Peter 
(Peter III) and to the “Panin party,” and so this study illuminates the origins of ideas 
shared, and policies advocated, by these groups22 (and indirectly, half a century later, 
by the future emperor Paul I). It also contributes to the history of morals and 
vospitanie in Russia: works on these topics tend to jump from Peter’s Mirror of the 
Honorable Youth straight to Catherine II and I. I. Betskoi.23 Speaking of Catherine, 
this dissertation provides an important antecedent to her educational reforms and 
experiments in social engineering. Finally, by illuminating the role of the elite in the 
post-Petrine period, I am hoping to contribute, if only indirectly, to our understanding 
of post-revolutionary normalization in general.     
 
Sources and Structure  
                                                     
21 Most recently, Cynthia H. Whittaker, Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Rulers and 
Writers in Political Dialogue (DeKalb, IL, 2003); Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, The Play of Ideas in 
Russian Enlightenment Theater (DeKalb, IL, 2003). 
 
22 See Ransell, The Politics. On Peter III and his reforms see, in particular N.L. Rubinshtein, 
“Ulozhennaia komissiia 1754-1766 gg. i ee proekt novogo Ulozheniia ‘O sostoianii poddanykh 
voobshche’,” Istoricheskie zapiski 38 (1951): 208-251; Marc Raeff, "The Domestic Policies of Peter III 
and His Overthrow," American Historical Review 75 (June 1970): 1289-1310; A.S. Myl'nikov, 
Iskuchenie chudom: "Russkii printz," ego prototypy i dvoiniki-samozvantsy (Leningrad, 1991); Carol S. 
Leonard, Reform and Regicide: The Reign of Peter III of Russia (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993); 
Kamenskii, Ot Petra, 272-274, 305-314. 
23 Catriona Kelly, Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from 
Catherine to Yeltsin (Oxford, 2001); Anna K. Kuxhausen, “Raising the Nation: Medicine, Morality, 
and Vospitanie in Eighteenth Century Russia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2006).  
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This dissertation is based primarily on the documents from the archive of the 
Noble Cadet Corps preserved at the Russian State Archive of Military History 
(RGVIA) in Moscow. The Corps is the earliest Russian school whose institutional 
archive survived intact. The data that I was able to mine there could be divided into 
two categories. On the one hand, there are sources that describe the policies pursued 
by the state and pedagogical techniques employed by the teachers at the Corps. These 
include various orders from the government, internal regulations, examination 
records, records of investigations into various transgressions, etc. On the other hand 
there are records that describe the family background of incoming cadets. These are 
supplemented by the records of the Heraldry, a government bureau established by 
Peter I and charged with keeping track of nobles and their service records – 
essentially, a personnel department of the Empire. Given the virtual absence – 
predictable, but still regrettable – of narrative sources left by the nobles of this period 
(such as letters, diaries, etc), I used these records to reconstruct, as far as possible, the 
reaction of the nobility to the educational policies pursued by the state.  
I also consulted the papers of the Senate, of Anna’s Cabinet of Ministers, and 
of the key personalities of Anna’s reign, including her favorite, Ernst Biron, and 
Field-Marshal Burchard Christoph von Münnich. (I by no means claim to have 
exhausted the latter’s volumnous records. Further study of papers related to his 
activities as the head of artillery and, especially, of the Military College, would, 
undoubtedly, provide futher insights into his activities related to education.) Naturally, 
I employ the full arsenal of standard sources available to a student of eighteenth-
century Russia, including the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire 
(PSZ), the records of the Supreme Privy Council and of the Cabinet of Ministers 
published before the 1917 revolution by the Russian Historical Society (in Sbornik 
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Imeratorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, Publications of the Imperial 
Russian Historical Society), and the published works of early eighteenth-century 
intellectuals, including F.S. Saltykov, V.N. Tatishchev, Feofan Propkopovich, and 
Prince Antiokh Kantemir. I made a conscious decision not to touch in this dissertation 
upon the literary works produced by the Corps’ graduates, especially the poems. 
These have been analyzed extensively by the students of eighteenth-century literature, 
and they should be properly discussed within the framework of the literary process.24  
This dissertation is organized thematically. In Part I, I attempt to put the 
foundation of the Noble Cadet Corps into its proper context. I present an outline of the 
relevant intellectual trends in contemporary Western Europe and of recent educational 
innovations, against whose backdrop Peter’s policies should be considered. I argue 
that this Western European context was defined by the unfolding “disciplinary 
revolution” based on changing notions of human nature, ability, merit, and morality. 
In my discussion of Peter’s educational policies I attempt to demonstrate that lacking 
these notions he was, essentially, a seventeenth-century ruler in his understanding of 
human nature and, consequently, in his methods of effecting a transformation of 
Russia. I also discuss the educational writings produced by Peter’s younger 
contemporaries in the 1720s-1730s. I argue that thanks to the growing familiarity with 
European theories, the need for a moral reformation of the nobility and creation of 
“true nobles” in Russia occupied an increasingly prominent place in their thinking.  
In Part II, I study the Cadet Corps as an institution. I present the foundation of 
the Cadet Corps as a result of a complex interplay of the court politics of 1730-1732 
taking place against the backdrop of broader cultural change, outlined earlier. In the 
next three chapters I focus on educational practices employed at the Cadet Corps. I 
                                                     
24 See, most recently, Elena Pogosian, Vostorg russkoi ody i reshenie temy poeta v russkom 
panegirike 1730-1762 gg. (Tartu, 1997). 
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argue that these practices reflected a determined attempt to reproduce at the Corps the 
latest educational methods borrowed directly from the Berlin Cadet Corps and, less 
directly, from August Hermann Francke’s Pietist schools in Halle. As such, these 
practices carried within them notions of human nature, which were both radically 
different from those that informed Peter’s policies and, if accepted, had significant 
social implications. Having identified these notions, I attempt to trace their influence 
on other policy measures implemented by Anna’s government, notably the reform of 
noble service in 1736-1737.  
In Part III, I discuss the reaction of the nobility to these measures. I 
demonstrate that the system of noble service in the 1730s, while demanding and rigid 
in theory, in practice allowed the nobles a de-facto freedom of choosing whether to 
study or not. Thus, the decision to enter the Corps could be interpreted as such – as a 
decision reflecting the circumstances and strategies of individual families. I go on to 
analyze the family backgrounds of incoming cadets to determine which strata of the 
nobility accepted the new opportunities offered to them and which did not, and to 
attempt to reconstruct the reasons behind these decisions. Finally, in the Epilogue I 
outline the relevant developments outside the Corps in the 1740s-1750s, including the 
creation of the Naval Cadet Corps and the Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps, to 
demonstrate how the ideas and practices introduced in the 1730s were employed and 
adjusted in subsequent decades. 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
“They Grow Up Like a Wild Forest”: 
The State, the Nobility, and Education, 1700-1730 
In May 1714, while celebrating in St.Petersburg the launch of a new warship, 
Peter I addressed a group of “his old Russians,” reports Friedrich Christian Weber, 
Hannoverian envoy to Russia. These “old” Russians were being reproved by the tsar 
for “not following the example of other Russian ministers and generals, and [for not 
taking] encouragement from their experience,” gained by the latter thanks to Peter’s 
reforms. So the tsar urged his stubborn subjects to consider the beneficial 
transformation undergone by their country in recent years:  
Brethren, who is that man among you, who thirty years ago could have had only 
the thought of being employed with me in ship carpenter’s work here in the 
Baltic; of coming hither in a German dress to settle these countries conquered 
by our fatigues and bravery; of living to see so many brave and victorious 
soldiers and seamen sprung from Russian blood; to see our sons coming home 
able men from foreign countries; to see so many outlandish artificers and 
handicraft men settling in our dominions, and to see the remotest potentates 
express so great an esteem for us?25  
Indeed, so successful had Russia been, according to Peter, in adopting foreign 
arts and sciences and putting them to good use that she was now playing a key role in 
a global (i.e., European) process of what he called the “transmigration of sciences.”26 
                                                     
25 Friedrich Christian Weber, The Present State of Russia, 2 vols. (London, 1722-1723; 
reprint, 1968). Vol. I, 15. Original version of Weber’s memoir on “Russia Transformed” was published 
in 1720 as Das Veranderte Russland, in welcheim die jetzige Verfassung des Geist-und Weltlichen 
Regiments…  (Frankfurt, 1720). The second and third volumes of the German version covering he last 
years of Peter’s reign, his death, and the subsequent events came out in 1738 and 1740. On Weber see: 
A.G. Brinkner, "Hr.-Fr. Veber: Materialy dlia istochnikovedenia istorii Petra Velikogo." Zhurnal 
Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshchenia 213 (2) (January 1881): 46-78; Iu.N. Bespiatykh (ed.), 
Peterburg Petra I v inostrannykh opisaniiakh (Leningrad, 1991), 16-21. 
 
26 This episode became widely known in Russia, and the “Petrine prophecy” played an 
important role in the eighteenth-century ideological constructions. See A.L. Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo 
orla… Russkaia literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v poslednei treti XVIII – pervoi treti XIX veka 
(Moscow, 2004), 95-122. Prince Kantemir uses it in his counterpropaganda efforts already in the 
17 
 
Historians, Peter theorized, believe that Greece had been the “ancient seat of all 
sciences, from whence being expelled by the fatality of the times, they spread in Italy, 
and afterwards dispersed themselves all over Europe.” The last ones to adopt “the arts, 
sciences, and improvements” were the Germans and the “Polanders.” As for Russia, 
due to the “perverseness of our ancestors,” sciences and improvements were 
“hindered from penetrating” this realm. Now, however, things were to change: “You 
may happen even in our lifetime to put other civilized nations to the blush, and to 
carry the glory of the Russian name to the highest pitch,” Peter observed to his 
subjects. He explained: 
I can compare this transmigration of sciences with nothing better than the 
circulation of the blood in the human body, and my mind almost gives me 
[that] they will some time or other quit their abode in England, France, and 
Germany, and come to settle for some centuries among us, and perhaps 
afterwards return again to their original home into Greece.27 
Indeed, for Peter it was by finally joining this “transmigration of sciences” that 
Russia was to assume a meaningful role in the flow of global history. Thus, this 
transmigration was the essence of his reign. What matters for the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, is Peter’s understanding of why and how exactly nations adopt 
“arts, sciences, and improvements.” Unsurprisingly, Peter believed that the key to the 
enlightenment of nations was the actions of well-meaning and persistent governments: 
the Poles and the Germans, allegedly, “formerly groped in the same darkness in which 
we have lived hitherto, but the indefatigable care of their governors opened their eyes 
at length.” What were his Russian subjects to do in this case? Here the advice offered 
by Weber’s Peter seems contradictory. On the one hand, the tsar invited his subjects 
simply to “practice the Latin saying ora et labora”: to him, “pray and work,” 
                                                                                                                                                        
1730s. “Tak nazyvamye ‘Mosovitskie pi’ma’,” in Rossiia i Zapad: Gorizonty vzaimopoznaniia. 
Literaturnye istocgniki XVIII veka (1726-1762). Vypusk 2. (Moscow, 2003), 158. 
 
27 Weber, The Present State, 15-16. 
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persistence and passive submission were enough. On the other, although “blind 
obedience” currently displayed by his subjects was important, Peter hoped that they 
would “seriously second” his designs: that is, add to their blind obedience “voluntary 
knowledge,” and “apply” themselves “to the enquiry of good and evil.”28  
These are, I would argue, two radically different approaches to cultural 
transformation, to the relationship between the state and its subjects, and to the 
meaning and purpose of power. The former, as Max Okenfuss has pointed out, is 
essentially pre-modern, for within the “ora et labora” framework desired 
transformation was a matter not of “continuous and continuing change and 
improvement” of human nature, but rather, of mere acceptance.29 The latter, it seems 
to me, smacks of modernity; for it implies a far more ambitious agenda on the part of 
the state. If “voluntary knowledge,” to borrow Weber’s phrase, is required, then the 
state aims to regulate not only the outward behavior of individuals, but also their will, 
their desires and values. It wants them not simply to obey, but to want to obey, i.e. to 
internalize prescribed values. As Joseph Michel Antoine Servan, an eighteenth-
century French reformer of morals and society, would put it half a century later “A 
stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains, but a true politician binds 
them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas; it is at the stable point of 
reason that he secures the end of the chain.”30  
                                                     
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Max Okenfuss, "From School Class to Social Caste," History of Education Quarterly 17, 
no. 4 (Winter 1977): 336. 
 
30 J.M. Servan, Discourse sur l’administration de la justice criminelle (1767) as quoted in  
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 102-103.  By the 1770s this idea 
becomes really a commonplace: in his book James Van Horn Melton supplies a long line of quotes 
from the Prussian and Habsburg cameralists to the same effect. To give just on example, Johann 
Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, the cameralist, wrote that “Enlightened Subjects are obedient because they 
wish to be, subjects blinded by prejudice because they are forced. A domesticated lion fondles his 
master, while a lion in fetters constantly seeks to break out of his chains. The lion in bondage will 
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This episode recited by Weber may well be apocryphal: we have no other 
evidence that Peter ever made such a speech, or that he said exactly what Weber 
reports he did. Overall, the actual wording in Weber’s rendering of the emperor’s 
speech probably says more about his own sensibilities than about Peter’s.31 
Nevertheless, the distinction between these two approaches is crucial for our 
understanding of Petrine and post-Petrine Russia. In the following pages I will argue 
that, lacking a concept of moral improvement and not conceptualizing the ethical as 
an element of relations of power, Peter was essentially missing out on a “disciplinary 
revolution” that unfolded in Western Europe in the late seventeenth – early eighteenth 
century and defined the essence of the ongoing transformation of the state. 
The central theme of Part I (chapters 1-5) of my dissertation is, thus, the 
emergence of a modern notion of social disciplining in early eighteenth-century 
Russia. In the following chapters I attempt to put the foundation of the Noble Cadet 
Corps in 1731 into its proper intellectual context which, I would argue, was framed by 
changes of the ways in which the mechanisms of power and the workings of human 
nature were understood. In chapter 1, I present an outline of the key intellectual shifts 
and changes in the practices of governing that defined the “disciplinary revolution” in 
Western and Central Europe in the late seventeenth – early eighteenth century. In 
chapter 2, I discuss how these shifts and changes were expressed in the emergence in 
Europe of that period of formal, “disciplinary” education. I place special emphasis on 
the development of institutionalized education in Prussia, which is important both as 
                                                                                                                                                        
eventually free himself of his fetters, and turn on his master in fury.” Melton, Absolutism and the 
Eighteenth-Century Origins, xxii.  
 
31 Four pages later, speaking this time in his own voice, Weber asserts that “as far as fear of 
government and blind obedience rather than wisdom of government can carry things, the Russians 
surpass all other nations.”  Weber, 20.  Similar statements on “blind obedience” of Russians are 
repeated elsewhere in the book. See, however, Weber’s contemporary, Englishman John Perry, who 
believed that the Russians are destined for “slavery” by their “Slavic soul.” Marshal Poe, “A People 
Born to Slavery”: Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1467-1748 (Ithaca, NY, 2000), 
192-193.   
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an extreme case of religion-driven disciplinary revolution, and as the key source of 
intellectual and institutional borrowing in early eighteenth-century Russia, including 
the idea of the cadet corps itself. In chapter 3, I analyze through this lens Petrine 
educational and social policies. I argue that the key feature of these policies was the 
tsar’s inability to perceive education as an instrument of social, much less of moral, 
transformation. In Chapter 4, I present an overview of educational writings of Peter’s 
younger Russian contemporaries, focusing on the way in which they appropriated, 
discussed, and used contemporary discourses and practices related to human nature, 
education, and morals. Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss in this context the creation of 
the Noble Cadet Corps itself. I show that far from being a concession granted by the 
state to the nobility as a result of the 1730 crisis, it in fact reflected the consensus 
among the key members of the ruling elite regarding the need to discipline and reform 
the nobility (and society) much more thoroughly than was done by Peter.    
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
The Soul of the Machine: Human Nature, Society,  
and the State in Early Modern Europe 
According to a standard version, implicit in a great majority of accounts, in 
refashioning the administrative machinery of his realm Peter was acting within the 
framework of progressive rationalization (“mechanization”) of political thinking - 
rationalization based on Cartesian philosophy and Lockean and Puffendorfian notions 
of the state. In particular, his “practical mind” was attracted by a secular concept of 
the state born in Europe out of the ravages of religious wars.32 Thus, according to 
Evgenii Anisimov, the leading authority on Peter, the emperor’s practices reflected 
the influence of the “epoch of rationalism of the European seventeenth century,” as 
embodied by “Bacon, Spinoza, Locke, Gassendi, Hobbes, Leibnitz.” The essence of 
this rationalism was the belief that the state, rather than being “immutable and God-
given,” was, in fact, a man-made institution, something akin to a machine:  
In an appraisal of social phenomena and institutions, mechanisms held sway – 
more precisely, mechanical determinism. The outstanding success of 
mathematics and natural sciences created the illusion that one might treat life in 
all its manifestations as a mechanical process. With equal ardor such an 
approach was applied to physiology, psychology, society, and the state, for, 
according to Descartes’s teaching on universal mathematics (mathesis 
universalis), all sciences were seen as another form of mathematics, which 
appeared to be especially important then as the only certain knowledge shorn of 
mysticism.33  
                                                     
32 To give an example of a false dichotomy between “modern” and “religious,” an author of a 
section of the Cambridge History of Russia writes that “although” Shafirov “explained Russia’s 
conduct in the [Northern] war as consistent with contemporary European thinking on international law 
and sovereignty, citing text from Grotius and Pufendorf. Yet (sic!) Shafirov also quoted Biblical texts in 
support of Peter’s conduct.” Similarly, “although Tatishchev has most often been read as a secularist 
thinker, he demanded that the tsar pay attention to close advisors lest dismissing their wisdom provoke 
divine punishment.” Gary M. Hamburg, "Russian Political Thought: 1700-1917."  In The Cambridge 
History of Russia. Vol. II, Imperial Russia, 1689-1917 (Cambridge, 2006), 117-118. 
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Hence Peter’s rational, “regulated” state.  
Indeed, in his classic study James E. King emphasizes the influence of 
contemporary “scientific” and mathematical thinking on European (French, that is) 
political theory and practice of the mid-seventeenth century. It was believed, 
according to King, that “the answer to all problems lay somewhere revealed in the 
bosom of reason and number,” while the sovereign authority was “both the product of 
reason and its instrument.” This belief in reason made the problem of governability 
irrelevant. According to Richelieu, “man having been created reasonable, ought to do 
nothing except by reason, since otherwise he would act against reason, and 
consequently, against himself who is the author of it.” A ruler who is being 
reasonable, and acts on basis of the reason of state, would be loved and obeyed by his 
subjects – because it is a reasonable thing for them to do.34 This reason-based theory 
of governing and governability went hand-in-hand with the rationalization of the state 
apparatus and, of course, with the staggering growth of the French military. The army 
grew – mostly under Louis XIV, but also under Richelieu – from peacetime strength 
of 10,000-20,000 in the early decades of the seventeenth century to about 150,000 
peacetime (and over 300,000 wartime) by the end of the century.35 This expansion 
was, allegedly, made possible by the new rational administration of the state – but at 
the same time, it also required introduction of the new, more impersonal, ways of 
governing. 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 E.V. Anisimov, The Refoms of Peter the Great: Progress Through Coercion in Russia 
(Armonk, 1993): 24-25. Anisimov’s interpretation of Peter, though, is driven to a significant extent by 
his not-so-subtle desire to draw a parallel between the reforming tsar and the Bolsheviks. 
 
34 James E. King, Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis XIV, 1661-1683 
(Baltimore, MD, 1948), 41-42, 49-50. 
 
35 John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge, 1997), 
57. 
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Yet, two caveats should be made here. First, the rationalization of contemporary 
European models of thinking and governing was never as absolute and unequivocal as 
implied in the traditional narrative of the progress of science. Peter, of course, knew 
and personally praised a number of contemporary philosophers, mostly German, and 
above all, Puffendorf, whose work he had translated into Russian and included in the 
program of studies for his son Aleksei.36 It is true that the Puffendorfian political 
theory is best understood within the context of Cartesian rationalization of analytical 
discourse and of the “post-Westfalian deconfessionalised sovereign territorial state.” 
This attempt to purge “moral theology from natural law” in order to justify removing 
the “levers of civil coercion from the hands of the clergy” justified, conveniently for 
Peter, the autonomy of the secular state.37 But to reduce Puffendof’s political theory – 
and late seventeenth-early eighteenth century European thought in general – to the 
mechanization of the state would be a gross oversimplification. Fashioning by 
Puffendorf of a “persona for the citizen that would allow individuals to accede to their 
civil obligations independently of their Christian moral personality” did not mean the 
abolition of this “Christian moral personality” altogether, or a “wholesale 
secularization or instrumentalisation of all social spheres.”38 On the contrary, as Ian 
Hunter points out, “the civil philosophers sought to remove ‘true Christianity’ from 
political supervision by treating it in terms of the informulable and unenforceable 
                                                     
36 See Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven and London, 1998), 
95, 145, 324. 
 
37 Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern 
Germany (Cambridge, 2001), 148-154 and passim. In fact, Peter’s interest in such an approach might 
be explained not only by an opportunistic desire to legitimize his own autocratic tendencies. In his own 
youth the tsar had witnessed a wave of remarkable and bloody outbursts of sectarian strife in Russia. 
Hence, his aversion to the mixing of politics with “superstitions” was probably quite sincere. This point 
is made in A.M. Panchenko, "Nachalo Petrovskoi reformy: ideinaia podopleka," in XVIII vek. Sbornik 
16. Problemy izucheniia russkoi literatury XVIII veka (Leningrad, 1989), 5-16. 
 
38 Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 153. 
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faith of an ‘invisible church’.” Moreover, such contemporary European thinkers as 
Leibnitz and Wollf – who knew Peter personally, maintained correspondence with the 
tsar, and advised him on academic matters – vehemently rejected “civil philosophy’s 
uncoupling of the spheres of civil and spiritual governance” and the alleged 
“indifference of sovereign power to moral truth.”39 The need to employ the state as an 
instrument for pursuing morally (religiously) motivated policies was never discarded, 
of course, by the early-modern authors, while the importance for the governability of 
the state of maintaining the internalized civic-cum-religious sense of duty toward it 
among the population was recognized as paramount.  
In fact, much of what we today associate with the modern state, that is, nearly 
all the techniques of social disciplining – especially, in the crucially important field of 
indoctrination through education – were invented and perfected by religious 
confessions. Driven partially by the new understanding of religiosity, partially by the 
need to adapt to realities of post-Augsburg Europe, Lutherans, Calvinists, and 
Tridentine Catholics engaged in ferocious competition for souls, designing in the 
process ever more sophisticated tools for manipulating minds through education, art, 
public displays, religious rituals, mechanisms of confession and communal exclusion, 
etc.40 Jesuit innovations in pedagogy and indoctrination were the most famous product 
of this competition, but not the only one. One should keep in mind the obvious fact 
that the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Brandenburg-Prussia that served as the key 
models for Peter, were all deeply Protestant societies. In particular, the strength of the 
Dutch model, so admired by Peter, and later, of the Prussian military machinery (itself 
based on the earlier military innovations of the house of Orange), is to a significant 
                                                     
39 Ibid, 89-91. 
 
40 For a comparative overview of social disciplining by the three confessions, see: R. Po-Chia 
Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750 (London, 1989). 
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degree explained by an earlier Calvinist disciplinarian revolution there.41 Even the 
employment and perfection by Louis XIV of utterly modern mechanisms of policing 
and disciplining urban “disorder” was driven by his “backward-looking” obsession 
with sin – an obsession that was “rooted deeply in the heavy-handed piety of the 
French religious revival.”42 Nor did the religious practices and modes of thinking 
cease to be relevant for the government with the advent of the new era. As David Bell 
argues in his study of the birth of French nationalism, when the leaders of the new, 
republican France had to mold the peasant masses into the new national body, they 
found themselves quite explicitly “reaching back to an older, clerical model of 
evangelization,” directly borrowing rituals, forms of schooling, and other techniques 
of indoctrination from the Catholic church.43  
Peter, of course, was highly interested in religious matters, initiating a radical 
reform of church governance based explicitly enough on the Lutheran model; in 
general, the church and the clerics were treated by him very much as an arm of the 
state.44 But the spiritual well-being of their subjects has been a major concern of 
Christians rulers for centuries. As late as 1598, for example, Duke Maximilian of 
Bavaria in his Law for Morality and Religion could demand that his subjects receive 
obligatory Easter Communion, attend church regularly, and pray at least one Pater 
Noster and one Ave Maria for the deliverance of Christendom from the Turkish threat 
when the bell rang daily reminding them to do so. As for cursing, failure to refrain 
                                                     
41 On the role of Calvinism in the rise of the Netherlands see Gorski, Disciplinary Revolution, 
39-77. 
 
42 Philip F. Riley, A Lust for Virtue: Louis XIV's Attack on Sin in Seventeenth-Century France 
(Westport, CT, 2001), 167. 
 
43 David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 
(Cambridge, MA, 2001), 7-8. 
 
44 Hughes, Russia, 332-356. 
 
26 
 
from it could lead to a punishment as severe as amputation of a limb.45 What was 
changing now were the ways of thinking about this spiritual health – and here I would 
turn over to the second of the two caveats.  
In fact, sometime around the year 1700 a change of paradigm was taking place 
important aspects of which are captured in the works of Michael Foucault. 
Intellectually, this change was driven, to a large extent, by a reaction to the earlier, 
however imperfect, mechanization, impersonalisation, and rationalization of the state 
– most notably, as in the case of Fenelon and Vauban, reaction against the model of 
the state built by Louis XIV. Theologically, it manifested itself in the emergence of 
such powerful movements as Pietism and Jansenism. In education, this change was 
most clearly expressed by John Locke. In the realm of natural science, it took the form 
of a shift away from the radically mechanistic reading of the Cartesian description of 
the human body:46 in fact, a sharper delineation between body and soul, suggested by 
Descartes, provoked a more intense debate on the immaterial – on what exactly soul 
and/or mind were? How were they connected to the body? And how did they manifest 
themselves through it?47  
                                                     
45 Robert Birley, The Refashioning of Catholicism, 1450-1700 (Washington, DC, 1999), 77. 
 
46 It is doubtful, though, that Descartes himself in his mechanisticism meant a “retirement” of 
the soul from contemporary thinking about men and society See, for example, Stephen Voss, 
"Descartes: Heart and Soul," in John P. Wright and Paul Potter (eds.) Psyche and Soma:Physicians and 
Matephysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment (Oxford, 2000), 173-196; 
Graham Richards, Mental Mashinery. The Origins and Consequences of Psychological Ideas. 
(Baltimore, 1992), 15-96. On Descartes, see Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago, 
1992). 
   
47 Daniel Garber, Margaret Wilson, “Mind-Body Problems,” in Daniel Garber and Michael 
Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Vol. I. (Cambridge, 1998), 
833-867. This debate was inseparable from contemporary religious concerns. To give but one example, 
the key precept of John Locke’s famous and hugely influential treatise on education – the idea that 
children were like “soft wax,” a tabula rasa – was grounded in his thinking on the problem of original 
sin, for without his rejection of the Aristotelian notion of inborn sinfulness it would have been hard, if 
not impossible, to discuss the malleability of human nature. J.A. Passmore, "The Malleability of Man 
in Eighteenth-Century Thought," in Earl R. Waserman (ed.), Aspects of the Eighteenth Century 
(Baltimore, 1965), 21-46. Overall, recent scholarship tends to emphasize the close links between 
physical and metaphysical concerns in the thinking of late seventeenth – early eighteenth-century 
scholars, as opposed to the traditional version of history of science, which focused on the triumphant 
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There were important differences in the way in which these questions were 
answered by different thinkers. Overall, however, this change could be summed up as 
the discovery of a more complex human being – of an “inner man” – as an object of 
governing. The rulers were no longer satisfied with the outer conformity of their 
subject to the laws and regulation: the subjects were now expected to want to obey – 
and that obedience from “reasonable” subjects was no longer taken for granted. 
Although the emerging eighteenth-century paradigm of absolutism was built directly 
on the absolutism of Louis XIV and Peter I, it was this focus on manipulating the 
“souls” that made it different from these seventeenth-century models. 
In the following paragraphs I will single out the key concepts, discourses – or, 
on the elementary level, simply buzz-words – that were fundamental to the shifts in 
contemporary thinking on society and in transformation of the means and purposes of 
governance, defining, in effect, eighteenth-century modernity. One of them was the 
intense thinking about morality and virtue as the cornerstones of society that was 
common to such widely different thinkers as John Locke and Fénelon, Puffendorf and 
the German Pietists.48 These could have been conceptualized as a primarily religious 
piety or as a primarily social, aristocratic virtue. Yet the common theme was the 
                                                                                                                                                        
progress of secularization dismissing as irrelevant  the volumes upon volumes of theologically framed 
writings produced by the leading scientists of the day. For an overview, see Richard Popkin, “The 
Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,” in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Vol. I. (Cambridge, 1998), 393-
424; Peter Harrison, "Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early 
Modern Natural Phylosophy, " in Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (eds.), The Science of Nature in 
the Sevententh Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy (Dordrecht, 2005), 
165-184. 
 
48 According to Locke, it is not knowledge as such, but “direct virtue which is the hard and 
valuable part to be aimed at in education.” It was his concern for preservation of virtue that led Locke 
to advise parents to prefer home schooling over the formal education with its dangers of corruptive 
influences. See Passmore, 21 passim. On the role of morality in thinking of Pufendorf, so popular in 
Russia, see Craig L. Carr, Michael J. Seidler, "Pufendorf, Sociability and the Modern State," History of 
Political Thought 17, no. 3 (1996): 354-378; and  Michael Nutkiewicz, "Samuel Pufendorf: Obligation 
as the Basis of the State," Journal of the History of Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1983): 15-29. On Pietism, see 
chapter 2 below. 
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juxtaposition of insufficient and unsatisfactory outward (bodily) conformity and the 
inner, internalized morality and virtuousness. Both the Protestant Pietists in Germany 
and the Catholic Jansenists in France searched for true piety, while Fénelon’s 
Adventures of Telemachus advocated the restoration of true virtue and warned against 
the follies of falsity and illusions of luxury, flattery, artificiality of court life, and the 
empty glory of needless conquest.49 Thus, the ruler, the pedagogue, and the cleric had 
to find ways to go beyond the ritual and outward conformity. They had to find ways to 
motivate their respective audiences, who now had to want to obey.  
Note the changing attitude towards “ambition” (“zeal,” revnost’, in Russian 
official parlance). Whereas a century earlier it had been used, according to Jay Smith, 
“to evoke the self-interested motives thought to prevent commoners from obtaining 
honorable reputation and royal recognition,” now it acquired a positive meaning as the 
“energy that one devoted to one’s profession.” One had to recognize his obligations 
and to act upon them – to display “application” (“diligence,” prilezhanie, in Russian 
official parlance): the true hônnete homme had to take satisfaction in “the application 
he brings to his duty.”50 In Prussia, it was the expectation of Friedrich Wilhelm I that  
an intelligent, assiduous, and alert person who after God values nothing higher than his 
king’s pleasure and serves him out of love and for the sake of honor rather than money 
and who in his conduct seeks and constantly bears in mind his king’s service and 
interest, who, moreover, abhors all intrigue and emotional deterrents.51 
                                                     
49 On transformation of concept of virtue, see Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in 
Enlightenment France. (Houndmills, 2001), 25-47, esp. 35-36. On virtue and Fénelon, see Jay M. 
Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY, 2005), 
41-48. 
 
50 Smith, The Culture of Merit, 173-175, 214-215. 
 
51 Quoted in Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian 
Expirience, 1660-1815 (Cambridge, MA, 1958), 93. 
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Compare that with the ideas of the Pietist August Hermann Francke, who demanded 
that the pupils in his schools study “not as if you were performing compulsory labor, 
but faithfully, diligently, and with relish.”52  
One way to achieve this was by encouraging emulation through the creation 
of a public and transparent system of reward and punishment to “encourage” the 
subjects to perform better, which also implied monitoring, recording, and 
assessment.53 Another strategy was to shield the youngsters from morally harmful 
influences by secluding them in an artificially created, pedagogically beneficial 
environment and attempt to manipulate the souls by manipulating the bodies (hence 
the birth of Foucaldian disciplinary institutions around the year 1700 with their focus 
on ordering, regimenting, observing bodies, including also drilling the troops 
increasingly important in the military thought of that period54). 
One more intriguing and inescapable extension of this discourse was the 
question of human talents and inclinations. Indeed, how were observable differences 
in human behavior to be explained – do they mean that not all subjects are 
reasonable? The state was now supposed to manipulate minds. Very well, but are 
there any limits to manipulability and malleability of human nature? Mid-eighteenth 
century radicals, most notably the abbé de Condillac and Helvetius, insisted that a 
human mind is “nothing but the sum of all it has acquired,” and that the observed 
differences in human abilities were produced not by nature, but exclusively by 
education. Yet, the majority, especially in the early eighteenth century, found it hard 
to reject the notion of inborn differences. Locke himself, apparently, did not deny the 
                                                     
52 Quoted in Melton, Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins, 38-44. 
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54 For an overview, see: John Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe: 1648-1789 (Manchester, 
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existence of differences of inborn abilities and inclinations. In any case, such 
differences were, at the very least, recognized, analyzed, and taken into account. This 
debate had understandably huge implications for the ways in which social hierarchies 
were understood and legitimized.55 
This outline of the key topic in early eighteenth-century thinking is necessarily 
crude and superficial, glossing over hugely important differences and complexities. 
Still, I find it more useful to focus in my subsequent analysis of Russian thinking and 
governmental practices on these key notions rather than split hairs arguing whether 
the ministers of Anna’s reign were moved by their alleged Pietism, or by their 
admiration for Fénelon. To give one example, in France Fénelon might have been 
regarded as a critic of absolutism. Yet the first German translation of Adventures of 
Telemachus was published in 1700 (seventeen years before the official French 
publication) and dedicated to Friedrich Wilhelm, the eleven-year-old Prince of Prussia 
and future champion of Pietism. The Berlin court appears to have regarded the book 
with benevolence. Fénelon’s book on the education of girls was published in 1698 in 
German in Halle with a preface by the leading Pietist August Hermann Francke, while 
in 1733 there appeared a new translation of Fénelon directly influenced by Pietism.56 
Another example is Locke. Most likely, his ideas on education reached Vasilii 
Tatishchev, a Russian administrator and intellectual, through the medium of Christian 
Wolff’s Reasonable Thoughts on God, the World, and Man’ Soul (1720). In this book 
Wolff presented the concept of schools as an artificial environment, in which the child 
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would be removed from the corruptive influence of superstitions, gossip, and similar 
threats. At the same time, Wolff’s emphasis on utilitarian elements of education is 
remarkably similar to the thinking of Francke, his colleague and rival at Halle.57  
*   *   * 
To sum up, it was this more complex understanding of human nature based, 
ultimately, on the increasing awareness of a mind-body duality that provided both the 
moral/ethical imperatives for reforming society through social disciplining, and 
reason to believe that such reform was possible. As a result, theoreticians and 
practitioners of disciplinary revolution were driven by a desire to go in their social 
reformism beyond simply changing the outward behavior of people towards 
manipulation of “inner human.” Discourses on natural science and religion, medicine 
and society were, therefore, interlinked to an extremely high degree. This connection 
is exemplified, for example, by Johann Georg Walch’s Philosophisches Lexicon 
(1726), in which the author, according to one recent study, upholds the position that 
“upright posture makes it easier to ‘look heavenward’; i.e., to live one's life in 
accordance with the divine will, while at the same time applying reason to shape the 
self and the surrounding world.”58  
It is instructive, perhaps, in this regard to consider the terms in which the 
transformation of Russia is discussed by Friedrich Christian Weber, already 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Writing about young Russian nobles going 
abroad to study, Weber contrasts their ability to learn elements of “bodily exercises,” 
                                                     
57 F. Andred Brown, "On Education: John Locke, Christian Wolff and the 'Moral Weeklies'." 
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on the one hand, to their refusal to “cultivate the mind” (which was not their “design” 
anyway). He admits, though, that there are some exceptions. Certain Russians, thanks 
to “that sagacity and cunning which is natural to almost the whole nation,” are able to 
“attain, by means of a good education and instruction abroad, to the same degree of 
perfection as children of other civilized nations.” Most of them, however, upon their 
return home shed that outward “politeness, [which] they acquired in foreign parts.” In 
short, due to their “obstinacy” (which Peter attempted to “break”) there is no room in 
Russia for “true virtue and sincere piety.”59 Indeed, Peter’s attempt to “reclaim 
[Russians] from irregular life” required from his subjects nothing short of a 
“conversion.”60
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Chapter II 
“In Reality, Seminaries”: Social Discipline and Early Modern Elite Schooling 
The transformation around the year 1700 of the European notions of 
government, outlined in the previous chapter, found a direct reflection in the evolution 
of European elite schools, particularly by the institutions for the training of future 
officers and gentlemen. This transformation was a culmination of a broader trend, 
described by Philip Aries in his classic book, and by 1700 it had been in the making 
for well over a century.61 Indeed, many pedagogical techniques and assumptions 
discussed here directly descended from those used by both Jesuit and Protestant 
educators. Yet, it was only in the late seventeenth – early eighteenth century that these 
techniques were coupled with a new notion of human nature and consciously used by 
the state to create and govern a new elite.  
This chapter outlines the interplay of the key notions, discussed above, in the 
transformation of European elite schooling in the early eighteenth century, which 
serves as a backdrop for Peter’s educational policies. In particular, I focus on the 
Prussian62 case. One reason for that is the fact that Brandenburg-Prussia was, 
probably, the early-modern absolutist state in its most extreme, most “perfect” form. 
Certainly it was recognized as such in Russia where the reigns of Peter III and Paul I, 
and less directly, of Nicholas I were (or were perceived to be) built on direct 
references to the “orderliness” and “efficiency” of the “Prussian model.” Prussian 
laws and regulations served as an important source of administrative inspiration 
                                                     
61 Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood (London, 1962), esp. 241-268. 
 
62 For the sake of simplicity, here and elsewhere I will refer to Brandenburg-Prussia as simply 
Prussia, even though at times it might be anachronistic. 
34 
 
already for Peter I himself. Another reason is that the Noble Cadet Corps in 
St.Petersburg was explicitly modeled after similar institutions set up in Berlin in 
1717-1720: a reference to the Berlin institution is made already in the founding 
documents of the Russian school. In this chapter, therefore, I present an overview of 
both the Berlin Cadet Corps itself and the role of Pietism and the Halle Pietist schools 
in shaping the Corps. Finally, the role played in Prussian educational reform by the 
Pietists helps to highlight the fact that the introduction of modern disciplinary 
practices went hand in hand with contemporary ethical and intellectual concerns.  
*   *   * 
The standard story of Petrine educational reforms is straightforward: Peter 
wanted to build a modern army and navy. So he had to set up schools to teach the 
necessary technical disciplines, first and foremost, mathematics. Indeed, his 
innovations, including the increasing use of guns, “scientific” methods of fortification 
and navigation, complex geometry of troop movements, required specialized, 
technical instruction systematically delivered in a classroom setting by a professional 
teacher. Transition towards formal, institutionalized forms of education that we 
associate with modern schooling is described as a natural, indeed, necessary 
consequence of the early-modern technical and military revolutions. Unfortunately, it 
is assumed, being preoccupied with the Northern War, and lacking funds and 
qualified teachers, Peter did not have time to place modern education in Russia on a 
firm foundation. 
This vision, however, ignores the basic realities of late seventeenth century 
military training and education of the nobility. The schools for the nobility that 
Russian dignitaries observed abroad were “academies.” These began appearing 
sometime around the beginning of the seventeenth century and were meant to prepare 
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young aristocrats for courtly life. They stressed fencing and riding, as important both 
for public display of individual skills on various occasions and for forming an 
appropriate “posture” in general. There was no fixed term or course of study, and 
overall, arrangements seem to have been extremely informal. Private or enjoying 
royal patronage, these academies were of limited size and charged very steep fees. 
These were institutions for the very top aristocratic families and their retinues, and 
education there, appropriately for future leaders, was often to be followed by a “trip to 
foreign countries to learn languages, <…> and how different peoples are governed.”63 
As for military training, the pre-modern model of preparing young nobles for 
military service was based on apprenticeship – ideally, apprenticeship as a page at the 
household of a prince, but increasingly, as an apprentice soldier (cadet) in a regiment. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, however, this practice was increasingly replaced 
by a more formal, institutionalized schooling. It seems that the main factors that 
motivated this transformation were twofold: the king, his councilors, and the 
concerned nobles wanted both to reform the morals and manners of the nobility and to 
draw larger numbers of nobles (especially, poor and provincial ones) into military 
service by giving them opportunities to display their “application” before the king’s 
eyes, directly or metaphorically. From the early-modern point of view, of course, both 
of these goals were directly related to the practical requirements of military service: a 
good professional soldier was a noble, who possessed necessary moral virtues and 
was motivated to serve the king by his sense of honor and personal loyalty.64  
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The transformation of the system of apprenticeship into a formal, disciplinary 
school was gradual. At first, royal pages began to be given instruction parallel to their 
palace duties. Later this system of apprenticeship was extended: royal household 
troops always included a certain number of cadets, but now prestigious Mosquetaires 
du Roi consisted nearly exclusively of them: more young nobles got the opportunity to 
serve in the vicinity of the king’s person, while simultaneously being segregated (at 
least in theory) from the morally corruptive influence of rank-and file soldiers. It is in 
this light that the establishment in 1682 by Louvois, Louis XIV’s war minister, of 
nine compagnies de cadets-gentilshommes should be considered. (In the navy similar 
companies of gardes de la marine had been established by Colbert few years earlier.) 
The French army had undergone a tremendous expansion during the reign of the Sun 
King, yet the demand for large numbers of officers did not immediately result in a 
transition to new, more institutionalized forms of training. At the heart of this system 
of compagnies de cadets-gentilshommes was the traditional concept of training 
through practice. The novelty of compagnies was, therefore, not so much in the 
military dimension of this establishment, as in its use as a modern instrument of social 
disciplining. As Guy Rowlands points out, Louis XIV and Louvois wanted “to reform 
the manners and practices of the nobility, and one way of attempting this was to make 
the cadet companies vehicles for moral regeneration.” Establishment of these 
companies meant segregation of young cadets from the troops. Eventually they were 
further walled off from harmful influences by being put into barracks, rather than 
being quartered in town. Round-the-clock monitoring by officers was encouraged. 
Brothels and even theaters became, in theory, off-limits. A contemporary diarist 
referred to these compagnies as “in reality, seminaries.”65  
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As instruments of moral reform, the late seventeenth-century compagnies de 
cadets-gentilshommes patently failed. Yet, subsequent reforms executed or planned in 
the French military schools betray the same focus of their authors on shaping the 
students’ minds through monitoring and observation, detailed regimentation of daily 
activities, formalized assessment, and milieu control. A 1691 règlement of a Parisian 
riding academy demanded constant supervision (“no gentilhomme will ever be present 
without the director of the academy, who will stand guard.”) A 1726 project for the 
reestablishment of the companies of cadets gentilshommes proposed that the no 
“disorderly conduct” be tolerated, and that the officers make sure that cadets “make 
their beds, that their rooms are clean, and that they themselves are clean.” A 1722 
règlement of the école des pages required  that “the subgovernor … always be 
present, in order to see that both masters and pages remain assiduous.”  
These increasingly pervasive mechanisms of social control were supposed to 
discipline, to discover individual abilities, and to motivate at the same time. As Jay M. 
Smith observes, in their drive towards total observation the authors of various 
proposals and regulations explicitly pursued two objectives. On the one hand, they 
hoped to motivate students to “apply” themselves; on the other, they recognized the 
need to “indentify and cultivate distinct talents and abilities.” This focus on 
motivating students toward greater application might appear surprising, for, as is well-
known, eighteenth-century military experts emphasized the need for uniform 
movement and for “maintaining order,” achievable through constant drilling, by 
instilling “habit” into soldiers, and by giving them as little as possible opportunity for 
“reflection.” Yet, this mechanistic vision of military service did not mean an attempt 
to create interchangeable automatons. On the contrary, it implied the need to 
recognize the peculiar “abilities” and “talents” of individual “parts” of the military 
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machine and to employ them properly. One had “to consider the scope of particular 
functions and determine the knowledge and talents demanded by each post, in order to 
choose and employ people usefully in the positions that suit them,” an observer wrote 
in 1738. A general must be “exact in the choice of the parts that compose the 
machine,” another expert demanded 15 years later. Each part, however, had to 
recognize its duties and to perform them willingly. According to the planners of the 
Ecole Militaire, “the spirit of subordination… has to do with knowledge of one’s 
duties.” That was the secret: if abilities and talents were assessed accurately, and 
officers were assigned to various positions accordingly, then “everyone happily does 
his duty; everyone loves his work, because it is always in proportion to talents and 
capacities, [and this is] the surest means of making the best use of officers.”66   
It is important to remember, however, that these innovations remained the 
exception, not the rule, which only underscores the fact that their raison d’être was 
disciplinary, not “practical,” and that the advances in military tactics and technology 
did not somehow make it necessary to set up formal schools. In fact, as David Bien 
has pointed out, the increasing emphasis on mathematics in eighteenth-century 
military education is best explained not so much by technical requirements of service, 
as by the desire to use it for disciplining minds and achieving “order, clarity, and 
precision of thought.”67 As far as practical skills were concerned, the majority of 
officers throughout the eighteenth century was still successfully trained through 
apprenticeship. The creation of military schools was often the result of a major defeat, 
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when the elite felt that “something had to be done.”68 In Austria, an academy at 
Wiener Neustadt was created only in 1751, and the Theresanium – in 1752. Until then 
young nobles enrolled directly in regiments. Note that compagnies de cadets-
gentilshommes in France were repeatedly created, disbanded, and then created again, 
while the École Militaire was founded only in 1751.69 Even in Prussia only about one 
third of officers in the mid-eighteenth century went through the cadet corps. Although 
this was a very high proportion for that period, two thirds of aspiring officers, of 
course, continued to be trained in regiments.  
Partially this is explained by the resistance of the military establishments 
themselves. Study in formal schools made sense only if at the end the king granted 
successful graduates commissions in his armies. That, however, squared badly with 
the still prevalent venality of offices.70 (Russia was probably the only major country 
where companies and regiments were not bought and sold; even in Prussia venality 
survived although the monarchy managed to centralize promotion.) At the same time, 
as John Childs points out, strictly speaking, there was no practical need to waste the 
time of an eighteenth-century gentleman in the classroom: weapons and tactics were 
simple and evolved slowly, while drilling of the troops was in any case done by 
NCOs. (It was a great innovation on the part of Friedrich Wilhelm I to actually 
demand that his officers personally supervise the drilling.) The ideal concept of 
preparation for military services implied that a young noble should familiarize himself 
with military history and the deeds of great generals, ancient and modern (by reading 
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their memoirs), prepare himself physically, and, perhaps, study one or two books on 
theory, especially Vauban’s L’Attaque et la defense des places, memoirs of 
Raymondo Montecuccolli, and L’Art de la guerre par principes et par règles  by 
Jacques de Puységur, marshal of France.71 (By 1740 all of these books had 
considerable circulation in Russia.) Indeed, military experts of Petrine times doubted 
the benefits of formal schooling: not only for infantry officers, but even for members 
of technical branches, for artillerists and engineers. Vauban, the greatest military 
engineer of early-modern Europe, said of the graduates of cadet companies that “they 
brought nothing to the service, they have seen nothing, thought about nothing, and 
know nothing but fencing, dancing and quarrelling.” In his own corps du genie 
engineers learned through practice by drawing ground plans of fortresses and 
entrenchments.72 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1730s a European traveler 
commented on the cadet corps in St.Petersburg in the following way: 
I had every day the pleasure of seeing those young persons [cadets] 
performing their exercises; but have been informed, that the state entirely 
neglects to give them an education becoming them; and hence the advantage, 
expected from this establishment, is frustrated. The Muscovites are grossly 
mistaken, when they imagine, that the only qualification requisite to make a 
good soldier, and a great captain, is the art of performing the exercises, and 
knowing all the motions of military discipline. All those, who arrived at any 
perfection in the military art, have had recourse to other sources, and learned 
rudiments, very different from those taught in Muscovy.  
This traveler suggested that instead of  
educating a body of cadets, they ought to have established colleges and 
schools, there to have taught the grand principles of religion and morality. 
There they should have begun the reform they proposed; and, indeed, if due 
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care is not taken in the education of youth, how can the nation possibly be 
extricated from that barbarity, in which it has been, for many ages, involved?73 
*   *   * 
Turning to Prussian experience, one might recollect that the link between 
Protestant values and the superior professional ethos of an “ideal” (i.e. Prussian) 
bureaucracy was pointed out long ago by Max Weber. In the last few decades, 
however, there appeared a significant number of works linking the origins and success 
of the “Prussian machine” specifically to the collaboration between the Hohenzollerns 
and Pietism, a religious movement with “headquarters” at the University of Halle.74 
This movement was the source of much of the clerical personnel and of some of the 
key disciplinary techniques employed by king Friedrich Wilhelm I. The latter’s 
agnostic son, Friedrich II, may have been “the meticulous king of small machines, 
well-trained regiments and long exercises,” obsessed with mechanical automata.75 But 
his ability to manipulate his largest toy, the Prussian army, is explained largely by the 
religious ethics instilled in his officers and men during the previous reign. It has been 
argued that it was thanks to this indoctrination that the Hohenzollerns were able to 
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transform their poor, sparsely populated and otherwise unpromising principality, 
lacking any natural resources, into a great military power.76   
Consider the role of Pietism in the formation of the Berlin Cadet Corps, the 
most disciplinary military school of its time. The key figure both in development of 
Pietist theology and educational theory and practice, and in orchestrating the 
movement’s cooperation with the Prussian state, was August Hermann Francke 
(1663-1727).77 The keys to Francke’s success as an educator were the institutional 
innovations that followed directly from his theological views. Pietists stressed the 
need for a personal “conversion experience.” According to Philip Jacob Spener (1635-
1705), the leading Pietist theologian, “the essence of our Christianity is to be found in 
the reflective, spiritually-reborn individual whose soul is possessed by faith and 
whose actions are the fruit of his faith.”78 The distinction between actions driven by 
inner conviction and by external coercion was, of course, central to the Lutheran 
doctrine in general. The Pietists, however, felt it necessary to call for a “second 
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Reformation,” protesting both against the growing pomp and moral laxity of some 
Lutheran princely courts, and also against the dogmatism of “official,” orthodox 
Lutheranism, which allegedly became too formal and shallow, focused on observing 
the externals of the faith alone, and as a result failed to transform the morals of the 
flock. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Francke the pedagogue put a premium on a 
teacher’s ability to influence the morals of his pupils. According to him, “we are not 
to be satisfied if the child exhibits an outer show of piety, but at heart remains 
unchanged.”79 In order to cultivate the child’s ability to freely and voluntarily accept 
faith and works, however, teachers had first to transform, even to break his will. As 
Francke wrote: 
The formation of the child’s character involves the will as well as 
understanding. … Above all it is necessary to break the natural willfulness of 
the child. While the schoolmaster who seeks to make the child more learned is 
to be commended for cultivating the child’s understanding, he has not done 
enough. He has forgotten his most important task, namely that of making the 
will obedient. 
This was to be attained by a number of pedagogical methods. One Franckean 
innovation was compulsory attendance. He therefore stressed the pedagogical 
importance of taking roll call. Another was a developed system of monitoring and 
recording, including the daily recording by teachers of each child’s progress and 
character.  Further, Francke and his followers emphasized (on religious grounds as 
well) the need to “make proper use of your time” through introduction of clear 
schedule of daily activities, where every hour was consigned to a particular task. 
Among other things, they were the first to introduce in this schedule a special time for 
“leisure,” which was to be filled with instructive activities (such as observing models 
of buildings and machines, pictures of exotic animals, work of artisans, etc.). This 
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setting aside of a special time for leisure also emphasized the fact that the rest of the 
time was to be devoted exclusively to work. Finally, Francke highlighted the need to 
strictly control and supervise student behavior at all times: the teacher was not to 
leave the classroom at the end of his period until replaced by the next instructor. 
According to Francke,  
Youth do not know how to regulate their lives, and are naturally inclined 
toward idle or sinful behavior when left to their own devices. For this reason, 
it is a rule in this institution that a pupil never be allowed out of the presence 
of a supervisor. The supervisor’s presence will stifle the pupil’s inclination to 
sinful behavior, and slowly weaken his sinfulness. 
This constant supervision was most easily attained, of course, at a boarding 
school and/or an orphanage, where conditions allowed for a round-the-clock 
monitoring and disciplining, not only of schoolwork, but of all of the child’s 
activities. “Wherever pupils may be, whether sitting in class, playing in the 
schoolyard, eating in the dining hall, sleeping in their alcoves, or changing their 
clothes, they must remain supervised,” Francke instructed the director of his 
orphanage. In short, according to James Van Horn Melton, he “sought to create a 
completely regulated and self-enclosed environment, neutralizing the impact of the 
outside environment and thus ridding pupils of any bad habits they might have 
developed outside the institution.” At the Paedagogium frequent trips home or visits 
by parents were strongly discouraged, and letters to and from students were inspected 
by the faculty – a practice that went considerably further than anything known in the 
Jesuit institutions. At the same time, corporal punishment was to be limited, and even 
discouraged. Instead, a premium was put on various ways of encouraging students 
through public recognition of their achievements, such as prizes, commendations, 
promotion to class monitor, etc.80  Note that for Francke disciplining of the body and 
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disciplining of the soul were directly linked: “At all times and in all societies guard 
yourself against indecent demeanor and activity and disorderly posture of the body. 
These give witness to disorder in the mind and testify to your secret mental turmoil.”81 
It is important for our purposes here to stress another element of Francke’s 
pedagogical theory and practice, namely, his emphasis on the “calling” (Beruf), or 
“inner vocation” (vocationem internam), of students. Pietist theology envisioned a 
divinely ordained social organism where every member performed an essential 
function depending on his “natural [i.e. God’s] gift,” thus recognizing inherent, 
“natural” differences between people in intelligence and other endowments. Indeed, 
Francke wrote that “the body of Christ consists of different members. Not every 
member can be a hand, foot, eye, or ear. Each member has its own task. … The foot 
should not desire to become an eye, nor the hand an ear.”82 In his Lectures Francke 
calls upon students “not to step beyond one’s limits,” “not to force something for 
which they are not skilled by nature.” Thus, exercise in (self)-discipline acquired 
broader purpose: one was to fulfill his calling by developing his gifts to the fullest. In 
fact, it would be equally a waste of God’s gift and of public resources both to push 
those of low abilities to pursue advanced studies and to relegate those with 
outstanding ingenia to menial tasks. The key task of educators and of the state was, 
therefore, selection and monitoring. Teachers had to distinguish among the 
“temperaments” (Gemüter) of the children not only “to know more about how each 
can be controlled and whether each should be treated more strictly or more softly,” 
but also “to discover the capacity of the intelligences and what in particular each child 
is skilled for, so that the gifts that God has implanted in each can be awakened and 
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applied to the common welfare.” Organizationally, another of Francke’s innovations 
was meant to capitalize on these “natural” variations among the pupils. Instead of 
each age group receiving its instruction in all subjects from the same teacher, at 
Francke’s schools each subject had its hierarchy of classes through which the students 
progressed. As a result of teachers’ observations and periodic examinations, the pupil 
might find himself at different class levels in different subjects, corresponding to his 
varying abilities and achievements.83 
While Pietists and their schools enjoyed the support of Prussian kings already 
in the 1690s-1700s, it was not until accession of Friedrich Wilhelm I in 1713 that their 
innovation in social control and indoctrination were utilized fully for the purposes of 
reforms launched by the new king. Initially Friedrich Wilhelm was hostile toward 
Pietists because of their alleged pacifism. A single surprise inspection of the Halle 
establishment, however, was enough for him to recognize their potential usefulness in 
his reforms aimed at making his army and bureaucracy more effective and efficient 
through instilling in officers and officials the spirit of duty, devotion to service, moral 
probity, and austerity. The army played a central role in this reconstruction of the 
Prussian state. Specifically, the king put a lot of effort into educating and religiously 
indoctrinating his subjects. His troops were made to regularly attend church sermons, 
and Pietist graduates of Halle received a virtual monopoly of appointments as military 
pastors (and in time, as pastors in general).84 
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The Berlin Cadet Corps, or Kadettenanstalt, was the single most important 
supplier of officers for the army.85 Whereas the older academies had concerned 
themselves primarily with providing a “general education fit for contemporary 
aristocrats,” thereby reflecting the less vocationally specialized conception of the 
noble officer’s way of life, the corps attempted to create an officer of a new type, one 
completely devoted to his king and service. Richard L. Gawthrop emphasizes 
Friedrich Wilhelm’s desire to make his officers “obedient instruments,” which 
required a “complete break from the cavalier conception” of the military profession: 
cadets were expected to “make fulfillment of their vocational duty the overriding 
factor in their lives.”86 On the one hand, the Kadettenanstalt, was formed through the 
gradual merger of three earlier Ritteracademien, and its curriculum combined 
elements of a proper gentlemanly education (including mathematics, foreign 
languages, riding, fencing, dancing etc.) with introduction to military drill.87 As was 
usual for early-modern military schools elsewhere, it catered to a large extent to 
poorer nobles, children of non-noble officers, and orphans. It was meant to produce 
polished gentlemen out of somewhat boorish Prussian Junkers and to draw them, 
often against their will, into state service (thus Friedrich Wilhelm’s goals were not 
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dissimilar to those of Peter). After the Kadettenanstalt was formed, the king had the 
lists of all young nobles in the realm drawn up, from which he himself chose those to 
be admitted or, rather, drafted. Sometimes soldiers had to be dispatched to fetch 
prospective cadets to the Corps.88 
In order to achieve the transformative goals, however, the Berlin Cadet Corps 
employed all the key methods of “milieu control” perfected at the Halle schools, 
including the round-the-clock monitoring; recording of moral and scholarly progress; 
a rigid schedule of daily activities, etc. Cadets were put in barracks and organized into 
companies, which facilitated control over them. Incoming cadets were immediately 
confronted with a strict conduct code as well as a full, holyday-free schedule of 
classes, military drill, and religious observances. The cadets were under constant 
supervision by either staff or cadet “officers.” Every year the Corps’ commander was 
required to submit reports on the performance and moral conduct of every cadet and 
officer. These reports were read by the king personally and served as the basis for his 
personal examination of individual cadets and officers and hence, all promotions. 
Strict discipline was accompanied by religious indoctrination: prayer, attending 
sermons, and Bible reading were all important elements of a daily schedule at the 
corps. The first commander of the Corps was a devoted Pietist, as were, of course, 
military pastors attached to the Corps.89 
*  *  * 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Prussian experience is 
relevant for the purposes of this dissertation not only because it was a very prominent 
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example of the “disciplinary revolution,” but also because of numerous links between 
Petrine Russia and early eighteenth-century Prussia, and Halle specifically. The Pietist 
influence in Russia has been the subject of extensive study.90 By the year 1730 the 
links between Russia and Halle were well-established, and a number of Francke’s 
active followers had already been working in Moscow and St.Petersburg. Partially this 
connection is explained by the traditionally strong presence in Russia (usually, in the 
capacity of pastors at Lutheran communities, teachers, or medical practitioners) of 
graduates of Jena, Leipzig, and other Mitteldeutsche universities that led to a natural 
growth of contacts on a personal level.91 These contacts were all the more natural 
since these universities were among the leading centers of European scholarship, far 
ahead of their competitors in other parts of Europe in terms of both institutional 
modernization and academic quality.92 Another reason was diplomatic: Russia and 
Brandenburg-Prussia were allies in the Great Northern War, and Peter I made 
significant efforts to expand contacts with this state. In fact, already in 1697 a treaty 
of friendship signed by Peter and Elector Friedrich III included a clause allowing for 
free movement of students between the two countries. Indeed, the first Russian 
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Rossii: russko-nemetskiie nauchnye i kulturnye sviazi, (St.Petersburg, 2000), 159-169. For a German 
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students who went to study in foreign universities, both voluntarily and on Peter’s 
orders, matriculated in most cases either at Halle or at Konigsberg.93  
Significantly, Francke himself, driven by a strong missionary streak in early 
Pietism, displayed strong interest in building Halle’s ties with Russia and expanding 
his influence there. For him this missionary activity was a part of his overall attempt 
to spread “true Christianity.”94 Although skeptical of the overall prospect for 
awakening in the “so long moribund” Russia, Francke nevertheless hoped to penetrate 
the Orthodox Church by training Greek students at Halle.95 Here it is sufficient to 
stress the conscious and determined efforts of Francke to influence educational 
practices in Russia.96 Already in 1697 Francke wrote to one of his correspondents in 
Moscow, the pastor of the German colony there, that “we would like to receive the 
Russians here [in Halle], and also we would like them to receive our youth in their 
land. I will gladly apply our utmost zeal so that they [Russian students] return home 
as useful instruments of their Fatherland. Oh, how much good could come from such 
a commertio nationum!” Francke managed to arrange in the early 1698 for a visit to 
Halle of the members of Peter’s Grand Embassy, including Fedor Saltykov (see 
chapter 4).97 On May 10-13, 1698, Halle was visited by Peter I, although he and 
Francke never met. Francke, however, had extensive learned discussions with P.V. 
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Postnikov, another member of the Embassy, and personally supervised the education 
in Berlin of a son and a younger brother of Boyar and Grand Admiral F.A. Golovin. 
Francke tried to arrange for a transfer of these two young nobles to Halle, but that 
never happened. In 1699 Francke proposed to set up a permanent seminary for 
Russian students at Halle. He tried to find someone who could get Peter to address the 
Elector with such a request, but nothing came of this idea.98 With the passage of time, 
however, a significant number of Pietists and sympathizers, including Francke’s 
graduates at Halle, found work in Russia and rose there to positions of some 
importance.99 Keeping this context in mind, in the next chapter I will consider Peter’s 
educational policies. 
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Chapter III 
“Our Folk are Like Unschooled Children”: Peter I and His Idea of Schooling 
The idea that Peter I wanted to transform Russia and to create a “new man” by 
introducing new forms of education is a commonplace. Indeed, Marc Raeff has an 
article specifically devoted to this topic: he insists that “schooling turned out to be an 
essential element in implementing Peter’s project of ‘transfiguring’ Russian man.”100 
Given the European context outlined in earlier chapters, the history of Petrine 
educational policies needs to be reconsidered. If the transition from pre-modern to 
modern forms of training must be viewed through the lens of the increase of the 
disciplinarian dimension of schooling, then the “utilitarian” nature of Petrine 
education, pointed out by historians long ago,101 acquires a broader significance. 
Peter’s lack of interest in formal schooling with its disciplinary practices and in the 
moral improvement of his subjects must be viewed as a reflection of his notions of 
governing in general.  
The main form of training introduced by Peter for the nobility was 
apprenticeship. The practice of drafting destitute noblemen into regiments as foot 
soldiers was not unknown before Peter. His innovation was to make this practice 
universal and to re-conceptualize it as a form of training and the mandatory first step 
in a military career rather than a punishment for poverty. Although young nobles had 
been drafted as privates more or less throughout Peter’s reign, this policy was 
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formally codified only in the mid 1710s, when the Great Northern War was nearly 
over, and the emperor started the second, major round of institutional reform. For the 
first time this rule was mentioned in 1714. In 1716 it appeared in the new Military 
Statute.102 Subsequently Peter insisted that for nobles the path to becoming 
commissioned an officer lay exclusively through the regiments of his own Life 
Guards. In 1719 he demanded that “nobody be admitted into any officer ranks … 
without having been a soldier in the Guards,” in 1723 - that “the children of nobles 
and foreign officers were not to be enrolled anywhere aside from the Guards.”103 By 
assigning his Life Guards this function, Peter was following, of course, the example 
set by France, where maison militaire played a similar role, and by Sweden, where his 
arch-rival and “teacher” Charles XII issued commissions only to those who had 
served for a certain period as privates in his Life Guards regiment.104 On a number of 
occasions Peter included in his important decrees extensive passages giving the 
rationale for this or that innovation being introduced by him105; in these cases, 
however, no such explanation was offered.  
Note, however, that Peter – quite typically – did not think the system through. 
Already in the fall of 1723 he changed his mind and specified that only young nobles 
from “prominent” [znatnye] families be enrolled in the Guards, while the rest were to 
be sent into the army regiments. Still, he offered his military administrators no usable 
definition of “prominence,” provoking thereby a considerable discussion among his 
                                                     
102 PSZ #2789; #3006, p.39, etc. 
 
103 PSZ #3265; Troitskii, Russkii absolutizm, 78. The same idea is twice repeated in Peter’s 
unpublished (and undated) notebooks.  E.P. Pod'iampolskaia,  "K voprosu o formirovanii dvor’anskoi 
intelligentsii v pervoi chetverti XVIII v. (po zapisnym knizhkam i "memoriiam" Petra I)." In 
Dvor’anstvo i krepostnoi stroi Rossii XVI-XVIII v. (Moscow, 1975), 185-187. 
 
104 Childs, Armies and Warfare, 93-97. 
 
105 This tendency is discussed in detail in N.I. Pavlenko, "Petr I (K izucheniiu sotsial’no-
politicheskikh vzgl’adov)," in Rossia v period reform Petra I (Moscow, 1973), 40-102.  
 
54 
 
officials that lasted well after the emperor’s death. In any case, the two regiments of 
the Guards were physically not able to admit all young nobles, so the majority of them 
ended up in the army anyway.106 At around the same time Peter instituted a formal 
system of apprenticeship for nobles in the civil service. In February 1722, he decreed 
that “able” young nobles be sent “as iunkery to the Colleges [governmental 
departments] for training [dlia nauki].”107 Apprenticeship, in the emperor’s view, was 
thus a perfectly proper way to prepare for civil service: the General Regulation of 
1720 stipulated that candidates “be admitted into the Colleges in advance so that 
through diligent copying of documents they could learn writing and arithmetic … so 
that eventually they could be gradually promoted to higher ranks.”108  
As for the schools as such founded during Peter’s reign, they could be roughly 
divided into two types.109 On the one hand, there were “technical” schools oriented 
towards teaching practical skills required by the army and the navy: i.e. mathematics 
and similar subjects. An early example of that type was a school established at the 
Preobrazhenskii Regiment in 1698. Apparently, officers of this regiment taught there 
the basics of arithmetic, geometry, and practical skills in fortification and artillery110; 
little else is known about it. Another example is the “artillery school” (1701), created 
on the basis of the “gunners’ (Pushkarskaia) school” (1699). It had approximately 
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150-250 pupils depending on the year; they were taught mathematics, geometry, 
engineering, and other technical subjects. There are also mentions of the “second 
artillery school” (1712) at the 1st Artillery Regiment, run by its colonel, and the “third 
artillery school” operating at the “Petersburg laboratory house” in 1721.111   
It is on account of their secular, mathematical focus that these schools are 
usually hailed as innovative and modern. Institutionally, however, they were terribly 
pre-modern establishments: there were no class rosters, no detailed curricula, no 
internal regulations, no records of various exams and assessments. They were 
established, staffed, housed, and supplied by students on an ad hoc basis. There are no 
detailed studies of these schools, because we simply have no records of their 
activities. It is no wonder that historians have trouble establishing exactly how many 
of them there were, when a given school was established and when disbanded, and 
whether there was any continuity between different episodes of training being 
mentioned as taking part at a given location.112 Similarly organized were the two 
nation-wide networks of schools established during Peter’s reign: the “cipher” schools 
(1714, see below), and the “Admiralty”, or “Russian” (as opposed to Latin or 
Slavonic-Greek) schools, attached to the major naval installations and supervised by 
the Navy (Beskrovnyi traces their origin back to the shipbuilding activities in 
Voronezh in 1703. They started to be re-established on a larger scale after 1717). 
Indeed, a typical Petrine school “more closely resembled institutionalized 
apprenticeship system” than a formal school.113   
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Finally, the most institutionalized schools of Peter’s reign were established not 
so much by the state, as by foreigners and foreign-educated Russian Orthodox 
ecclesiastics, although these might have been occasionally invited to do so by Peter. 
As a rule, these schools were explicitly modeled after one or another foreign school; 
they tended to have a somewhat clearly outlined curriculum; and to be staffed by 
expatriate teachers. One example of such a school was the already-mentioned Naval 
(or, Marine Guards) Academy modeled by Baron de Saint Hilaire on the French port 
schools at Toulon, Rochefort, and Brest.114 Other examples were the gymnasium set 
up by Pietist Pastor Gluck in Moscow in 1703 and a school opened by the Czech 
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Jesuit in Moscow in the 1690s.115 The most famous example was the legendary 
Moscow School of Mathematics and Navigation (1701), modeled after the Royal 
Mathematical School founded at Christ’s Hospital near London in 1673, and run by 
three British expatriates.116 Finally, there were schools set up by Kiev-trained 
ecclesiastics and modeled after the classic Latin academy with its seven-step sequence 
of humanitarian studies. These included the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy established 
in Moscow in 1687; schools set up by Archbishop Ioann Maksimovich in his dioceses 
(in Chernigov in 1700 and in Tobolsk in 1703-1704); the Kharkov Kollegium (1726), 
and others.117  
Our understanding of the proper place of these schools in the history of Russian 
education is impeded by a tendency to view everything happening during Peter’s 
reign as the direct expression of his personal ideas. This could hardly be true: I would 
argue that often even though certain actions might have been condoned or even 
supported by the tsar, they were driven, in fact, by individual agendas of this or that 
particular individual. The history of Petrine education provides a good illustration: the 
establishment of many of the key schools in the earlier part of his reign is best 
explained not so much by the needs of the state or desires of the monarch, as by the 
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missionary activism of various denominations and competition among them.118 It is 
reasonable to suggest that Peter’s support for these schools did not necessarily mean 
that he shared, or even comprehended, the educational ideas underpinning this or that 
particular model and its social implication: in fact, the simultaneous existence of such 
vastly different models suggests as much.  
A telling example, emphasizing both this point and Peter’s overall indifference 
towards disciplinarian educational innovations, is the fate of Pastor Gluck’s school. 
Ernst Gluck was not an ordinary pastor. He had studied theology and oriental 
languages at Wittenberg, Leipzig, and, later, at Hamburg, where one of his classmates 
was Francke himself. Subsequently Gluck maintained a correspondence with Francke 
and was clearly influenced by his ideas. He was engaged in missionary work among 
Estonians, Latvians and Russian Old Believers in the Baltic provinces and persuaded 
the king of Sweden to support the establishment of Latin schools there. In Livland 
Gluck also translated the Bible and various school textbooks into Latvian and Slavic 
languages and, apparently as early as 1697, attracted the attention of F.A. Golovin, 
one of the nominal leaders of Peter’s the Grand Embassy to Western Europe, who 
supported his translating efforts. Moreover, Marta Skavronskaia, Peter’s future wife 
and empress under the name of Catherine I, was brought up in his house. Thanks to all 
these connections, after the conquest of the Baltic provinces by Russian troops Gluck 
soon found himself in Moscow enjoying (although against his will) the status of 
Peter’s “special guest.”119  
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Having arrived in Moscow, Gluck quickly took over what was left of a school 
set up in 1700 by a certain Nicolaus Schwimmer. Originally it was meant to train 
young clerks of the Foreign Chancellery in foreign languages. Gluck, however, 
persuaded F.A. Golovin and Peter himself to support the transformation of this school 
into nothing less than a Gymnasium Petrinum.120 The curriculum of Schwimmer’s 
tiny school was dictated by the practical needs of a state at war (teaching the Swedish, 
Latin, German, and Dutch languages). Gluck, however, refashioned it into an 
academy for nobles. He intended to instruct pupils at his Gymnasium in ancient and 
modern languages, and also in geography, philosophy, “politics,” ethics, and rhetoric. 
Besides, he was planning to teach them “bodily orderliness [telesnomu blagolepiiu 
chinom nemetskim i frantsuzskim] according to French and German examples,” that is, 
fencing, dancing, rules of appropriate behavior, and horse-back riding.121 Indeed, his 
school was immediately recognized by qualified Russian contemporaries as an 
academy for the nobility: “That year there were schools established, to call them 
simply, academies, to study different languages and also noble sciences [kavalerskikh 
nauk] [such as] horse-back riding, and fencing, and [exercises with] flags, and music, 
and engineering,” Prince Kurakin reports.122 Meanwhile, teaching methods employed 
by Gluck at his Gymnasium were recognizably Franckean, including emphasis on 
supervision, on observing a detailed schedule with sharp delineation of work and 
leisure, etc.123 
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It is noteworthy, however, that when Gluck’s successors (his own son and his 
second in command, Johan Werner Pause) started an ugly feud after the pastor’s death 
in 1705, the authorities allowed the Gymnasium to rapidly degenerate into exactly 
what it was originally meant to be, that is, into a “language school.” In 1715 its 
remnants were closed down altogether.124 Peter did not appreciate either Gluck’s 
Franckean pedagogical innovations, or his broader agenda of forming “true nobles.” 
This lack of appreciation could sometimes be quite striking. Indeed, the 
emperor, who could be obsessively attentive to the details of his pet projects, never 
put any significant effort into working out the details of educational processes and 
procedures in his schools. Peter played a key role in shaping major institution 
introduced during his reign, and he personally drafted important pieces of legislation, 
such as, for example, the regulation for the Admiralty College, which was to serve as 
a model for all others, or the General Regulation. He could also personally edit 
successive versions of books he considered important. For example, according to his 
timetable for 1721, he planned to spend four days a week (Monday to Thursday) 
working on the Admiralty Regulation, whereas Saturday morning was set aside for 
work on the history of his war with Sweden.125 According to E.V. Anisimov, of all the 
decrees and laws issued during Peter’s reign, no less than half were either written by 
the tsar personally, or shaped decisively by his resolutions. Peter’s military regulation 
contains two hundred corrections and additions authored by the tsar himself.126 Yet, I 
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know of no comprehensive document on education and schooling that attracted even 
remotely comparable attention from Peter and could be taken to reflect his own views 
rather than those of his lieutenants.  
Indeed, most of Peter’s own (imennyie) decrees on schooling are exceedingly 
short: they are evidently nothing but oral orders barked out by Peter on some occasion 
and written down by clerks. One such decree is called, characteristically, On Train 
Horses for Army Regiments, and On Sending Young Clerks to Konigsberg to Study the 
German Language. The decree consists of two paragraphs: the order to increase the 
complement of horses at an infantry regiment to 300 comes first, the order to dispatch 
“30 or 40” clerks to study in Prussia – second. The paragraph on horses is twice as 
long as the one on studying.127 Evidently, both orders were ad hoc measures proposed 
in response to some specific instances of shortage of, respectively, horses and 
German-speaking clerks.  
Even more comprehensive Petrine decrees that might be interpreted as meant to 
institute some large-scale educational innovations are still extremely short and vague. 
Here is, for example, the often-cited decree of 1714 introducing mandatory education 
for the nobility and establishing a country-wide system of secular “cipher” schools for 
members of the elite, the first such measure in Russia:  
The Great Sovereign ordered: in all the provinces children of nobles and clerks, 
with the exception of odnodvortsy [single homestead owners], from 10 to 15 
years old, are to be taught numbers and some geometry, and for that end a few 
students from the Mathematics school are to be sent to every province to 
bishops and prominent monasteries; they are to be given space for schools at the 
bishops’ residences and at the monasteries and a salary of 3 altyn and 2 den’ga a 
day from the provincial revenues; and they are not to charge their pupils 
anything; and when those pupils master these subjects completely, they are to be 
given certified letters signed by these students [i.e. teachers], at which point 
they [teachers] are allowed to take a ruble from every pupil; and without such 
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certificates they [pupils] are not to be allowed to marry and not to be issued 
marriage certificates.128   
That is all that the legislator had to say on the subject (and that, moreover, was 
initially a verbal order). The salary for teachers was specified, but the methods of 
instruction were not. Neither, for all practical purposes, was the curriculum: note the 
typically vague “some geometry” and “a few students.” The decree, it appears, 
implied that basic literacy was to be acquired by pupils elsewhere, but where exactly 
it was not clear. The next year the tsar repeated his order, as if the 1714 decree never 
existed. This time the decree was even shorter: “From the school of My Lord Grand 
Admiral take [students] who have already mastered Geography and Geometry, and 
send them to every province, two to each, to teach young children of various 
ranks.”129 The decree was repeated again in 1716. In 1719 the Senate repeated it again 
citing a report that of all the central provinces a school had been set up in Yaroslavl 
only.130 
 In fact, the more comprehensive educational regulations produced in Peter’s 
reign were invariably written not by the tsar himself but by his lieutenants. Here the 
question of authorship of key ideas and concepts comes up again: traditionally, 
historians tend to treat the works of some of Peter’s lieutenants as directly reflecting 
Peter’s own views.131 This approach might not be necessarily justified, however. 
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131 N.I. Pavlenko, for example, in his old work used the writings of Peter and Archbishop 
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Surely, Peter’s collaborators did not write anything that was blatantly contrary to the 
tsar’s views, but that does not mean that their more sophisticated ideas were 
necessarily shared and comprehended by him. In many instances Peter knew what he 
was doing far better than his contemporaries, and articulated it more clearly. But when 
compared to such highly educated individuals as Feofan Prokopovich or some of his 
foreign-born advisors, the tsar was way behind conceptually.  
A good example of such collaboration is the relatively extensive Instruction for 
the Marine Academy of 1715. The Instruction laid out a set of rules of behavior for 
noble gardemariny. Besides military discipline, it also included measures meant to 
expose students to norms of conduct appropriate for a polite gentleman. Gardemariny 
were expected to “display all possible respect for each other, and call each other My 
Lord [Moim Gospodinom]” (Article 9), and “make an effort regarding their dress, and 
always to be clean both in their dress and their underwear” (Article 26). The students 
were to refrain from “drinking, swearing, and blasphemy,” (Article 18) and to behave 
orderly “without any confusion and without any affront to each other” (Article 3). 
Their day was to start with a common prayer (Articles 2).132 
The author of the Instruction is not known. To launch the Academy Peter hired 
a French expatriate Baron de Saint Hilaire. Although textually the Instruction differs 
significantly from a proposal written by Saint Hilaire in 1713, he should probably still 
be considered its author. At the very least, the format of the Instruction is somewhat 
unusual for Petrine documents: most of the articles start with the formula “His Tsarist 
Majesty orders that…” (Ego Tsarskoe Velichestvo povelevaet…), as if the author 
speaks on the tsar’s behalf. Moreover, Baron de Saint Hilaire ran the Academy for the 
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first two years, which probably would not have been the case, were his ideas rejected. 
His dismissal was a result, apparently, of his quarrels with Russian dignitaries.133 
Similarly to Gluck’s Gymnasium – and despite significant attention paid by the tsar to 
his “favorite school” – all the disciplinarian principles outlined in the Instruction were 
soon forgotten, or rather, failed to be implemented.134 Weber, the Hanoverian envoy, 
reported a few years later that the school “only taught navigation and what belonged 
to it.”135 In terms of the teaching arrangements the Academy never moved beyond an 
“institutionalized apprenticeship.” 
 Serving as clear evidence of Peter’s own thinking on the subject are his 
additions to the final text of the Instruction, included in the version this document 
published in PSZ. (The very fact that he though it necessary to make them also 
suggest that the Instructions was not written by Peter). These additions are, indeed, 
telling. Article 7 of the Instruction dealt with absenteeism, and the tsar added that the 
“Director is not to allow anybody to leave the city for whatever reason without a letter 
signed by an Admiral.” Article 8 dealt with behavior in the classroom. Here Peter 
commands that 
For subduing shouting and rioting choose from among the guardsmen good 
retired infantrymen, and put one of them in every classroom with a whip in his 
hands during the studies; and if a student starts rioting, beat him with this whip 
regardless of his family.  
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At the end the tsar adds a resolution: “So be it. It is also necessary to add to each 
article [specific] punishment [for violating it].”136 Discipline for Peter is the same 
thing as corporal punishment.  
*   *   * 
Much is made of Peter’s alleged belief in rationality of human beings. Indeed, 
many of Peter’s decrees betray a belief that the measures, taken by the state, ought to 
be explained, so that the rational subjects would see and recognize the beneficial 
results, to be expected from these innovations.137 At the same time, Peter knew that 
his God-fearing subjects did not automatically follow his order. On the contrary, as 
Marc Raeff noted, the emperor, in fact, “acted on the assumption that all of his 
innovations will be resented and resisted.”138 Hence, the promises of “merciless 
beating” and other punishments for offenders, so common in Petrine decrees. Peter 
had a tendency to supply his subjects with models of everything: of bayonets, knives, 
hats etc. – to be copied and used.139 He was thinking however, purely in terms of 
outward submission: in 1707 he ordered that nobody working at the Admiralty wear a 
Cossack-style cap, but rather use a hat of an approved model. The old-fashioned hats 
were to be taken off heads by the guards, and that was the end of the story.140 
There are, of course, other examples. In November 1723, commenting in a 
decree on the difficulty of promoting manufacturing in Russia, Peter wrote  
It is true that few are eager, inasmuch as our folk are like unschooled children 
who will never take up the alphabet if not compelled to do so by the master, 
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and who find it vexing at first. But once they learn it, they are grateful; and 
this is clearly true of all the current undertakings carried out under 
compulsion. For already gratitude is heard for much that has borne fruit.141 
 The same idea, that practice makes habit, is found in a decree of one of the 
most famous of Peter’s cultural innovations – the assamblei, or assemblies, decreed 
by him into being in 1718 and meant to introduce to Russia the Western model of 
polite socializing. The author explains at the end of the preamble that the decree 
regulated “the manner in which these assamblei are to be held is explained below, for 
the period until it becomes habit.”142 Yet, we know that the decree was actually 
written by the chief of the St.Petersburg police, Anton Devier, a Portugalese 
expatriate.143 Surely, by commissioning Devier to draft this decree Peter wanted to 
send some sort of message to his subjects. But could this particular wording be 
interpreted as reflecting his personal sensibilities?  
So, did Peter have any explicit notion of education, and specifically, of 
transforming his subjects through education? In a note to clerks compiling the history 
of his reign he lists among his key cultural achievements the establishment of the 
“navigation school” and “schools of German and other languages,” and also the 
expansion of the “Latin schools” – along with permitting his subjects to study abroad 
and forbidding them to grow beards. No explanation of importance of these measures 
is offered, however.144 Late in his life Peter commented on a lists of statements 
(quotations, apparently) prepared by some assistant and meant, the publisher of his 
papers suggests, to express the philosophy of his reign. He writes a heartfelt paragraph 
commenting on the issue of vengeance as a necessary element of rulership. The 
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statements that “The ignorant ones ought to be instructed,” and that “Reasoning is the 
highest of all virtues, for any virtue without reasoning is empty” are left without 
comment.145 Significantly, perhaps, he has not reacted in any way to the project for 
establishing formal schools (academies) for the nobility presented to him by Fedor 
Saltykov (see next chapter) and Baron Magnus Wilhelm Nieroth, a Franckean Pietist 
and an Estland landowner (who had actually set up such a school on his own and was 
asking for governmental support),146 or to two anonymous projects for establishing an 
“Academy of Politics” and “Slavo-Latin Academies.”147 Equally ignored were the 
projects presented by Leibnitz, including his idea to establish the College of 
Education – a governmental department in charge of schooling.148  
All this may sound unfair and ahistorical. To be sure, Peter clearly wanted to 
effect change in society, which was quite a radical break with the past in a society that 
was still essentially medieval in its attitudes towards time and tradition.149 Still, when 
Petrine schools are compared to the Berlin Cadet Corps instituted around the same 
time, this absence of any concern for modern disciplinarian techniques could not be 
more glaring. Peter studied Prussian examples quite extensively, yet as far as 
schooling was concerned, he chose to ignore them. The reason, I would tentatively 
suggest, is not his “practicality,” but rather his inability to see the mind as a separate 
object of manipulation and disciplining. He was not prepared to think in terms of 
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contemporary discourse on body and mind, environment and nature, and, in essence, 
lacked a concept of “morality.” Proverbial shaving of beards was, therefore, totally 
consistent with Peter’s overall view of social pedagogy. At the end, nothing, probably, 
illustrates Peter’s indifference to these issues better than a decree demanding that “In 
Kazan and Azov provinces Bessurmen of the Mohammedan faith are to be baptized in 
a half year at most.”150 Whether it was the expression of Peter’s Westernized (of his 
increasingly outdated rationalistic notion of governability), or traditional (of the ritual-
focused Orthodox religiosity, or of uncomplicated Russian view of society in general) 
outlook is hard to tell without a further in-depth study: most probably, it is one more 
case of the new, imported notions curiously strengthening the old, traditional ones.       
*   *   * 
At this point, a brief overview of Peter’s policies towards the nobility is due. 
Indeed, in the second part of his reign the emperor took a number of significant steps 
toward the creation of a more “Western-like” nobility. This, his 1714 decree on 
“single inheritance” was meant to achieve two goals. On the one hand, the 
disinherited younger sons would be induced to join state service (which was 
mandatory anyway, of course), as they did in the West. On the other, this measure 
would help to avoid the splintering of landed estates: as a result of this new decree, 
the legislator argued, “Great families would not be declining [any more].”151  
This reference to the “great families” is significant, for even though Peter 
envisioned a unified nobility, gradations of birth mattered to him. Znatnost’ (literally, 
“prominence”) was routinely used as a social category in personnel decisions of his 
reign. This broad category gradually replaces in the governmental parlance the 
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numerous older categories of servitors. In 1704, the decree announcing a review of 
young nobles enumerates “boyars, okol’nichichie, the Duma nobles, and all the palace 
personnel [palatnykh liudei].”152 In 1712, a similar decree is addressed “to the 
members of prominent families and the children of the nobility.”153 A still broader 
category of shl’akhetstvo, derived from the Polish sczliahta and embracing all the 
nobles, was first officially introduced by Peter himself in 1712, and in the 1720s-
1730s it becomes a common way of referring to the nobility.154 Meanwhile, the 
category of “prominent” nobility remained very much in use. In his comment on the 
list of prospective candidates for the position of Master of the Heraldry, for example, 
Peter specifically orders that the members of the Military College be involved in the 
election of the Master, for “there are many prominent ones [znatnykh] among them.” 
Note that the list of candidates included two princes, three royal in-laws (Naryshkin, 
Apraksin, and Saltykov), and two members of old non-titled nobility.155  Even more 
tellingly, in a personal letter Peter berates Admiral Apraksin for drafting into the navy 
only the lower-born nobles: “only five [nobles] are drafted, and even those from the 
lower nobility [iz nizkikh] (we offer to the Lord only that what is not good enough for 
ourselves [a Russian proverb; na tebe Bozhe chto nam negozhe).”156 Subsequently, the 
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decrees specified that “the prominent ones … are to be enrolled in the Guards, and the 
rest – into the army.”157   
Yet, what exactly does this prominence implied was not clear. In fact, in 1724 
the Military College requested from the Senate a clarification on which definition it 
should use in distributing young nobles among various regiments – whether the 
“prominence” should be measured in the number of serfs owned (100 male serfs and 
more), or according to the father’s position in the Table of Ranks. Both of these 
definitions were, in fact, used in contemporary administrative practice. Note that the 
Military College (upon the suggestion, of all men, its president, Prince A.I. Repnin) 
excluded “genealogy and titles” (po rodosloviiu i titlam) from the list of possible 
definitions. Peter’s cryptic (and famous) resolution was “Znatnoe dvor’antsvo po 
godnosti schitat” (“Prominence of nobility is to be measured according to one’s 
fitness”).158 
  This resolution, however, contradicted Peter’s own established practice: in 
1713, for example, it was decreed that all minors who had at least 130 serf household 
present themselves for revue in Saint Petersburg, and the rest – in Moscow.159 More 
importantly, it did not offer any definition of “fitness.” This resulted in a protracted 
correspondence between various agencies which continued after Peter’s death. In 
December 1724, the Heraldry vaguely suggested that, absent any clarification from 
the sovereign, “fitness” should probably be taken to encompass physically able body 
and certain age (16 years old of age or older), and, in some circumstances, literacy. A 
member of the Military College acerbically remarked that, according to this 
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definition, all the young noble servitors were “prominent,” for “the unfit ones are not 
enlisted in H.I.M.’s service.” Still, for the lack of any alternative, this definition was 
accepted as the criterion for selecting young nobles for service in the Guards.160      
That was a very loose criterion, indeed, as at no point in time could all the able-
bodied young nobles be accepted into the Guards. The failure of Peter to establish 
different criteria of fitness, ability, and merit is noteworthy, though. In his memoirs 
V.V. Golovin tells that in 1712 all the noble minors were summoned to St.Petersburg, 
and  
at the end of May there was a revue, conducted by His Tsarist Majesty 
personally, who deigned to divide us into three groups: first, the older ones, 
[were called for active] service as privates, those in the middle, [were sent] 
overseas to Holland to study the naval science of navigation, (and I, sinner, 
was among them, to my misfortune), and the younger ones [were sent] to 
study at Revel.161 
Age, thus, was taken by Peter to be the main criterion for sorting out the young 
nobles. Characteristically, the famed instrument of meritocracy, the Table of Ranks, 
contains no references to merit: it simply institutionalized gradual promotion from one 
rank to another, but whether this promotion should be based, for example, on 
seniority, or on election by fellow officers (two options used in the 1720s-1730s), was 
not specified. In short, nowhere in Petrine legislation does one find any notion of 
intellectual or moral qualities as a definition of the nobility or as a characteristic 
required of a servitor, that is, as something to be taken into account by the state and 
measured. It was precisely for this reason that Peter, as is well known, never 
envisioned anything like education specifically designed for the nobility as different 
from the technical training of future officers and bureaucrats. 
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Chapter 4 
“To Equal the European States”:  
Reconstructing the Russian Nobility, 1700s-1730s 
In this chapter I attempt to present a broad outline of ideas on education, and 
especially on education for the nobility that are found in the writings of some of 
Peter’s younger contemporaries. The sources at my disposal here are few, and I in no 
way claim that the works discussed below represent any sort of consensus among the 
elite. On the contrary, these authors were clearly exceptional and highly atypical 
individuals, the key intellectuals of their time. In each particular case peculiarities of 
views expressed are, probably, better explained by the accidents of their education 
and career experience that brought to the attention of these authors one or another 
element of Western European educational discourse available at that time. As is the 
case with most of us, it would be fruitless to attempt to describe the views and 
perceptions of their authors solely as Lockean, Wolffean, Franckean, etc. Rather, they 
were usually a mixture that approximately reflected the key themes in contemporary 
philosophical and political discourse. While it would not be possible here to trace 
each and every intellectual influence and to attribute every particular idea to 
familiarity with specific Western works, I will, nevertheless, attempt to emphasize the 
uses and interpretations by Russian authors of such common themes of contemporary 
European pedagogical literature as human nature and environment, inclinations and 
ability, as well as the role of disciplinarian techniques. 
Still, the ideas found in their works are important for a number of reasons. 
First, by discussing this body of texts I am hoping to further emphasize Peter’s 
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indifference towards educational theories of his time. Second, some of these 
individuals participated in the events of 1730 and, to some degree, in shaping the 
educational policies of Anna’s government in 1731-1732. So, an overview of their 
writing helps to put the foundation of the Noble Cadet Corps in a broader intellectual 
context. At the very least, I hope to demonstrate that the concepts underpinning the 
foundation of the Corps and the educational practices employed there ought to have 
been recognizable to the top members of the elite.  
*   *   * 
Members of the Russian elite travelling to Western Europe during Peter’s 
reign invariably paid a lot of attention to the educational arrangements they 
encountered in various countries. These high-ranking Russian travelers observed the 
ways and mores of the European aristocracy. They identified themselves with this 
nobility and came to the conclusion that education of a certain kind was an important 
attribute of a noble. Prince Boris Kurakin lists in his diary various academies and 
universities in the countries he visited, and even observes knowingly (in September 
1705) that in Berlin an “academy for cavaliers is only now being set up, and [so it is] 
not quite good [yet].”162 The same year Andrei Matveev, an okolnichii and the future 
count of the Holy Roman Empire, ambassador to Holland and son of Boyar Artamon 
Matveev (killed during the streltsy revolt of 1682) noted upon visiting Paris:  
Truly, with great amazement should it be mentioned that not a single male or 
female member of French noble families could be found who has not 
undertaken the above mentioned studies for the sake of honest upbringing [ko 
svoemu chestnomy vospitaniiu]. 
The program of studies outlined by Matveev is quite typical, indeed, 
archetypical of a European schools for nobility in the late seventeenth - early 
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eighteenth centuries. It is also nearly identical both with that proposed ten years later 
by Fedor Saltykov and with the curriculum introduced 25 years later at the Cadet 
Corps: 
In France children of high families, from their earliest years, are educated 
[imeiut vospitanie]163 quite well in various languages and in all liberal arts, 
especially in mathematics, geography, geometry, arithmetic, in military 
exercises and horse-riding, and for that sake there are great academies set up in 
Paris, and also [nobles are educated] in dancing, and singing, and various 
musics.164  
By the time of his writing an attempt to set up such an academy had already 
taken place in Moscow. The fate of this Gymnasium, set up by Pastor Gluck, is 
outlined in the previous chapter. Although short-lived, it proved to be reasonably 
popular among the elite, especially after 1706, when the school’s new supervisor, 
A.D. Menshikov, ordered that the students be paid a “salary.” At this point their 
numbers rose to almost 100; 19 of them, however, studied at their own expense. 
Among the students one finds, apparently, not so much the likes of Andrei Matveev 
and Prince Kurakin, but rather mid-ranking noblemen and the sons of high-level 
clerks in the Foreign Chancellery.165 At the same time, the Jesuit school operating in 
Moscow in the early 1700s included among its students such names as the Naryshkin 
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brothers (Peter’s young cousins),166 Prince Golitsyn, the Golovkin brothers, and 
others. 
The idea that the nobility needed a special kind of education was, however, not 
self-evident. Consider, for example, proposals of Aleksei Kurbatov, one of Peter’s 
low-born associates, who was, among other things, a former superintendant of 
Moscow schools. Writing to the tsar in 1721, he called upon the government to create 
ecclesiastical schools for future priests, schools for sons of merchants to be instructed 
in the “art of commerce,” and also schools “to instruct young children of nobles, 
soldiers, gunners and other ranks in Russian grammar, arithmetic and geometric 
sciences for the multiplication of naval and artillery servicemen.”167 Kurbatov 
recognized nobles as a separate group within the existing social taxonomy. Yet their 
educational needs were defined in his view solely by their profession. Therefore, as 
far as schooling goes, nobles could be lumped together with other groups whose 
primary occupation was fighting. This approach is very much in line with the overall 
Petrine practice outlined in the previous chapter. 
Compare these ideas with the stance taken in his writings by Fedor Saltykov 
(d. 1715), Peter’s emissary in London from 1712 until 1715. Whereas Kurbatov was 
born a serf, Saltykov owned 1300 serf households. Besides, he was a member of an 
old boyar family and a cousin of Tsarina Praskovia, the wife of Ivan V, Peter’s half-
brother and co-ruler from 1682 to 1696. At the same time, he was highly 
“Westernized” for a member of his generation, at least in terms of his experiences. In 
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1697 he was sent to England and the Netherlands to study shipbuilding and 
navigation. Subsequently, he took part in a diplomatic mission to Poland, supervised 
shipbuilding efforts in the northern port of Olonets and in St.Petersburg. Finally, in 
1711 he was dispatched abroad on a secret mission to purchase ships for the Russian 
navy.168  
Saltykov’s two policy papers, Proposals (“Propozitsii”) and Declarations of 
state profit (“Iziavleniia pribytochnye gosudarstvu”) were sent to Peter in 1713 and 
1714, respectively.169 Typically for documents of that type and period, they were lists 
of unrelated suggestions on vastly different matters: from justifications for Russia’s 
claims to Karelia, Finland, and Lifland, to feeding paupers, horse-breeding, promotion 
of markets, “rules for writing history,” etc. In many respects, Saltykov was a man of 
the Petrine era: that is, a believer in the omnipotence of the state. The essence of most 
of his proposals boils down to “strictly ordering” various individuals and groups to 
behave in one or another way. He fails to give any thought to the potential inability of 
the state to monitor and enforce implementation of the proposed measures, much less 
to the unwillingness or inability of subjects to follow these orders.  
At the same time, Saltykov’s ideas on nobility and education bear clear signs 
of familiarity with contemporary Western concepts. In fact, it is thanks to the 
appropriation of these concepts that he was able to take a stance as a staunch defender 
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of noble privilege170 and at the same time as a proponent of Westernization. The first 
five chapters of his Proposals are devoted to reforming Russia’s social order along 
Western European lines. For example, Saltykov proposes to grant Russian nobles 
titles, such as Landgraf, marquis, count, prince, duke, etc. That, of course, sounds 
very similar to what Peter actually did: by the time Saltykov was writing, the tsar had 
already begun to grant such titles. Yet there was a difference: Peter bestowed these 
titles on his closest lieutenants, often the low-born ones, and his motivation was 
primarily to assert his prerogative vis-à-vis both his own subjects and foreign 
sovereigns.171 Saltykov, however, seems to suggest that titles be given automatically 
to all nobles, depending on the size of their serf-holding. He also emphasizes that “in 
case somebody from a lower rank enriches himself, he should not be able to buy noble 
landholdings, or votchiny, for those are appropriate for nobles only.” In other words, 
his proposal, if implemented, would have led to the entrenchment of the existing 
aristocratic elite. Saltykov also talks about introducing primogeniture, granting nobles 
coats of arms, hitherto unknown in Russia, establishing a “Ritterhaus” to keep track of 
heraldic matters and to publish annual lists of top dignitaries.172  
Petrine language crops up every now and then in the Proposals. For example, 
Saltykov justifies bestowing titles in terms of “benefit to the state” by suggesting that 
a fee be charged for them. Still, his preference for nobility is clear. Consider his 
proposal for a Russian cavalry company to be attached to the headquarters of the 
Ukrainian hetman. The government should pretend that it was providing the hetman 
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with guards of honor, but in reality these troops were to spy on him. True, he admits, 
in previous years there had been not a company, but an entire Russian regiment, 
stationed in the Ukraine, yet it did not prevent Hetman Ivan Mazepa from going over 
to the Swedish side in the Northern war. Saltykov, however, explains this failure away 
by pointing out that the regiment was made up of common soldiers, strel’tsy, with the 
only noble there being the colonel himself. He therefore suggests that the cavalry 
company be made up entirely of nobles, for “those of noble rank are more loyal and 
reasonable because of their nobility and because of their [concern for their] relatives, 
so as not to cause the latter any dishonor [porok], but to serve His Majesty and the 
state more faithfully.”173 According to Saltykov, nobles were useful to the state as 
better servants, but their usefulness is apparently based on their moral superiority. 
 It is in this context that Saltykov’s ideas on education should be considered. 
His central proposal, highly ambitious and unrealistic, was to establish in every 
province two “academies” with 2000 students each, housing them in monasteries 
(monks were to be evicted for this purpose). In the beginning of his section on 
education Saltykov wrote that the schools were to accept “children of noblemen, 
merchants, and people of other ranks,” yet afterwards he clearly referred to nobles 
only. Similarly, the curriculum clearly went beyond the practical needs of military 
profession, and replicated the educational pattern of an ideal Western European noble. 
It included a mixture of languages from Latin to French (“for socializing and 
conversing with various nations”), the seven liberal arts, mathematical subjects from 
arithmetic to artillery and architecture, and finally, riding, fencing, and dancing.  
Saltykov’s approach to schooling is part and parcel of Petrine practice in 
general. Education for nobles was to be compulsory; fathers were to be fined for not 
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sending their children to school, while teachers were to be similarly punished for 
keeping their students in school for too long, thus helping them to shirk state service. 
Yet, he is clearly influenced by contemporary European ideas on education. To begin 
with, Saktykov had a notion of individual ability: he admits that not all of these 
students will master the prescribed program. Still, “even those who are not completely 
learned will be better than those who are taken [into service] straight from their 
villages, for they will understand faster various procedures and state duties.” Indeed,  
when those young children from their early years on are always gathered 
together among themselves, they will improve their natures [natury] through 
continuous socializing [obkhozhdeniem]. In this case they will be much better 
off than those noble children who are currently brought up in [their] villages, 
growing up as a wild forest.174 
This passage is significant in a number of respects. First, Saltykov refers here 
to something he calls “nature,” which, apparently, determines the worth of an 
individual: not only his worth in terms of service, but his social worth as well. 
Second, this nature for Saltykov was not something constant, given from birth, but 
needed to be “improved.” Saltykov thus contrasts the “natural” state of one’s nature to 
the one created in the process of education. Third, this improved nature is shaped 
slowly, by continuously exposing an individual to an appropriate environment. 
Finally, note that this appropriate environment is created by exposing a young noble 
not to teachers, but to other nobles, while exposure to a non-noble milieu (countryside 
estate) appears to be detrimental. At the end of his chapter on education Saltykov 
discusses in a similar vein the education of girls, likewise, clearly the noble ones. 
These girls were also to attend schools to be set up in every province, “and when they 
gather together, they will be much more clever and polite [obkhoditelnee] as 
compared to [their current state] when they live until marriage at their fathers’ houses, 
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not knowing how to behave in society and to converse [ne znav obkhozhdenia 
liudskogo i razgovorov].”175    
If Saltykov’s views are considered in their totality, he is proposing a program 
for the reconstruction of the Russian nobility. A scion of a boyar family himself, he 
defines nobility not only as a service category, but as a qualitatively different group 
with superior moral attributes. Yet, in his writings the defense of noble superiority 
takes the form not of opposition to the Petrine reforms and calls to return to some 
ancient order, but on the contrary, leads to proposals for improving the nobility 
through education. This meant remaking the nobles according to models he 
encountered in Western Europe. In Propozitsii, Saltykov directly expresses a desire 
that “our womenfolk also equaled [that of] the European states [zhenskii nash narod 
uravnialsia s evropiskimi gosudarstvami],”176 and by “our womenfolk” he clearly 
means Russian noblewomen. Saltykov did not believe that his program contradicted 
Peter’s intentions. Quite the opposite, he was hoping that these proposals would help 
him to improve his standing in the eyes of the Emperor. Indeed, on many counts 
Saltykov’s thinking on education and nobility appears more complex than that of 
Peter. As a minimum, he views education as a gradual process of improving human 
“nature,” and also attempts to indentify some factors that might be helpful or 
detrimental to such a process. Saltykov’s writings, however short, are still unique. 
They are the most comprehensive analysis of educational matters produced in Russia 
in the first decades of the eighteenth century.  
As such, his suggestions on education, or on any other matter, were never 
implemented by Peter. At the same time, they were not rejected out of hand. Specific 
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proposals on various issues were sent for consideration to relevant officials and 
government agencies, including the Senate, so they were likely to have been read by 
many of those destined to become decision-makers in the late 1720s-early 1730s.177 
The sources of his ideas, however, are poorly understood: Anthony G. Cross in his 
magisterial study of Russians in England in the eighteenth century does not have 
anything to say about Saltykov’s experiences and meetings there. We know, however, 
that as a young stol’nik Saltykov was a member of Peter’s famous Grand Embassy to 
Europe in 1697-1698. In that capacity he apparently visited Halle, inspected Francke’s 
schools, discussed with the professor issues related to the education of Russian 
students abroad, and even received a book of Pietist theology with Francke’s own 
inscription in Russian.178  
*    *   * 
Similar influences and ideas could be discerned in the works of the three leading 
intellectuals of late Petrine and post-Petrine period – Archbishop Fefofan 
Prokopovich, Vasilii Tatishchev, and Prince Antiokh Kantemir. Besides their strong 
interest in educational matters and their familiarity with the contemporary European 
discourse on education, human nature, and nobility, all three of them were active 
participants in the crisis of 1730, playing a key role in the overthrow of the Supreme 
Privy Council and the restoration of the autocracy.  
Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich (1681-1736)179 was, for all the practical 
purposes, the author of the Spiritual Regulation of 1721, which besides establishing 
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the new principles of church governance in general, was also the most comprehensive 
educational document of the Petrine reign. The Regulation pointed out that the 
Russian army had been “poor and weak” until Peter gave it a “correct education.” 
Similarly, the Church could not function properly without the “light of learning.” The 
Regulation demanded that each bishop in his dioceses set up a school for children of 
priests and for other prospective clerics, and that only graduates of these schools be 
appointed parish priests or admitted to monasteries. At the same time, the authors of 
the Regulation warned that not every education is beneficial: “it should be strictly 
observed that this education be good and well-established. For there is education 
which is unworthy of that name, and yet it could still be considered upright by some 
people who might be intelligent, but not sufficiently informed in these matters.”180  
The model for this upright education was outlined in sufficient detail. There is a 
notion of ability here:  entering students were to be examined to see whether they 
were “dumb,” so that money would not be wasted on them. The author also criticized 
some unspecified schools for attracting great numbers of students without 
“considering how many sharp and good-studying ones there are among them.” The 
educator was supposed to identify those who give reasons “to hope for a great 
usefulness from them.” There is also a notion of human nature, which, in some cases, 
could not be reformed: “if a youngster turns out to be unshakable in evilness, wild, 
eager to fight, slanderous, rebellious, and there is no way to overcome him by a year 
of persuasion and harsh punishment,” such a student was to be expelled. Finally, some 
consideration is given to an appropriate environment for schools: the Regulation also 
advised bishops to set up their schools outside of towns, so as to avoid distracting 
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students by “noise” and unspecified “occasions” that might “carry away the thoughts 
of young men.” Once admitted, students had to promise to stay in the school until the 
completion of their course of study. 181 
The key role in drafting the Regulation was played by Prokopovich, and the 
subsequent history of church education suggests strongly that the passages on 
education reflected his vision and sensibilities. Besides being the leading ideologue of 
the reign, Prokopovich was one of the very few among Peter’s associates who had the 
personal experience of Western schooling (he studied at a Jesuit college in Rome), 
and he was known also for his familiarity with contemporary Western works on 
education. Enemies accused him of Protestant sympathies. What we know for a fact is 
that Prokopovich corresponded with Francke and, apparently, arranged for a few 
Russian students to go to study at Halle.182 
In the years following the promulgation of the Spiritual Regulation Peter, it 
appears, did nothing to push forward implementation of its articles on education. The 
story of the church seminary in St.Petersburg shows that the driving force behind the 
attempt to actually launch it was Prokopovich; Peter merely acceded to his initiatives 
and demands for funds.183 The seminary designed by Prokopovich (which he 
proposed to call Peter’s Garden, “Petrov Sad”) was to accept boys no older than 10 
years old of age, for they “have not really learned evil mores [zlonraviyu] yet, and 
even if they had, they have not yet gotten firmly entrenched in it through custom, so it 
is still possible to reform them.” While at the seminary, the students were to be 
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completely cut off from the wider world and not allowed to venture into the town or 
to see their families “until they get accustomed to being at the seminary and realize 
the great usefulness of such upbringing [vospitanie].” Only after three years at the 
seminary could the students be permitted to visit their relatives, and between any two 
of such visits students were to stay at the seminary for no less than seven days. In a 
Franckean spirit, students were to be constantly supervised: they were to visit their 
families only in the company of a special “inspector, or observer,” while any meeting 
with visiting relatives at the seminary itself was to take place in the dining room, or in 
the great hall, and in the presence of teachers. Moreover, each of the three “ages” into 
which the students were to be divided, was to be assigned a “prefect, or a supervisor,” 
someone of an “honest life; and a neither a cruel one, nor a melancholic.” These 
supervisors were supposed to prevent fights and cursing, and to make sure than 
students did only what they were supposed to be doing in any given hour.184 
 Teachers were also to take measures to “heal the boredom” [ko vrachevaniiu 
skuku] of the students. Lunch and dinner were to be followed by a walk, during which 
the students were not allowed “even to take books into their hands.” Instead, they 
were to entertain themselves with “honest games [involving] movements of the 
body.”  Meals were to be accompanied by the reading of history books describing the 
deeds of worthy men of the past. Students were also to observe occasionally such 
instructive spectacles as the construction works in St.Petersburg and in the fortresses, 
and even visit theater and learned disputation, for the latter would teach them the 
posture and oratory skills appropriate to future preachers. Note also his emphasis on 
finding truly qualified (“the best and certified”) teachers to be invited “from foreign 
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academies.”185 The plan for the seminary, however, led nowhere. Still, in his capacity 
as bishop Prokopovich founded a lower-level school that was based on exactly the 
same principles: rigid daily schedule, regularization of activities, and seclusion 
(including the demand that people not be allowed outside without supervision).186 
*    *    * 
Probably the most important works on education in the post-Petrine era, and 
certainly the most extensive ones, belong to Vasilii Tatishchev (1686-1750). 
Tatishchev was a member of a reasonably established, although not particularly 
aristocratic noble family; his career included, among other things, a few years spent in 
Germany (first, in 1706-1710, as a lieutenant with the Azov Dragoons and then, in 
1713-1715 studying in Berlin and traveling on government business) and a mission to 
Sweden in 1724 to study the mining industry. His later posts included assignments as 
the top colonial administrator in Bashkiria on the Volga, as the governor of 
Astrakhan, as the head of the Mint, and as superintendant of ironwork and mines in 
the Urals. He wrote the first ever academic article on the Siberian mammoth, the first 
modern history of Russia, a large number of articles and policy papers on various 
economic topics, and undertook an unsuccessful attempt to produce the first Russian 
encyclopedic dictionary.187  
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Tatishchev’s key texts on education and nobility are the Conversation Between 
Two Friends on the Usefulness of Science and Schools (“Razgovor dvukh priiatelei o 
pol’ze nauk i uchilishch”), Testament (“Dukhovnaia moiemu synu”), and 
Memorandum on Students and Educational Expenditures in Russia (“Zapiska ob 
uchashchikhsia i rashodakh na prosveshchenie v Rossii”), a short proposal for a 
restructuring of Russian education. All of these texts were written sometime in the 
1730s and went through a number of revisions, hence to point out the exact date of 
their composition is hard. Tatishchev also touched upon educational matters in his 
Discourse of the Russian Nobility [“Proizvolnoe i soglasnoe razsuzhdenie i mnenie 
sobravshegosia shl’akhetstva russkogo o pravlenii gosudarstvennom”], a position 
paper on the 1730 crisis, and in his unfinished Leksicon.188 His writing were, of 
course, extremely heavily influenced by the contemporary Western European works 
he read. In his works he praised or discussed, among others, Puffendorf, Descartes, 
Erasmus and Leibnitz, but especially important for him were Christian Wolff and 
Christian Thomasius. A large part of his Conversation, however, seems to have been 
directly translated from Johann Georg Walch’s Philosophisches Lexicon (1726), 
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especially the parts that deal with human nature.189 As one of his biographers notes, 
one more possible source of influence was a successful school set up by the Swedish 
Pietist prisoners of war in Tobolsk, which he had a chance to observe in 1720.190 
Human ability to learn, for Tatishchev, is determined physiologically. He 
argues that although “the soul in human body is, doubtlessly, perfect,” yet it acts and 
manifests itself through “bodily instruments,” which are, clearly, different for 
different people. He divides life into five “ages” defined by variations of mental 
agility and psychological traits (like stubbornness, curiosity, modesty, etc.). These 
differences are explained by the density and speed of the circulation of blood and 
“humors” (liquids) in the human body, which change from one age to another because 
of changes in other bodily processes (changes in of the body temperature, for 
example) and diet. Naturally, the younger ages are more appropriate for learning 
because (due to lower blood density) a child’s brain is like “soft wax”: it absorbs 
knowledge more easily. Similarly, differences in ability are explained by, among 
other things, the parents’ age: children born from older parents are generally less 
capable because parents by that time are burdened by “heavy thoughts” (that is, life 
problems), which in turn impact on blood density. Equally, the density of our blood 
might be influenced by heavy food, which narrows the “channels” and impedes the 
flow of “fluids” in the body. Another factor is practice: our body becomes more 
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skilled with exercise, and the same goes for our intellectual abilities, which is one 
reason why study is so important.191  
For Tatishchev the content of studies appropriate for the nobility is determined 
by two major factors. On the one hand, nobles are the “foremost and most honorable 
station [stan] in the state, for they are the born [prirodnoe] soldiers for the defense of 
the state and [born] ministers and town administrators – for government.”192 
Tatishchev therefore lists the usual “noble sciences,” including languages (especially 
German), mathematic and geometry, and also physical exercise (fencing etc.) Note 
that French is nearly as necessary as German for it is used by all the aristocracies, and 
also because “the best books on all the subjects useful for the nobles are written in this 
language.”193  
On the other, there is a very strong ethical element to Tatishchev’s thinking. 
He opens his Conversation by stating that for parents the source of “true joy in [their] 
children is their reason and ability to acquire good and avoid evil.” Furthermore, “the 
foremost science for a man is learning to know oneself.” Our reason (or lack thereof) 
is, in fact, the source of happiness and unhappiness, for humans have a tendency to 
always desire more than they have already, and that results in passions, envy etc. 
Reasonable man, however, “disregards the opinions of others, and is satisfied with 
everything [he has] and calm in his consciousness; and having acquired this [state of 
mind] he feels as if he had been the owner of all the land.”194 This theme of 
moderation and reason is constantly repeated in Tatishchev’s writings. It is echoed 
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also by a call for moderation in food, for example, for both indulging and restraining 
oneself too much equally lead to the disruption of bodily and, therefore, mental 
processes.195  
This need for reason and moderation leads Tatishchev to divide all the 
“sciences” into five categories: 1) necessary; 2) useful (languages, literacy, eloquence, 
mathematics, history, natural sciences); 3) foppish, or entertaining (music, painting, 
horseback riding, dancing, which is good for one’s posture, for example); 4) driven by 
curiosity (astrology etc.), and 5) harmful (sorcery). First come, however, the 
“necessary sciences,” which, once again, boil down to reason and moderation for 
“perfecting body and soul.”196 Note in this regard Tatishchev’s attitude towards 
religion. Although strongly condemning “superstitions,” he time and again 
emphasizes the need for religious instruction. The alleged lack thereof is one of the 
main reasons for Tatishchev to criticize both home schooling of noble children and 
the program of studies at the Noble Cadet Corps in the mid-1730s.197 Another reason 
for him to condemn home schooling also has to do with morals: Tatishchev follows 
the example of Saltykov in stressing the harmful influence of the family environment, 
where “women, girls, and slave children” could teach young nobleman nothing but 
laziness, vanity, and cruelty, while politeness and respect for one’ equals and 
subordinates, which are “so much necessary for all nobles,” are not acquired.198 Note 
that in his 1736 regulation for schools in the Urals (although these were intended for 
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commoners) teachers were instructed to care for welfare of students “in everything, 
not just in their studies.” In particular, they were expected to concern themselves with 
the students’ health, while the students had to come to school “washed and with clean 
nails” and refrain from “indecent games,” “obscene language,” lying, and stealing. As 
for the personality of a model instructor, he had to be “wise, gentle, sober, not a 
drunkard, brute, fornicator, thief, liar,” and his “honest life” should set the example 
for his pupils.199 
*    *    * 
Finally, in a discussion of the early eighteenth-century Russian reflections n 
education one should mention the satirical verses of another leading intellectual of 
that period, Prince Antiokh Kantemir (1709-1744).200 Although much younger, 
Kantemir together with Tatishchev played a key role in the 1730 crisis: both of them 
acted as spokesmen for the nobility, addressing the Empress with a call to nullify the 
“Conditions” and assume full autocratic powers. Another key actor and somewhat of a 
master-mind behind the restoration of autocracy was Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich, 
the Author of the Spiritual Regulation. All three men seem to have been in close 
contact at that time, and appreciated each other as intellectuals.201 In 1732, apparently 
                                                     
199  N.F. Demidova, "Instruktsiia V.N. Tatishcheva o poriadke prepodavaniia v shkolakh pri 
Ural'skikh kazennykh zavodakh." Istoricheskii arkhiv V (1950), 166-178. 
 
200 Kantemir was a son of the ruler of Moldavia who supported Peter during his unsuccessful 
Prut campaign and had, therefore, to emigrate to Russia. Some works V.I. Pokrovskii (ed.), Antiokh 
Dmitrievich Kantemir: Ego zhizn' i sochinenia. Sbornik istoriko-literaturnykh statei. (Moscow, 1910);   
Z.I. Gershkovich, "K biografii A.D. Kantemira," in XVIII vek. Sbornik 3, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), 
456-459; Z.I. Gershkovich, "Ob estetiticheskoi pozitsii i literaturnoi taktike Kantemira," in XVIII vek. 
Sbornik 5 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), 179-204; I.V. Shkliar, "Formirovanie mirovozzrenia Antiokha 
Kantemira." In XVIII vek. Sbornik 5 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), 129-152; "Monteskie i Kantemir," in 
M.P. Alekseev, Sravnitelnoe literaturovedenie,  (Leningrad, 1983), 119-146. 
 
201 A well-balanced evaluation of long-standing attempts to construe these relationships as a 
sort of a “party” (“learned guard”) is presented in A.V. Chernysheva, "K voprosu o sushchestvovanii 
'uchenoi druzhiny'," Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriia 7: Filosofiia, no. 6 (1989), 40-43. Poetic 
exchanges between Kantemir and Prokopovich are discussed in "'Proroche rogatyi' Fefofana 
Prokopovicha," in Alekseev Sravnitelnoe literaturovedenie, 93-96. 
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as a result of some court intrigues, Kantemir was dispatched as ambassador to 
London, and then, after the restoration of diplomatic relations – to Paris.202 Kantemir 
is primarily known as the author of “Satirical Verses”: the first five were written 
sometime between 1729 and 1732, i.e. in the very midst of the succession crisis and in 
it immediate aftermath.203 Satirical poetry being by that time a highly formulaic genre, 
these verses contain myriad references to works of ancient and modern European 
literature, including direct quotations. For our purposes it is enough to emphasize that 
among these references one apparently finds those to Fénelon, Locke, and Charles 
Rollin, not to mention earlier authors such as Montaigne and Erasmus.204 An 
important source of intellectual influences was also Kantemir’s studies of philosophy, 
natural law, and other subjects with the professors at the Academy of Sciences in the 
1720s.205 
The central themes of Kantemir’s satirical verses, are, unsurprisingly, human 
(mis)behavior and (im)morality: passions and the need to restrain them, vice and 
superstition, etc., are, quite naturally, central to all eight of his satirical verses. The 
characters – a glutton, a drunkard, a fop, an ignorant and superstitious cleric, a corrupt 
judge, etc. – have traditionally been present in European poems of that genre, 
although Kantemir “Russifies” them with a very sharp eye for characteristic detail. 
First and foremost, however, he criticizes the unworthy nobles – both those who are 
                                                     
202 He himself, it is suggested, wanted to be made president of the Academy of Sciences, even 
though he was only 22 in 1732: when the British ambassador to Russia pointed out to A.I. Ostermann 
the extremely young age of the new Russian envoy, the head of the Foreign College had to lie that 
Kantemir was, in fact, twenty eight years old. 
 
203 P.N. Berkov, "Pervyie gody literaturnoi deiatelnosti Antiokha Kantemira (1726-1729)." In 
Problemy russkogo Prosveshcheniia v literature XVIII veka, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1961), 190-220. 
 
204 These references and quotations are catalogued in detail in Iu.K. Shcheglov, Antiokh 
Kantemir i stikhotvornaia satira (St.Petersburg, 2004): 339-366. Kantemir’s Letters on Nature and 
Man (1743) were based on Fenelon’s Démonstation de l’Existence de Dieu tirée de la Connaissance de 
la Nature. Freydank, 162, n.22. 
 
205 On this connection see  M.I. Radkovskii, Antiokh Kantemir i Peterburgskaia Akademiia 
nauk. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1959).  
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not Westernized and live ignorant, boorish lives, and those who are Westernized too 
much and became useless (and equally uneducated) fops. Satire II is a dialogue in 
which a young noble complains that despite his extensive pedigree, he has neither 
rank nor office worthy of his illustrious name. His friend, however, points out that all 
of his forebears were distinguished and virtuous soldiers and statesmen, whereas he 
cannot boast of any achievement whatsoever. In Satire III, “On Differences in 
Passions,” addressed to Prokopovich, the author inquires whether the differences in 
our passions are determined by nature – whether it was “Nature who, having provided 
people with bodies and souls in them, gave them also passions, so now they [humans] 
were not able to master them?”206 
Satire VII, which was, according to Kantemir’s own comments, written in 
1739 in France, deals however specifically with education. Overall, it reflects the 
strong influence of Locke. Two themes are central to this poem. The first of them is 
the importance of moral, rather than utilitarian education: Kantemir has nothing 
against the arts and sciences as such; but he would rather deal with an uneducated, yet 
honest person than with a learned, but evil one. Education for Kantemir is about 
restraining passions: “The main purpose of education is to make sure that the 
maturing heart of an infant, having ridden itself of passions, become firmly rooted in 
good mores; through that your son will be useful for the Fatherland, agreeable and 
always welcome among people.” The second theme is the role of upbringing in 
shaping an individual. According to the author, most people believe that we receive 
certain “passions” from birth. Kantemir, however, repeats Locke nearly verbatim, 
insisting that “Most of our features, which are attributed to nature, upon mature 
consideration should be found to be solely an outcome of our upbringing.” Here 
                                                     
206  Antiokh Kantemir. Sobraniie stikhotvorenii (Leningrad, 1956), 89. 
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follows, predictably, a discussion of such issues as the importance of parental 
example and family environment in general, and as a subtheme, of perils associated 
with the detrimental influence of poorly chosen servants who have a tendency to 
flatter their young master, indulge his whims, or, in case of immoral female servants, 
to outright destroy his innocence.207 Note, however, that that although Locke warned 
against the harm that might be caused by immoral servants, the key dangers for him 
were associated with evil class-mates at school, so much so that he advocated home 
education. Kantemir, however – and before him Saltykov and Tatishchev – focused 
exclusively on the dangers of staying at home. 
*   *   * 
Thus one might tentatively suggest that by the 1730s the leading members of 
the elite displayed familiarity with contemporary European discourse on education 
and discussed it in terms of nature, body, and mind. Following this European 
discourse they stress the moral component of education. One might cautiously state 
also that their analysis of the state of education and morals in Russia leaves them 
unsatisfied. They believe, however, that this unhappy state of affairs is explained by 
the abandonment of Petrine principles. Kantemir, in his very first satire, “On the 
Scorners of Learning,” laments that 
Ignorance, in the seat of Learning placed, 
Beneath the mitre flaunts its ornaments, 
Gives judgment on the bench, leads regiments. 
Learning is flayed, and dressed in rags or worse, 
Driven from 'most all houses with a curse.208 
                                                     
207 Ibid, 158-159. 
 
208 Here “Satire I” is quoted as translated in: Prince Antiokh Kantemir, "Satire I. To His Mind: 
On the Scorners of Learning." Slavonic and East European Review. American Series 21, no. 1 (March 
1943), 5. 
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The poet expresses only extremely qualified hope that the young emperor, Peter II, 
would be able to suffieciently support learning in the face of the silent hostility of 
unnamed “many” towards it: 
Great hope, 'tis true, our youthful Monarch's name 
Gives to the Muses; ignorance with shame 
Flees him - Apollo's glory doth obtain 
A champion who honors Phoebus' train 
The god hath seen him striving without cease 
Parnassus-dwellers' number 'to increase: 
But many, out of fear, praise in the Tsar 
What in his Subjects they would fain debar.209 
 
It is quite natural, of course, for an author, closely following the models set up 
by Juvenal, Horatius, and Boileau, to present an unfavorable comparison of today’s 
decay with past greatness and virtue, a discussion of the “golden age” lost.210 For 
Kantemir this “golden age,” already in the late 1720s, is associated with the reign of 
Peter I.211 There is nothing surprising about that, given the rapidly developing cult of 
Peter. Yet, it is noteworthy how Kantemir interprets Peter’s educational policy: in 
Satire VII he insists that “Peter, our gifted monarch,” recognized the importance of 
moral education and set up schools specifically so that “an obedient reason would 
have the opportunity to put infants on the path of virtue.”212  
Years later Tatishchev complained that: 
There is no difference whatsoever in our land between a nobleman and a 
commoner [podlyi], nor is there a law to this effect, but rather [all those are] 
considered [noble] who own villages; clerks, priests’ sons who have bought or 
otherwise acquired landed estates assume coats of arms of their own invention. 
                                                     
209 Ibid, 1-2. 
 
210 Shcheglov, 84-97. 
 
211 Riazanovsky, 23 passim; Shmurlo. 
 
212  «Большу часть всего того, что в нас приписуем \ Природе, если хотим исследовать 
зрело, \ Найдем воспитания одного быть дело. \…И знал то высшим умом монарх одаренный \ 
Петр наш отец никаким трудом утомленный \ Когда его труды нам в пользу были нужны.\ 
Училища основал, где промысел услужный. В пути добродетелей имел бы наставить \ 
младенцев.” Kantemir, Sobraniie, 158-159.  
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The notion of ideal nobility becomes for him inseparable from education and 
morals: “Nobility [in Russia] is not educated, and schools are not established…; but 
without education a man does not know what decency, morality, piety, duty, and 
privileges are, nor does he have enough sense to understand his own, and his 
country’s, good and harm.”213 Thus, given his insistence that nobility is the “foremost 
station,” formation of a proper nobility – the one which would possess appropriate 
education and virtues and fulfill appropriate functions in the society – becomes, really 
an issue of constitutional (in the early-modern sense) importance. However, the period 
immediately after the death of Peter appears to be especially closely associated for 
Tatishchev with the abandonment of Petrine policies towards nobility. In his 
Testament he openly complains that “shameless profit-seekers [srebrolyubivye], 
because of their cunning pride [kovarnogo samolyubia] or ignorance, forsaking the 
welfare of their Fatherland, at first covertly, and during the reign of the underaged 
sovereign [i.e. Peter II, 1727-1729] openly, destroyed” the rules of noble service 
established by Peter. Among those rules he mentions the requirements that the nobles 
should participate in local administration, have a monopoly on officer-rank positions 
in civil service, and be trained to this end through apprenticeships at the government 
bureaus and at Russian embassies abroad.214  
Thus, overall, the late 1720s-early 1730s were a period of quite intense (by the 
Russian standard of the day) thinking among the leading members of the elite about 
the directions to be taken by the state, not only in education.215 It was only natural, 
therefore, for Tatishchev and other members of the elite to view the beginning of a 
                                                     
213 V.N. Tatischev, Izbranyie proizvedeniia (Leningrad, 1979), 386. 
 
214 Tatishchev, Izbrannye proizvedenia, 142. 
 
215 See, among others, Anisimov, Rossiia bez Petra, 95-105; Kamenskii, Ot Petra, 184-245; 
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new reign in 1730 as a chance for renewal, when the state policy towards the nobility 
would be set right. Putting education of the nobility on a firm footing was the key 
element of any such renewal.
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In part I of this dissertation I outline the evolution of thinking on education 
and learning in the early eighteenth-century Russia and place it within the wider 
European contexts of social disciplining. Contemporary Western discourse was 
defined by notions of human nature that put emphasis on disciplining minds and 
bodies through methods of milieu control, monitoring and assessment, regulation of 
daily schedule and seclusion. These methods were alien for Peter I: despite his close 
familiarity with contemporary European educational practices, he chose to ignore 
these educational innovations completely. When actually faced with proposals 
presented by various advisors and based on these principles, he likewise demonstrated 
remarkable indifference. Contemporary European concepts of human “nature” as 
something to be taken account of and manipulated were alien to Peter. That is why it 
would be unwarranted to describe his policies in general, and his policies towards the 
nobility in particular, as an attempt to “transform” Russia and the Russians – at least 
to transform them in terms of the early eighteenth-century educational discourse. In 
his sensibilities he was, essentially, a pre-modern ruler.  
At the same time, I demonstrate the growing awareness of this discourse 
among the members of the elite. Already during Peter’s reign the members of the elite 
attempted to use this discourse to legitimize their own visions of the nobility, where 
its claims to special status were conceptualized in terms of the moral (educational) 
superiority – superiority which was, allegedly, characteristic of an European nobility 
and which the Russian nobles were yet to attain. By 1730 the dissatisfaction of the 
leading intellectuals with the present state of the Russian nobility and their calls for 
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the creation of a “true nobility” became clear and loud. Anna’s reign was expected to 
bring about a moral reformation of the nobility as a key prerequisite for putting the 
Russian state in general in good order. It is in this context that I turn in Part II to the 
discussion of the establishment of the Noble Cadet Corps, of educational practices 
employed there and their theoretical underpinnings, and of Anna’s policies in general. 
The overall theme of these chapters is the gradual shift from practical learning 
towards a focus on the need to shape the morals of the elite.  
 
 
 
 
Part II 
“Among the Honest Nobles”: 
Reforming the Russian Nobility, 1730s 
On January 1, 1740, Colonel von Tettau, the Director of the Cadet Corps,  
congratulated Empress Anna with the beginning of a new year on behalf of the Cadet 
Corps and presented to her verses composed by a young cadet, Aleksandr Sumarokov, 
the future leading mid-eighteenth century poet and playwright.216 In his verses the 
young nobleman described the happiness and gratitude felt, supposedly, towards the 
reigning monarch by his fellow cadets and by the nobility in general:  
They [cadets] appeal to you raising their hands: 
ANNA, with THOU we see the light of learning, 
ANNA, be our MOTHER forever, 
We are becoming humans [liudi] out of nothing; 
If THOU, our MOTHER, were not the master here, 
Years of our lives would have been wasted for nothing. 
THOU! ANNA ist our MOTHER, MOTHER of all your subjects 
And, because of your kindness towards us, MOTHER of the entire nobility.217  
                                                     
216 Two hundred copies (70 of them printed on expensive paper of various sorts) were 
prepared to be distributed on the day. RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1818, ll. 21, 24.  Overall, the Corps 
congratulated Anna by presenting to her verses three times at New Year (1736, 1737, 1740), twice on 
the anniversary of her accession to the throne (1735, 1738), and once on her birthday (1737). On these 
verses and their literary context see Elena Pogosian, Vostorg russkoi ody, 23–84; "Mikhail Sobakin:  
Mladenchestvuiushchaia rech'," Annaly, no. 3 (2007); P.N. Berkov, "U istokov dvor'anskoi literatury 
XVIII veka. Poet Mikhail Sobakin," in Literaturnoe nasledstvo. Vol. 9-10. (Moscow, 1933).  On the 
role of the Corps in the festivities of Anna’s court, see, among others, A.I. Savel'ev "Pervye kadetskie 
smotry. 1734-1737 gg.," Russkaia starina 66, no. 5 (1890): 351-352; Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress, 
214-215. 
 
217  Вопят те всегда воздевая руки: 
АННА мы ТОБОЙ видим свет науки, 
АННА нам и впредь МАТЕРЬ буди буди, 
Мы из ничего становимся люди, 
ТЫж бы здесь когда МАТЕРЬ не владала,  
Жизнь бы наших лет даром пропадала. 
ТЫ! Нам АННА МАТЬ, МАТЬ всего подданства, 
Милостью же к нам МАТЬ всего дворянства. 
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This description of subjects loudly thanking their sovereign is not particularly 
unusual, but the line on “becoming humans out of nothing” is striking indeed.218 The 
theme of creating Russia out of nothing was not new, of course: Peter was 
traditionally portrayed as a demiurge, or as Pygmalion bringing to life his Galatea-
Russia. This time, apparently, the same myth was applied to Anna. Still, the bluntness 
of Sumarokov’s assertion is noteworthy: for all practical purposes, he is saying that 
until their enrollment in the Corps the young noblemen were but “nothing.” 
Moreover, the idea of recreating the Russian nobility through education is presented 
here as an element of an officially approved description of the regime’s achievements. 
After all, Sumarokov most likely consulted his superiors before composing the poem 
to be presented by the Corps’ director to the Empress, to the members of the court, 
and to the generals on its behalf.  In this chapter I address the “meaning” of the Cadet 
Corps by analyzing the decision-making process that led to its establishment and 
educational practices employed at this institution. I also address the reform of noble 
service implemented in 1736-1737. As a result, I am hoping to illuminate the nature 
of the political regime in the 1730s and the relationship between the state and the 
nobility during that decade; by extension, I am also hoping to shed new light on the 
crisis of 1730.  
                                                                                                                                                        
"Eia Imperatorskomu Velichestvu Anne Ioannovne ... Pozdravitel'nyie Ody v Pervyi den' 
Novago Goda 1740," in A.P. Sumarokov,  Ody torzhestvennyia. Elegii liubovnyia. Prilozhenie k 
reprintnomu vosproizvedeniiu izdanii 1774 goda ( Moscow, forthcomin), 227.  
218 Regarding the theme of “becoming humans out of nothing,” one is reminded of the often 
quoted remark by Ivan Nepliuiev, one of the nobles sent by Peter abroad to study navigation. In his 
memoirs he commented on Peter’s death by saying that the late emperor “taught us to recognize that 
we are human beings as well [shto i my luidi].” Zapiski Ivana Ivanovicha Nepliueva (St.Petersburg, 
1893): 122. Equally famously, he admitted in his memoirs that upon their return to Russia, the young 
“volunteers” (himself included) were “not only hated by our equals, but we were even ridiculed and 
abused by our relatives for the European manners evident in us.” Ibid, 96. 
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Traditionally, the creation of the Cadet Corps is presented as a “concession” to 
the nobility: the nobles, it is assumed, did not want to serve in the “low and 
demeaning ranks” and demanded in 1730 a right to avoid beginning their service as 
privates by enrolling in some sort of special school. Likewise, the reform of 1736-
1737 (which included, among other things, limiting the term of obligatory service for 
the nobles to twenty five years) is treated traditionally as a concession to the nobility 
that represented a major step toward the “emancipation” of the nobility from the state 
and, eventually, towards the emergence of an autonomous public sphere. How exactly 
the nobility was able to wrest these concessions from the autocrats is not clear, 
however. While the theory that mid-eighteenth century Russia was a dvorianskaia 
imperiia is not in vogue anymore, the leading contemporary historians do not seem to 
offer a coherent picture of the relationship between the post-Petrine state and the 
nobility. Typically uncertain in this respect is Robert E. Jones, who argues that in 
pursuing these policies the government had its own goals in mind (“using the service 
of the nobility more efficiently and productively”), “although [it] was not unaware of 
the nobles’ desire for a shorter service and easier requirements.”219  
Overall, however, historians of all stripes and persuasions assume the 
foundation of the Corps and reform of 1736-1737 to be a response to the demands 
voiced by the nobility in 1730. Brenda Meehan-Waters believes that Anna “granted 
many of the demands of the projects and petitions [presented in 1730] in the early 
years of her reign.”220 E.V. Anisimov insists that the mentality of former servitors had 
been undergoing a transformation in the post-Petrine period, and so “the government 
                                                     
219 Robert E. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785 (Princeton, NJ, 
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could not ignore their demands and ideas any longer.” While there were different 
views on the optimal political arrangements in 1730, all the nobles “were united when 
it came to their soslovnye [“estate”] interests.” So, after the crisis was over, “Anna 
took the traditional path, satisfying the soslovnye demands of the nobility, thus 
broadening the social base of her rule.”221 According to A.B. Kamenskii, in 1730 “the 
state authorities for the first time faced the fact of existence in the country of a social 
group capable of self-organization and defending its soslovnye interests.” These 
“tensions” between the state and the nobility, in turn, reflected the “transformation of 
the nobility in the first quarter of the eighteenth century and, in way, is a result of 
Petrine reforms.” There was a growing perception of common interests among all the 
strata of the nobility and a feeling that in defending their common interests nobles, in 
fact, struggled for the “good of the Fatherland,” or “the common good.” Speaking 
about establishment of the Cadet Corps, Kamenskii mentions that by doing so the 
state “satisfied another important aspiration of the nobility.”222  
The authors of the most recent specialized works on the 1730s do not offer a 
more coherent picture either. N.N. Petrukhintsev, the author of a study of Anna’s 
policies regarding the army and the navy, concludes that after 1730 the nobility “had 
neither organization, nor leaders, and was incapable of action.” Still, he feels obliged 
to insist, somewhat awkwardly, that the governmental policies in the 1730s, “although 
a direct response to the noble demands of 1730, were not forced” upon the 
government, but rather reflected the class nature of the “feudal state.” Petrukhintsev 
calls the establishment of the Cadet Corps a “measure of a clearly soslovnyi 
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character.”223 Lee A. Farrow, writing about the abolition of the “law of single 
inheritance” shows convincingly that the nobility resented and circumvented this law, 
yet she has virtually nothing to say about how exactly this resentment influenced the 
decision-making process in 1731.224 With the exception of Petrukhintsev, however, 
none of these authors studied the policies of Anna’s government in any detail. And 
none of them is able to quote a single document indicating, however indirectly, that 
the government in the 1730s was at all concerned with the attitudes, desires, and 
demands of the nobility, or that it viewed the nobility as a political force. It is simply 
assumed that if the measures mentioned in 1730 resembled those implemented by the 
government in the subsequent decade, there must have been a direct casual connection 
between the former and the latter.  
Finally, Valerie A. Kivelson believes that by creating the Corps and reforming 
the system of noble service, Anna “responded favorably to all requests [of the 
nobility] except those that encroached upon autocratic authority.” This assertion is of 
central importance for her argument regarding early-modern Russian political culture 
in general – the argument that seems to be becoming the dominant orthodoxy in 
recent years. Overall, she proposes, quite reasonably, that a traditional distinction 
between “political” (i.e. limitation of autocracy) and “bread-and-butter” (reform of 
noble service) demands of the nobility is misguided. According to Kivelson, the 
nobles acted very much within the framework of a traditional political culture – a 
culture where “kinship politics was politics and autocratic culture meant clan 
                                                     
223 Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie, 66, 100, 117, 299.  
224 Lee A. Farrow, Between Clan and Crown: The Struggle to Define Noble Property Rights in 
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maneuvering under the carapace of tsarist rule.” In fact, it was “the rank-and-file 
nobility’s focus on service, family, and inheritance” that “propelled that group onto 
the national political scene and forced the nobles to express an abstract political 
vision” in 1730. Thus, even though the idea of constitutionally limiting the autocracy 
was discarded, the nobles – by forcing the monarch to establish the Corps, to reform 
the system of service, and to abolish the law of single inheritance – still achieved their 
basic “political” goals. The outcome of the 1730 crisis meant that autocrat was 
“obligated … to hear noble complaints and meet noble needs.” This confirms the 
broader thesis, put forward by Kivelson, Nancy Shields Kollmann, and some others, 
regarding the “traditional consultative relations between a mutually dependent tsar 
and the nobility.”225 
In the following chapters I offer a radically different reading of the 
establishment of the Cadet Corps and of the reform of noble service in 1736-1737. 
The key to this reading are the administrative and pedagogical techniques and 
practices, which were employed by the Corps’ officials in a surprisingly coherent and 
determined way. Using the contemporary European concepts of human nature, 
outlined in chapter 1, as a lens through which to read these techniques and practices, I 
attempt in chapter 9 to reconstruct the broader concepts of governing and 
governability that informed them. I focus here on ideas and agendas of the two 
leading ministers of Anna’s reign, von Münnich and Ostermann, who played key roles 
in the establishment of the Cadet Corps and in formulating the policies of the reign in 
general. This approach allows me to inquire into whether these notions also informed 
other policies of the 1730s, and as a result, to reinterpret the trajectory of Anna’s reign 
                                                     
225 Kivelson, “Kinship Politics / Autocratic Politics,” 25-26. See also note 10 (p.6) of this 
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and the dynamics of the relationship between the state and the elite in the immediate 
post-Petrine decades. 
In Chapter 5, I reconstruct the policy discussions that led to the establishment 
of the Cadet Corps. Although the creation of the Corps reflected the general 
consensus among the ruling elite on the need for moral/cultural reformation of the 
nobility, the process of decision-making and the actual design of the Corps are best 
understood within the context of the court politics of the day. In Chapter 6, I turn to 
discussion of educational practices employed at the Corps. I demonstrate that the 
Corps officials employed an extensive arsenal of disciplinary measures, such as 
seclusion, monitoring, shielding from harmful influences, and creating an artificial 
Westernized environment, to turn young cadets into “honest nobles.” In Chapter 7, I 
outline the curriculum and the system of examinations used at the Corps. I emphasize 
here the importance for the thinking of the Corps’ authorities of various procedures 
for discerning differences in human ability, assessing them, and “sorting out” the 
youngsters on that basis. This assessing and “sorting out” was meant to identify the 
unreformable cadets and to remove them from the Corps to avoid harmful influence 
on the mores of their fellows. At the same time, such assessments were viewed as a 
pedagogical tool, since identifying and justly rewarding the worthy ones (or punishing 
the unworthy) was also meant to “encourage” other cadets to apply themselves more 
“diligently.”  In Chapter 8, I emphasize the centrality of such notions as “inclination,” 
“nature,” or “natural inclination” for the thinking of the Corps’ founders and 
authorities, and, increasingly, of other officials as well. In Chapter 9, I move from the 
discussion of the Corps towards the discussion of policies of Anna’s reign in general. 
I analyze the decision-making process that led to the reform of noble service in 1736-
1737. I argue that the practices employed at the Cadet Corps reflected the broader 
106 
 
thinking of such key personalities as von Münnich and Ostermann: I reconstruct here 
something of a “theory of governing” apparently shared by them. Building on this 
assertion, I argue that the reform of noble service in 1736-1737 was not 
conceptualized as a concession to the nobility, but rather reflected this “theory” and 
was thus part and parcel of the social disciplining practices used at the Cadet Corps. 
The creation of the Corps and the reform of 1736-1737 were meant not to give any 
freedom and privileges to the nobility, but to reform and reshape it according to the 
government’s vision.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
“Diligent Discussion in the Palace”:  
Court Politics and Education for the Nobility, 1730-1732 
In chapter 4, I argue that by the late 1720s the leading members of the elite 
were notably dissatisfied with how the transformation of the nobility was progressing. 
This mood, I would suggest, should be taken into consideration when assessing the 
events of 1730-1732. The foundation of the Cadet Corps has traditionally been 
described as a concession granted by Anna to the nobility as a result of the 1730 
crisis; as a revision of Petrine policy towards the nobility; or as a step towards 
“normalization” in a country exhausted by the excessive demands of the Petrine 
reforms. At the same time, we know relatively little about the policy discussions that 
took place in the first months of Anna’s reign. The Supreme Privy Council had 
already been disbanded, and the Cabinet had not yet been formed, so there was no 
institutionalized forum for debating policy at the highest level. Consequently, there 
are no records of any such discussions that might have taken place. The Kamer-
fur’erskii zhurnal for 1730-1731, or the official records of the sovereign’s daily 
schedule, including his meetings and visitors, has not survived either.226 
By reconstructing (as far as such reconstruction is possible) events preceding 
the formation of the Corps, I hope to demonstrate that far from being imposed upon 
the government by the nobility, this decision reflected concerns and goals shared by 
the key leaders of Anna’s emerging regime. At the same time, the monarch, the 
abstract state, and the equally abstract nobility do not figure as actors in this chapter. 
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Instead, the key actors here are the leading ministers of the reign with their political 
rivalries. While there was a wide consensus among the top members of the elite 
regarding the need to reform the nobility, the actual design of the Corps, and even the 
very fact that it eventually came into being, are best understood within the framework 
of court politics. 
*  *  * 
The decree announcing the creation of the Cadet Corps was issued on July 29, 
1731.227 Ernst von Münnich, the son of Field Marshal Burchard Christoph von 
Münnich,228 claims in his memoirs that the idea of creating that institution was his 
father’s from the very beginning. According to Ernst von Münnich, the Field-Marshal 
“submitted to the sovereign various proposals with the goal of improving the state of 
the military, which were approved and entrusted to him for execution.” Among them 
was a project for “establishing a corps of cadets, so that four to five hundred young 
nobles and officers’ sons could be educated there and taught both the physical and 
military exercises, and also foreign languages, arts, and sciences.”229 This assertion is 
                                                     
227 PSZ #5811. According to Stroev, the dating in PSZ is inaccurate, and the decree was issued 
a month earlier, on June 27, 1731. Stroev, Bironovshchina, Part 1, 69, footnote 1.  
 
228 Burchard Christoph von Münnich (1683-1767), a native of Oldenburg, spent nearly twenty 
years in the armies of France, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and Poland, before finally joining the 
Russian service in 1721 as a military engineer. By 1730 he was the governor of St.Petersburg and the 
head of artillery. In the 1730s he became field-marshal, count, and the head of the Military College; he 
also led the Russian armies in the War of Polish Succession and against the Ottomans. For (outdated) 
biographies, see M.Vischer, Munnich (Frankfurt, 1948); Francis Ley, Le Marechal de Munnich et la 
Russie au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1959). See also M.D. Khmyrov, "Fel'dtsekhmeisterstvo grafa Minikha," 
in Zapiski grafa Minikha, ed. S.N. Shubinskii (St Petersburg, 1874), 217-387. For a review of  the 
historiography, see Brigitta Berg, Burchard Christoph von Münnich: die Beurteilung, Darstellung und 
Erforschung seines Wirkens in Russland in der deutschen und russischen Historiographie; der Versuch 
einer Perspektivenuntersuchung an Hand von Beispielen (Oldenburg, 2001). 
 
229 For standard Russian translation, see: "Zapiski grafa Ernsta Minikha, syna fel’dmarshala, 
pisannye im samim dlia detei svoikh," in Rossia i russkii dvor v pervoi polovine XVIII veka (St 
Petersburg, 1891). All the references here are to the modern reprint: Ernst Minikh, "Zapiski," in 
Perevoroty i voiny. Khristofor Manshtein. Burkhard Minikh. Ernst Minikh. Neizvestnyi avtor (Moscow, 
1997), 319-410. The quote here is from pp. 339-340. 
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also repeated by Christoph Hermann von Manstein, Field-Marshal Münnich’s aid-de-
camp, who asserts in his memoirs that von Münnich began promoting the idea of the 
creation of the Corps “from the very beginning of 1731” until “the project was well-
received and approved.”230  
This version is plausible: although throughout most of the period von Münnich 
stayed in St.Petersburg, he did spend January and February 1731 in Moscow, where 
he was favorably received by the Empress and promoted to General-
Fel’dtsekhmeister (the Commander in Chief of the Artillery).231 And indeed, von 
Münnich, as I show in the following pages, played the key role in making the Corps a 
successful institution and also in shaping it according to his own ideas. In all fairness, 
he has the right to be called its founder. At the same time, the Field-Marshal is 
somewhat uncharacteristically modest in this regard: in his memoirs he claims that 
“he established the Cadet Corps according to the order” of the Empress.232 Von 
Münnich lists the foundation of the Corps among other military reforms he executed, 
such as the restructuring of the guards and the army regiments, the foundation of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
230 For the standard Russian translation, see: Zapiski Manshteina o Rossii. 1727-1744 (St 
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imperii," in Perevoroty i voiny, 273-318. The memoirs were written by von Münnich much later, see: 
David L. Ransel, "The ‘Memoirs’ of Count Münnich," Slavic Review 30, no. 4 (December 1971): 843-
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first cuirassier regiments and of the specialized military engineers units. He does not, 
however, mention any earlier (pre-dating 1731) projects or proposals of his regarding 
the Cadet Corps.233 
Meanwhile, the first project for the establishment of the Corps is found already 
in the papers of the Supreme Privy Council.234 According to the project, the Corps 
was to have 200 cadets, commanding officers, and support personnel, as well as 
teachers of artillery and fortification (military officers), riding and dancing, 
arithmetic, geometry, drawing, and foreign languages. Also, separately from the 
teachers, there were to be four professors (of jurisprudence, geography, history, and 
“politics”). The document itself is neither dated nor signed. If the label is to be 
believed, the project should have been produced somewhere between 1726 and 1730. 
In many details (including the direct references to the Berlin model) this project is 
very close to the actual charter issued in 1731.  
It was not unexpected, therefore, that the idea of a special school for the 
nobility arose during the crisis of 1730, when the Supreme Privy Council, at the 
moment of its most intensive negotiations with the rest of the elite, suggested in one 
of its documents that “special cadet companies [should be created] whose graduates 
are to be promoted directly to field-officer ranks.”235 This proposal is found in a so-
called “Articles of Oath” composed, according to G.A. Protasov, by the Council in the 
last days of January 1730, which marked the high point of the political crisis.236 Thus, 
                                                     
233 Von Münnich, “Ocherk,” 294. 
 
234 RGADA, f. 16, op.1, d. 76, ll, 1-4 ob. The document bears a label “From the papers of the 
Supreme Privy Council” attached by the nineteenth-century archivists who apparently removed it from 
the files where it was originally held. Thus, there is no way to ascertain this attribution. 
 
235 G.A. Protasov, "Verkhovnyi Tainyi sovet," 70. 
  
236 Protasov argues that this document was written after the original “Conditions” had been 
already accepted by Anna, but before the submission by the nobility of their “opinions.” It was meant 
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in a way, it is not unreasonable to suggest, as historians traditionally do, that the 
Council achieved its own “oligarchic” goals by forcing Anna to sign conditions – and 
was now trying to attract rank-and-file nobles to its side by introducing a package of 
additional measures designed to appease them.  
Yet, as demonstrated in Part III of this dissertation, the vast majority of the 
nobles were not necessarily interested in the  opportunity to avoid serving as privates 
by spending a few years at school. Nearly all the projects mentioned the need to limit 
the term of service for the nobility, but the need for educational opportunities was 
barely broached: besides the documents produced by the Council, the issue of 
schooling was brought up explicitly only in the project presented by Prince 
Cherkasskii and composed, apparently, by none other than Vasilii Tatishchev.237 
Hence I would suggest that the Council’s proposal was a part of a dialogue between 
the Council and other educated members of the elite regarding the further reformation 
of the nobility, not an attempt to placate the rank-and-file.  
Indeed, this proposal came as part of a larger package of suggestions on the 
overall constitutional arrangements and the status of the nobility. Thus, after spelling 
out in some detail norms regulating the role of nobility in a future limited monarchy, 
the “Articles” called upon the monarch to “relieve the nobility from service as private 
soldiers and sailors” and “in degrading [podlykh] and lower ranks” in general; to 
renounce the practice of confiscating the family property of nobles condemned for 
                                                                                                                                                        
as a way of extending the “Conditions” without actually correcting them, for a straightforward 
correction would have required their recall by the Council, resubmission to Anna, and securing her 
approval all over again, an understandably risky process. See also A.B. Plotnikov, “Programmnyi 
dokument Verkhovnogo tainogo soveta v 1730 g.,” in Rossiia v XVIII stoletii. Vypusk I (Moscow, 
2002), 38-49; idem, “‘Prodolzhenie’ Konditsii i poslednii politicheskii proekt Verkhovnogo Tainogo 
soveta v 1730 g. Verkhovniki za izucheniem predlozhenii ‘znatnogo shl’akhetstva’.” In Rossiia v XVIII 
stoletii. Vypusk II (Moscow, 2004), 221-232. 
 
237 “Dokumenty o vosshestvii na prestol Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny,” in V.V. Kashpirev, 
ed., Pamiatniki novoi russkoi istorii: Sbornik istoricheskikh statei i materialov, Vol. III. (St.Peterburg, 
1873), 1-16; Korsakov, Votsarenie, 160-174;  
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various crimes, and of persecuting their kin; to award ranks “on the basis of merit and 
worth, not of passions and bribes”; and not to admit peasants and serfs into civil 
service. To sum up, the Council suggests in the “Articles” that “the entire nobility be 
maintained on a similar footing to that of other European states, duly respected and in 
Her Imperial Majesty’s good favor and consideration.” None of these demands had 
any basis in Russian history: it was clearly not a restoration of rights and privileges 
taken away by Peter. For example, the Russian nobility had never been secure in its 
property rights, and the wholesale purge of clans deemed disloyal was standard 
practice. Instead, the “Articles” read as a plan for further reconstruction of the elite 
and for turning it into a “true” nobility, something quite necessary for the proper 
functioning of the state.  
It was apparently at this time that Tatishchev, that great enemy of the Council, 
began writing his Conversation Between Two Friends on the Usefulness of Science 
and Schools. The dates mentioned in his Conversation are somewhat confusing, and 
Tatishchev was clearly writing and rewriting this essay throughout the entire decade, a 
fact that also reflects his sustained interest in the matter. Significantly, he mentions in 
his Testament that the work on Conversation began after discussions with Prince 
Sergei Dolgorukov, Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich, and Prince A.M. Cherkasskii 
(and also with professors of the Academy of Science).238 Both Tatishchev and 
Prokopovich played key roles in the overthrow of the Supreme Privy Council, while 
Prince Cherkasskii, due to his name, wealth, and rank, was the undisputed (although, 
it is sometimes suggested, nominal) leader of the anti-Council party.239 Prince Sergei 
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239 Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich Cherkasskii (1680-1742) was one of the wealthiest landlords 
in Russia: he had over 70,000 male serfs. His first wife was a Naryshkin, a first cousin of Peter I, the 
second – a Princess Trubetskoi, from the same clan. Although he has not, unlike many of his relatives, 
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Dolgorukov, however, was a relative and supporter of the Council’s leading members, 
Princes V.L. and A.G. Dolgorukov.240 As pointed out by S.N. Valk, Prince Sergei 
Dolgorukov, along with his kinsmen, was already exiled from Moscow by April 9, 
1730, so the conversation between him and Tatishchev must have taken place before 
this date. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the conversations that gave the 
initial impetus for writing Conversation took place in Moscow between late 1729 and 
early 1730.241 It means that in the first weeks of 1730, in the very midst of a major 
political crisis, the education of the nobility was very much on the mind of the 
members of both pro-Council and anti-Council parties.  
Some clues regarding the subsequent discussion of a school for nobility can be 
found in Tatishchev’s correspondence. He spent 1730 and 1731 in Moscow, where the 
court resided, and was actively involved in a number of important policy measures of 
that period, including the preparations for the coronation and a massive program of 
reforming copper coinage. For his efforts he was promoted to the rank of Actual State 
Councilor.242 In the summer of 1731 his daughter married Lieutenant of the Guards 
A.L. Rimskii-Korsakov, and the empress herself acted as a matchmaker.243 In short, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
been sent by Peter to study abroad, he was put in charge of construction of St.Petersburg, and spent the 
last years of Peter’s reign as governor-general of Siberia. Throughout the 1730s, he was one of three 
members of the Cabinet – the highest governing body. Despite all this, he is widely regarded by 
observers as a political non-entity. Some of the foreign diplomats present a more favorable picture of 
him, but it is still true that as a member of the Cabinet he seems not to have had any political influence. 
RBS, 24, 183-194; Korsakov, Votsarenie, 193-194. 
 
240 Among other things, he was a graduate of the Uuniversity of Leipzig. Andreev, Russkiie 
studenty,124. 
 
241 Tatishchev, Izbrannye proizvedenia, 14-18. 
 
242 See, for example, his letter of July 14, 1731, in V.N. Tatishchev, Zapiski, pis’ma 1717-
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243 See memoirs of the bride’s granddaughter in: Rasskazy babushki: Iz vospominanii p’ati 
pokolenii, zapisannye i sobrannye eie vnukom D.Blagovo (Moscow, 1989), 10-12, 16-17. 
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can be safely assumed that Tatishchev was highly informed about court politics and 
the policy discussions of 1730-1731. 
His correspondence, if fact, contains references to policy debates on education 
held in 1731. In the letter of April 1731 to J.D. Schumacher, librarian of the Academy 
of Sciences, Tatishchev refers to unspecified educational projects which had already 
been discussed, yet had not so far materialized. He complains that the “establishment 
of schools here [in Moscow, where the court resided at that time] is being quite 
delayed, and I cannot see when they will be started.” Apparently, the discussions 
(which were being “delayed” at the time of his writing) began quite a while before, as 
Tatishchev had enough time to bring his son Evgraf back to Moscow from Revel in 
the vain hope that there soon would be opportunities to educate him in the old capital. 
Yet, Tatishchev despairs that his son “had lost much time for nothing, and will lose 
still more.”244 Discussions on educational policy continued, however. However, on 
May 24 Tatishchev was happy to report to Schumacher that “yesterday there was a 
diligent discussion in the palace regarding the establishment of a gymnasium here 
according to my proposal.”245 (It is not clear from his wording whether Tatishchev 
means that this was a discussion of a specific proposal submitted by him, or that it 
was he who proposed to have a discussion.) 
One month later the creation of the Corps was formally announced. In his 
study, N.N. Petrukhintsev discusses a series of decrees issued on June 1, 1731, which 
he construes as a program of Anna’s government. Thus, the discussions regarding the 
need for a Cadet Corps went on against the backdrop of broader discussions of the 
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most urgent policy measures to be taken by the new regime.246 During the first few 
months of its existence the Corps seems to have been under the supervision of the 
Senate and Pavel Iaguzhinskii (1683-1736), the procurator-general of the Senate and a 
leading supporter of Anna in 1730.247 Indeed, the decree of July 29 was “given to the 
Senate” (Imennoi, dannyi Senatu), and so the Senate started looking for an appropriate 
building (initially, the Corps was to be located in Moscow, with Frantz Lefort’s 
mansion, vacated by the recently-exiled Prince Menshikov, being suggested).248 
Enrollment into the Corps was initially administered by the Heraldry, which was 
directed by Iaguzhinskii in his capacity as procurator-general.249 Meanwhile 
Iaguzhinskii himself declared to the senators “that he would submit a project 
regarding the foundation [of the Corps] and teaching the cadets, and also a list of 
teachers.”250 In a letter to Schumacher on August 16, 1731, Tatishchev reported that 
“here [in Moscow] the procedures for the establishment of a cadet corps are already 
being composed, so I hope this will really be executed, that is, as soon as the 
necessary personnel for directing and teaching are found, they can start to gather 
cadets.”251 Throughout the fall of 1731 von Münnich stayed in St.Petersburg, so he 
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247 Pavel Ivanovich Iaguzhinskii (1683-1736), of an unclear national and confessional 
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could not have been among those drafting the charter “here” in Moscow.252 That work 
had most probably been conducted by Iaguzhinskii. 
Indeed, Tatishchev later reported in his Leksikon that the procurator-general at 
some unspecified point submitted to the Empress a project for the establishment two 
cadet corps (in Moscow and St.Petersburg), each with 500 cadets.253 In fact, 
Iaguzhinskii was qualified for such work as during the reign of Peter I he was 
commissioned on a number of occasions to study Prussian and Danish governmental 
practices.254 If Tatishchev is to be believed, the project was approved by Anna. Yet 
“Iaguzhinskii, due to animosity towards him from Münnich and [Count Karl Gustaf] 
Loewenwolde,255 was relieved [of his posts] and sent to Berlin, [and so] Münnich has 
corrupted this institution according to his whims.”256 This story sounds plausible in 
the sense that von Münnich and Iaguzhinskii seem to have been bitter rivals, and even 
writing twenty years later von Münnich could not conceal his hostility towards the 
procurator-general, long dead by then.257 Indeed, in the fall of 1731 Iaguzhinskii was 
rapidly losing influence and finally realized that he would not be made a kabinet-
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ministr. His frustration led to a public outburst against his rivals at the court. As a 
result, on November 8 Iaguzhinskii was relieved of his posts and dispatched as 
ambassador to Berlin.258 Ten days later it was announced that the court would return 
to St Petersburg, and on the same day (November 18) the Charter (Ustav) of the Corps 
was published.259 At around the same time (actually, during the discussion regarding 
the Charter) it was decided that the overall direction of the Corps was to be entrusted 
to von Münnich, who was rapidly rising in the empresses’ favor.260 Whereas 
originally Iaguzhinskii was originally planning for a corps in Moscow, the charter 
firmly placed it in St.Petersburg. At the end of the day, it was von Münnich who 
oversaw the creation of the Corps, drafted its new charter in the spring of 1732, and 
lobbied for increase in the number of cadets from 240 to 360, and for a rise in the 
institution’s budget from 33,000 to 63,000 rubles.261 
*   *   * 
In this chapter I show that the need for improved schooling for the nobility 
was very much on the mind of all the key individuals and elite groups circa 1730: it 
was discussed both by members of the Supreme Privy Council and by their 
opponents. Even more importantly, however, the story did not end in 1730. In the first 
year and a half after the crisis there was an impressive number of proposals and ideas 
in circulation (they are summarized in Table 2.1). Moreover, this was not the end of 
the story. At some point in the next two years a new proposal regarding the Corps was 
prepared by Vasilii Tatishchev himself. Fifteen years later he claimed that this 
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proposal caused his removal from the capital to supervise the mining and metals 
industry in the Urals: “Her Majesty received [the proposal] with gratitude, yet the 
Germans in their envy not only caused it to be rejected, but also led to my  … exile to 
Siberia.”262 As for the proposal itself, Tatishchev most likely refers to the document 
that was eventually found among the papers of Ernst Biron, Anna’s favorite. We do 
not know exactly how it ended up there and what the circumstances of its creation 
were. However, the fact that it was written in both Russian and German is highly 
suggestive: Biron was the only member of the highest leadership who might have 
needed a German translation.263 In this memorandum Tatishchev suggested increasing 
the number of students at the Cadet Corps from 360 to 500, while at the same time 
cutting down annual expenses from 65,000 to 48,000 rubles. Besides, he proposed the 
establishment of two “academies, or universities” with 2,000 students (“for bringing 
to perfection theology and philosophy”), four gymnasiums with 6,000 students, and 
“120 to 200 seminaries for males and females for basic education in all the towns” 
with 12,000 students.264 A similar proposal for vastly expanding the school system is 
also found in Tatishchev’s Conversation. Characteristically, he discusses the Corps 
under the rubric of “schools for the nobility,” or [schools for] “studies for nobles” 
(“shliaketsikie shkoly,” “nauk shliketskih”).265 It appears plausible that Tatishchev’s 
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insistent criticism of excessive expenditure at the Corps was implicitly aimed at von 
Münnich. Even if the proposal was not directly commissioned by Biron, who viewed 
von Münnich as something of a rival, it must have been highly convenient for the 
favorite.266 
Two conclusions can be drawn here. First, contrary to the assumptions 
prevailing in the historiography (see the introduction to Part II of this dissertation) 
there appears to be no reason whatsoever to believe that the establishment of the 
Corps was an echo of the crisis of 1730, much less a direct concession to the nobility. 
It was an important measure supported by the key members of the government, who, 
in fact, fought over the right to be put in charge of the new project. There is simply no 
evidence that the government viewed the establishment of the Corps as a measure 
forced upon it from the outside: on the contrary, being put in charge of the project was 
clearly taken to be an enviable assignment and a sign of Imperial favor. Tatishchev, as 
we saw, tried to take part in the court intrigues around the project, but was quickly 
pushed out by much more powerful players. Two “fathers” of the Corps forcefully 
pushed through the idea in 1731-1732, namely Field-Marshal von Münnich and Pavel 
                                                                                                                                                        
about 63,000 rubles a year: the 700,000 rubles mentioned by Tatishchev is an absolutely fantastic 
figure for that period. Tatischev, Conversation, 129-130; PSZ #6050. To further emphasize the 
centrality of issues related to the moral reformation of the nobility, one might mention that, among 
other things, Tatishchev is known to have been working in 1733 on a translation of a work by Dietrich-
Hermann Kemmerich, professor of law at Wittenberg. According to Tatishchev, this book is where “the 
rules of sound reason and well-being are shown”: that is “morality [nravouchenie] and natural law and 
law of nations” which pave the way for “rational life.” A.I. Andreev, “Trudy V.N. Tatishcheva po 
istorii Rossii,” in V.N. Tatishchev, Sobranie sochinenii, Vol.1 (Moscow, 1994), 5-38. 
 
266 The idea that von Münnich was overspending on the Cadet Corps is repeated again by 
Tatishchev in his dictionary. Tatishchev, Leksikon, 304. Note that a few years later Artemii Volynskii, 
apparemtly began formulating  proposals for reducing the size of army and army expenses after 
discussing it with Biron. Petrukhinsev, Tsarstvovanie, 203. Hence, the critisism of allegedly exessive 
expenditure on the army appears to have been a standard way for Biron to keep pressure on von 
Münnich. On the rivalry between Biron and von Münnich see, for example, Khmyrov, 
“Fel’dtsekhmeisterstvo,” 347-348. Incidentally, von Münnich seems to have been more or less the only 
dignitary to resist cutting down expenditure on the army after the death of Peter I. See S.G. Nelipovich, 
“Pozitsiia B.Kh. fon Minikha v diskussii 1725 g. o sokrashchenii armii i voennogo budzheta Rossii,” 
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no.8 (1990): 3-8.  
 
120 
 
Iaguzhinskii: the former – a German mercenary,267 the latter – the ultimate Petrine 
“new Russian,” a parvenu through and through. Both are highly unlikely champions 
of the “bread-and-butter” demands of the rank-and file Russian nobility. Even if the 
nobility was able to wrestle any concessions from the autocracy, the establishment of 
the Noble Cadet Corps was not one of them.   
Second, there is little room in this story for a “state,” much less for any 
abstract “state policy.” While there was a broad consensus regarding the need for such 
an institution, the final design of the project took shape within the context of highly 
pragmatic and cynical court intrigues and interpersonal rivalries. This is not meant, 
however, to juxtapose the “high politics” of ideas to the “low politics” of power–
grabbing and backstabbing. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, one does not 
exclude the other. Having assumed the leadership of the Cadet Corps, Field-Marshal 
von Münnich implemented there a highly coherent program of molding the cadets into 
“true nobles.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
267 Von Münnich refused to become a Russian subject well into the 1730s, making a point of 
renegotiating short-term contracts and maintaining his right to leave the country after their expiration. 
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Table 2.1  
Discussing a School for the Nobility, Late 1720s-Early 1730s 
 
 
Author of an 
Idea/Proposal 
 
Date 
 
Key Features 
 
Source 
Unknown 1725-1729 Corps of cadets, 200 
students 
Papers of the Supreme Privy 
Council 
Supreme Privy 
Council 
Late January - 
Early February, 
1730 
“Cadet companies” “Oath of Allegiance” prepared by 
the Supreme Privy Council 
Von Münnich Early 1731 Corps of cadets, 400-
500 students 
Memoirs of Ernst von Münnich 
and Hermann von Manstein 
Tatishchev(?) May 1731 “Gymnasium” in 
Moscow 
Tatishchev’s letter to Schumacher 
Iaguzhinskii 1731 Two cadet corps (in 
Moscow and 
St.Petersburg), 500 
cadets each 
Tatishchev’s Leksikon 
Iaguzhinskii August 1731 “Project regarding the 
foundation [of the 
Corps] and teaching the 
cadets, and also a list of 
teachers” (unfinished) 
Senate papers 
 Iaguzhinskii or 
von Münnich 
November 1731 Charter of the Corps: 
Corps in St.Petersburg, 
200 cadets 
PSZ 
Von Münnich Spring 1732 New charter, 360 cadets PSZ 
Tatishchev 1731-1734 Expanding the Corps to 
500 cadets plus 
establishing 
gymnasiums and 
seminaries in the 
provinces 
Tatishchev, a memorandum for 
Biron  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
“Well-Mannered Cadets”: Everyday Life,  
Foreign Languages, and Disciplinary Practices 
The decree announcing the creation of the Noble Cadet Corps in 1731 also 
explained also that the new institution would follow the model of “Prussian, Danish, 
and other royal cadet houses.”  Moreover, the Corps’ founders made a point of 
staffing the Corps with foreign officers, including some who had actually served at 
the Berlin Cadet Corps.268 As pointed out in chapter II, the Berlin Kadettenanstalt was 
not just any school: it was an extreme example of the “disciplinarian revolution” that 
defined the essence of the ongoing transformation of state and education in the early 
eighteenth century. The choice of such a model to follow appears highly significant: it 
meant a break with Petrine notions of education, of human nature, and of the state’s 
role. 
Indeed, the most striking feature of the new Noble Cadet Corps was that, 
unlike earlier Petrine schools, it was organized in such a way that not only teachers 
and books, but also the very environment at this institution, the structures of everyday 
life would have an educational, or rather, a formative influence on the students. The 
Corps’ authorities employed the full arsenal of disciplinary practices, such as 
structuring and regulating everyday life, secluding the cadets, monitoring their 
behavior, and creating an artificial Westernized environment. Peter, of course, also 
forced his nobles to wear Western dress and to learn foreign languages. However, the 
                                                     
268 See, for example, RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 8011. Mentioned, among others, are officers of 
the French, Danish, Prussian, and Hesse-Cassel armies. While some of the officers were hired on the 
“international market,” or were transferred from other units of the Russian army (which they had 
previously joined for a variety of reasons), at least a few were obtained directly from the King of 
Prussia in exchange for recruits for his famous “tall grenadiers.”     
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efforts made to this end by the Corps’ officials, their persistence, and the 
comprehensiveness of these efforts mark them as not only quantitatively, but 
qualitatively different from those of Peter. In the eyes of the Corps’ authorities 
learning polite manners and European languages was not only a matter of outward 
conformity, but also of moral transformation. Young nobles had to internalize the 
values of discipline, restraint, and order. The very possibility of formulating such 
goals, of course, implied certain assumptions about human nature: it was both 
something to be taken into account and to be sorted out, governed, and improved.     
*   *   * 
Disciplinarian practices at the Corps were based on the explicit notion that the 
arriving cadets were bearing the kind of habits and mores which, if left unattended, 
would prevent young nobles from succeeding at the Corps. It was believed that if left 
to their own devices the young nobles would follow these objectionable habits and 
might even corrupt their comrades. As it was explained in one of the Corps’s internal 
regulation, the reason for creating the document was that “some uneducated 
[nevospitannye] cadets show daily signs of their wicked character. Due to their 
madness, they not only persist in their wickedness, but also through their indecent 
examples lead other, well-mannered, cadets toward evil.”269 Therefore, supervision 
was necessary. Since the students’ customary way of life was to be changed in its 
entirety, replaced with a prescribed daily routine from dawn till dusk, the supervision 
was to be similarly all-embracing. This supervision was to fence the students off from 
harmful influences, to identify transgressions and to point them out (both to the 
offenders themselves and to their comrades) through punishment.  
                                                     
269 Luzanov, Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, appendix 6.  
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The attempt to isolate the students from the corruption of the outside world is 
evident at the earliest stages of the Corps’s existence. From its foundation the Noble 
Cadet Corps in St.Petersburg was housed in an enclosed compound. This made the 
Corps different from earlier Russian schools, which were usually housed in random 
buildings, often sharing them with other institutions, such as military units or 
governmental bureaus. The Artillery School founded by Peter in 1701 was located at 
the “Artillery Yard”; another was attached to the Artillery Regiment, the pupils of the 
third school, set up in 1721, studied at the “Petersburg laboratory house.” An 
engineering school founded in 1719 was initially located “in the antechamber of the 
Artillery Chancellery”; it was then moved to the “large hall at the Gunners’ Quarter,” 
and not until 1724 did it get a separate building. The Naval Academy through most of 
this period had to share premises with various Admiralty departments and with the 
Apothecary.270 When a school was given a separate building at all (the Sukharev 
Tower in Moscow, for example, was given to the Navigation School in Moscow, and 
the Kikin Mansion in St.Petersburg was given to the Naval Academy), no attempt was 
made to separate the students from the surrounding environment. Normally they did 
not reside on the premises, but lived with their parents or relatives, or rented rooms on 
their own. Although the regulation of the Naval Academy demanded that all of its 
students board at the Academy itself, this was simply not the case. Mikhail Danilov, a 
student at Moscow Artillery School in 1737, reported later in his memoirs that he and 
his brother stayed with a relative of theirs, a certain Miloslavskii, at his house by the 
Stone Bridge, and had to walk every day “to the artillery regimental yard by the 
Sukharev Tower,” that is, nearly to the other end of town.271 Note that Vasilii 
                                                     
270 Beskrovnyi, “Voennye shkoly,” 290-294; Veselago, Ocherk, 65, 82-85.  
 
271 Veselago, Ocherk, 82-85; M.V. Danilov, “Zapiski…,” in Bezvremen’e i vremen’shchiki. 
Vospominaniia ob epokhe “dvortsovykh perevorotov: 1720e-1760e gody (Leningrad, 1991): 309-310. 
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Tatishchev in his Conversation sees no need to have boarding facilities for students at 
his proposed schools for the nobility in provincial capitals: instead he calls upon the 
government to fund a “few rooms for the poorest” nobles.272 
However, the Corps from its very foundation was located at the palace of 
Prince A.D. Menshikov, the exiled favorite of Peter the Great, on Vasilievskii Island. 
Menshikov began construction of the palace in 1710, and by 1713 it was a four-storey 
mansion facing the river. Subsequently it was supplemented with two two-storey 
wings, and with the construction of one more, northern, wing the palace formed an 
enclosed quadrangle with an internal courtyard and covered galleries running along its 
inner perimeter. At around the same time two more two-storey wings were added: a 
“western” wing facing the river, and an additional wing running at a straight angle to 
it. With the addition of a gated wall on the northern side these new wings a second 
enclosed courtyard. By the 1720s the Menshikov palace was really the largest and, 
according to a contemporary, the most luxurious building in the new capital, 
surpassing even the imperial residence itself.273 By the time the Cadet Corps moved 
in, gilded mirrors and expensive furniture had already been removed from the palace, 
and it was rapidly falling into disrepair. Still, the exquisitely painted ceilings and 
walls, fashionable Dutch tiles, expensive wooden floors, and a row of statues running 
atop the main building’s facade reminded one that it was from here that Menshikov 
de-facto ruled the empire at the height of his power in the late 1720s. On the northern 
edge of the palace was a “large garden with a beautiful greenhouse and numerous 
service buildings”; it was also surrounded by a wall. The garden was sufficiently large 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
272 Tatischev, Conversation, 129-130. 
 
273 K.R. Berk, "Putevyie zametki o Rossii," in  Iu.N. Bespiatykh (ed.),  Peterburg Anny 
Ioannovny v inostrannykh opisaniiakh (St.Petersburg, 1997), 227.  
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that the cadets could subsequently entertain themselves by shooting birds there. The 
complex also included stables and warehouses. Later the Corps’ authorities built a 
large covered hall for equestrian practice and converted two chambers into an in-
house church and a hospital.274 
How meaningful was the fact that the authorities granted this palace to the 
Corps? Certainly it showed that the new institution enjoyed special imperial 
patronage. It probably reflected the growing influence of its high commander, Field-
Marshal von Münnich. At the same time, redistribution of spoils, such as the movable 
and immovable properties of disgraced officials, was standard practice in the period. 
In 1732 the Naval Academy moved into the mansion confiscated from Prince Aleksei 
Dolgorukii (but had to share it with the Admiralty and the Apothecary). In the early 
1740s the Academy attempted to appropriate for their schools the confiscated palaces 
of exiled dignitaries from Anna’s reign (Ostermann and Count Golovkin).275 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, originally Pavel Iaguzhinskii originally considered 
installing the Corps at the late Frantz Lefort’s mansion at the German Quarter in 
Moscow. From the government’s point of view, accommodating the Corps at the 
Menshikov Palace was probably the most expedient way of solving the problem: it did 
not require additional funds for construction, and the building was ready to be used.  
Yet, once the opportunity was there, the Corps’ authorities definitely tried to 
make the most of the fact that the palace was actually an enclosed compound. All the 
enrolled cadets had to reside in the complex, and the authorities tried to accommodate 
the faculty and the officers of the Corps. A foreign traveler reported that all the cadets 
                                                     
274 On the Menshikov palace, see: N.V.Kaliazina, L.P. Dorofeev, and G.V. Mikhailov, Dvorets 
Men'shikova. Khudozhestvennaia kul'tura epokhi. Istoriia i liudi. Arkhitekturnaia khronika pamiatnika  
(Moscow, 1986); Danchenko, Kalashnikov, Kadetskii korpus, 16 passim. 
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“live in this house, and it has only one large gate.”276 (Another foreigner believed that 
the palace had “as many rooms as there are days in a year”277). In other words, here 
was an attempt to create a self-contained entity with limited (especially as far as the 
cadets were concerned) contact with the outside world. 
The Corps’ founders clearly believed that such a separation had an educational 
purpose. Indeed, they agreed that exposure to the right sort of environment was a 
prerequisite for the formation of a “true” noble. Thus, the Corps’s founding 
documents mention that it should be located in St.Petersburg because the cadet could 
benefit from being close to the Academy of Sciences, various state agencies and 
military units, all of which would be valuable resources in the education of young 
nobles. On the other hand, an average Russian noble family was hardly a source of 
beneficial cultural influence. Echoing the writing of Tatishchev and, still earlier, of 
Saltykov, the charter insisted that the students had to be brought to the capital in order 
to separate them “from their relatives, estates, and homes, especially when their 
relatives themselves have little desire for learning or do not consider it useful.”278  
Once brought into a secluded compound, cadets were to avoid contact with the 
outside world, which could lead them astray. In June 1732 von Münnich ordered 
Baron Johann Ludwig Pott von Luberas, an engineer and diplomat in Russian service, 
and the first director of the Cadet Corps (from November 18, 1731, to February 16, 
1734)279 to prohibit the Corps’s officers from visiting taverns and coffeehouses 
“where there are billiard tables and other entertainments” because such behavior not 
                                                     
276  John Cook, "Puteshestviia i stranstviia po Rossiiskoi imperii," in Iu.N. Bespiatykh (ed.),  
Peterburg Anny Ioannovny, 407-408. 
 
277 Elizabeth Justice,  "Tri goda v Peterburge," in Iu.N. Bespiatykh (ed.), Peterburg Anny 
Ioannovny, 103. 
 
278 Luzanov, Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, 15. 
 
279 Ibid, 80. 
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only led to unnecessary expense, but also because “quarrels and fights and other 
indecencies” that take place at such establishments made it inappropriate for the 
Corps’s officers. Von Luberas was also to ensure that the cadets did not go there 
either.280 The Corps’s authorities were weary of other possible sources of harmful 
influence: a woman named Ekaterina Lursenig, “of Prussian birth,” for example, was 
deemed unworthy of washing laundry for the cadets because of her “ill fame.”281 
Later on the authorities issued an order prohibiting the Corps’s personnel from letting 
any outsiders live at their apartments in the Corps “permanently or temporarily.”282 
Appropriately, the gates in the wall surrounding the Corps were guarded by sentinels. 
Special rules regulated the cadets’ access to the city, depending on the season and the 
time of the day.283  
The principle of seclusion was closely related to that of surveillance. While at 
the Corps cadets were to be kept under constant “supervision,” which was described 
as crucial for their improvement. The imperial decree proclaiming the foundation of 
the Corps stated that “it is necessary that all the cadets of the Corps live in one house, 
following the example of the Prussian, Danish and other Royal Cadet houses, so that 
they waste less time on walking around, inappropriate behavior and entertainments, 
but rather [spend their time] on their studies as well as on all other activities under 
constant supervision.”284 The idea of putting young nobles under “supervision” is 
reinforced in a later decree, which mentions that the earlier practice of sending young 
nobles abroad to study did not produce the desired result. This was precisely because 
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281 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 8011, ll. 6ob-7. 
 
282 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2570, l. 1. 
 
283 Luzanov, Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, 58-59. 
 
284 PSZ #5881. 
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the youngsters “did not have sufficient supervision” while in foreign countries, and 
hence wasted time on various objectionable activities.285 Overall, the supervisors, 
according to the decree, were to “diligently watch their mores, habits, and deeds, so 
that they behaved according to the demands of virtue, politeness, due humility, and 
honor, while lies, unfaithfulness, and other vices inappropriate for nobility were 
rooted out from them early on.”286 Teachers were to submit monthly reports on the 
academic progress of each cadet. In addition, company officers were expected to 
produce similar reports on their behavior.287 
At the Corps the cadets themselves were involved in supervising each other. 
Each room had to have a cadet “headman.” The best among the cadets were promoted 
to be an NCO. A regulation written in 1750 specifies their duties: besides carrying out 
ordinary military tasks, like standing on guard, etc., they entail primarily “overseeing” 
and “supervising” other cadets.288 The Corps authorities tried to establish their control 
over the cadets even when they were given leave. In July 1732, for example, director 
von Luberas ordered that in such cases “two or three or more of them should go to the 
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287 Not only cadets were to be disciplined and monitored, but the instructors as well. 
According to a government decree, besides good teachers, there were also “the lazy ones, who have so 
much forgotten their duty” that they spend their time in the classroom “chatting and in indecent 
conversations, and do not display any true zeal and diligence in teaching.” In 1736 it was decided that 
if a teacher had to miss a class, he was to warn the officer on duty and the ober-professor beforehand. 
An ober-professor, in turn, was supposed to produce reports on the teachers’ diligence every four 
month. Absence from classroom without an acceptable excuse was to be punished by a fine: for each 
missed hour the teacher was to lose his weekly salary, for every missed day – his monthly salary. In 
practice, however, absenteeism among teachers seems to have been reasonable high. The records for 
the first months of 1736 show that the teachers were especially prone to be late or absent on January 2 
and January 29 (January 28th being the Empress’s birthday). Contrary to the order, in practice for each 
missed day the teachers were fined to the tune of their daily (not weekly) salary, plus they often got a 
“discount” when the overall amount of the fines accumulated by them was calculated at the end of a 
four-month period. RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1794, l. 96 ob.; d. 1757.   
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same place, and one of them is to have supervision over them so that they behave 
decently and go everywhere together and not alone.”289 
“Supervision” also meant that the cadets were to observe a set of rules that 
attempted to regulate nearly every detail of their daily life. The Corps papers are full 
of references to the desire of its commanders (especially von Münnich, who appears 
to have concerned himself with the everyday minutiae of the Corps life) to establish a 
daily routine that in itself would discipline the cadets. The need for a detailed daily 
schedule was already stressed in the late 1720s, in the very first proposal for a Cadet 
Corps, which quoted such a schedule at the Berlin Corps as an example: “5am to 6am 
– getting up and dressing; 6am to 7am – prayer and breakfast; 7am to 11am - lunch,” 
etc. At 11am “they are put in a proper formation by the captain on duty and led to 
lunch.”290 A similar schedule was introduced at the Corps in St.Petersburg, but 
besides, the authorities produced a number of surprisingly detailed documents which 
attempted to regulate various aspects of the everyday routine. There were, for 
example, Rules on how to act in the grand hall where the cadets dine (discussed 
below) and a Regulation on how to behave in class (which prescribed the correct ways 
of leaving and entering the class, etc.).291 Taken together these documents, as well as 
daily disciplinarian practices were designed to create a certain way of life, which 
emphasized discipline and order, cleanliness and self-control over one’s mind and 
body.  
It must have been a dramatic change for noble youngsters accustomed to a 
carefree life on their fathers’ estates to be subjected to a strictly observed daily 
                                                     
289 Luzanov, Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, 34. 
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schedule, which at that time was not necessarily the case even in military units (the 
regiments were not regularly drilled and the vast majority of them did not have 
barracks). Cadets were woken up at 4:45 am, and went to prayer at 5:45 am. 
Afterwards they had classes until noon and then again from 3 pm to 6 pm.292 The 
authorities also wanted the cadets to be dressed “properly,” that is, to wear clean, 
buttoned down uniforms and to have an appropriate haircut. After one of his visits to 
the Corps, von Münnich was disturbed by the fact that “many of them wear dirty 
jackets and instead of neckties they wear silk scarves.”  
Ultimately, the bodily movement was also to be controlled and regulated. 
Military drill was a central part of education at the Corps (which organizationally 
formed a battalion), and in fact marching in formation was the very first thing that the 
cadets were taught at the newly created Corps. Already in 1732 the empress was 
pleased to observe a parade of a cadet company. Moreover, in theory cadets were 
supposed to march to and from their meals, prayers, and classes in formation (in 
reality, they hardly ever did so). At the same time, however, the rules of polite and 
polished conduct were similar to the military drill in that they were also a kind of 
orderly and regulated movement. Von Münnich insisted that “on the streets as well as 
in public places cadets are to act respectfully (uchtivo) and politely (vezhlivo) and to 
greet important gentlemen and ladies and officers with due humility.” In the 1730s, 
when Münnich was the Corps’s high commander, cadets were assigned to him as 
orderlies. Four days before their turn, all of them were sent to a dance teacher, who 
was to “give them extra lessons on how to approach their commanders, how to leave 
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and how to greet.” Von Münnich demanded that even candles at the Cadet Corps were 
to stand in chandeliers in a “straight and proper” manner.293 
The cadets’ meals were also to be strictly regulated. It is clear that meals were 
supposed to be more than just a time for eating, but were to be a kind of cultural 
experience. The author of an anonymous project of the late 1720s emphasized that 
“for appropriate maintenance special cooks ought to be appointed, and also the 
necessary tableware.”294  The founding charter of the Cadet Corps prescribed that 
“during their meals, as well as on other occasions cadets are to behave politely, and at 
the table they are in turn to read aloud something from the rules, regulations and 
decrees, and also from the history books and newspapers etc.”295 Indeed, the 
documents suggest that, indeed, at lunch, while the cadets ate, Russian and German 
newspapers were read to them in turn.296  Moreover, in 1733a special Instruction for 
tafeldeker, or table supervisor, specified that the white tablecloths, for example, were 
to be clean and washed twice a week, while the room itself and the tables had to be 
cleaned every Saturday. When cadets came for lunch, each of them was to find in 
front of him three plates (one of them a soup bowl), a napkin, a knife, various forks, 
and a spoon. The authors of the instruction found it necessary to emphasize that all of 
the cutlery was to be clean, and in fall and winter the room was to be lit with 
candles.297  
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*   *   * 
An important element of this artificially-created environment was the learning 
of foreign languages. The attempt to use the study of languages as a means of molding 
the new elite was built into the organizational structure of the Corps. First of all, the 
student body of the Corps consisted of two linguistic groups: “Russians” and [Baltic] 
“Germans.” Both of them, in the vast majority of cases, came to the Corps without 
prior knowledge of the other group’s language. According to the Corps charter, a third 
of all students were supposed to be drawn from the Baltic provinces, and indeed, the 
Russian and Baltic German (or simply “Germans,” as they were referred to by 
contemporaries) students were brought together under the same roof specifically in 
order to facilitate the merger of the two elites. The charter even suggested that 
servants of “Estland and Lifland” origins should be assigned to Russian students, and 
Russian servants – to the Germans, so they would “better learn other languages and 
get used to them.”298  In practice, however, it meant that “Russian” and “German” 
cadets were almost invariably taught the basic subjects separately in their own 
languages. 
Secondly, due to the nearly complete absence of Russian textbooks and 
qualified teachers well into the 1750s, Russian cadets were effectively prevented from 
learning advanced subjects unless they knew a foreign (i.e. German) language. In the 
founding charter the government already voiced the fear that it would face serious 
problems in finding enough qualified teachers, especially natives. In case “it proved 
impossible to find enough teachers skilled in Russian, all the cadets should be taught 
foreign languages - French and German - for it would be easier for the young people 
to learn the languages in which they are taught, rather than for the teachers to learn to 
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explain their subjects in Russian with due perfection.”299 These fears proved to be 
well-founded. The director von Tettau reported to the Cabinet of Ministers in 1739 
that lack of progress exhibited by the Russian cadets in advanced classes was because 
“the reason is that upon their entry into the Corps they knew nothing of the German 
language, and therefore had to be taught it first.”300 In another report he elaborated:  
[Russian cadets] were greatly impeded by the fact that they did not know any 
German before their entry into the Corps, while the teachers they were 
assigned to were all foreigners who did not know any Russian. Therefore these 
cadets had to be forced (for they themselves were inclined toward French 
rather than German) to learn German.301  
Thus, it was the German that served young Russian nobles as a gateway to 
advanced learning. At the same time, it appears that the two languages had something 
like different “area of responsibility.” French was the language of literature, both 
modern (Fénelon, Boileau, and others) and ancient, and, incidentally, of fortification 
and artillery, the two fields dominated by the colossal figure of Vauban. It also 
appears that Greek and Roman authors, as well as classical mythology, were absorbed 
in Russia in French translation or as retold by French writers. Yet, the Russians 
almost invariably began learning French only after mastering German. It also appears 
that at least in some cases German was a medium for teaching French. Russian 
students were often expected to translate from German into French and the other way 
around. Among other languages mentioned in the Corps’ founding charter, Latin was 
taught, but only taken by a tiny minority of students. Although German cadets were 
incomparably more likely to know Latin upon coming to St.Petersburg, very few 
bothered to study this language at the Corps. In fact, there were almost as few 
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Germans taking it as Russians. Two other languages – Italian and English – were 
never taken by more than one or two cadets simultaneously, and it appears that for 
long periods of time they did not offer it at all. Table 2.2, based on a catalogue 
compiled by an officer at the Corps in 1750, shows the distribution of books at the 
Corps’ library according to language. It appears from the table that German, French, 
and Latin were more or less equally represented. It is unclear, however, to what extent 
it takes into account numerous textbooks and “authors” used in the classroom. These 
books, in fact, were issued to the students and their teachers, rather than kept in the 
library, and their life cycle must have been relatively short).  
 
Table 2.2. 
Books at the Library of the Cadet Corps by Language, 1750302 
 
 
Language 
 
Titles 
 
Items 
Russian 34 197 
German 163 860 
Latin 159 604 
French 113 598 
Italian 5 12 
Dutch 2 1 
Latin&German 8 74 
Russian&German 2 23 
Other 11 16 
Total: 497 2355 
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The records of the Corps also mention some texts used in the classroom. More 
often than not the teachers had trouble finding appropriate manuals. Thus, in 1737 the 
documents note the absence of a Russian grammar book which could be used by 
German students, and so the basic rules of grammar were read out loud by the teacher, 
while the students wrote them down. The existing Russian grammar books in foreign 
languages – particularly, Latin Grammatica Russica by Ludolf (1696) and Vasilii 
Adodurov’s short grammar in German (1731) – were apparently neither used on any 
large scale, nor even available to the cadets. This is in spite of the fact that Adodurov 
himself took an active part in “general examinations” at the Corps in the late 1730s. 
As for Russian grammar books in Russian, the first edition of Mikhail Lomonosov’s 
Russian Grammar did not appear until 1755. Students in German and French classes 
had the advantage of being able to use grammar books printed abroad, which were 
apparently purchased in quantities sufficient to make them available to every student. 
In 1746, for example, the Corps purchased 140 copies of German grammar books303 - 
a huge number, given that a standard press run for a book in the Petrine period, for 
example, was about 1200 copies. 
Besides grammar books, language teachers at the Corps also used such texts as 
the Russian and German versions of the Military Regulation in the classroom, as well 
as St.Petersburg newspapers in Russian: these helped German cadets to learn the 
bureaucratic Russian necessary for their future careers. At advanced stages of their 
language training the students at the Corps also widely used the so-called “authors,” 
or unabridged texts, which were routinely divided into “easy authors” and “difficult 
authors.” Not all books were deemed suitable for use in the classroom. Thus, although 
the Corps’s library was one of the largest in Russia, the teachers in 1746 complained 
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that the cadets who were being trained to translate from German to French had “no 
book or author for them to translate,” so the authorities approved the purchase of two 
copies of a German newspaper for use in each French class. At the same time the 
German cadets studying Russian apparently used the twenty five available copies of 
what they called The Azov History,304 but the teacher complained that they went over 
it so many times that the students knew it “almost by heart, so it became useless.” 
Meanwhile, the teachers pointed out that the bookstore of the Academy of Sciences 
had a book called True Politics (“Istinnaia politika”), “which is translated by a born 
Russian and therefore more coherent and thus better for teaching.”305  
The importance of studying foreign languages, however, went far beyond 
simply providing students with certain technical skills. The languages were also a 
central element of the cultural environment that the Corps’ authorities strove to create. 
In addition to being used in classrooms for teaching, newspapers were also read to 
students during lunch. In 1740, for example, the Corps subscribed to an Amsterdam 
newspaper in French, Lübeck newspapers in German and Latin, a “Postman” from 
Hamburg, Italian newspapers from Vienna, and St.Petersburg newspapers in Russian 
and German. The Corps’s documents also mention newspapers from Utrecht and 
Leiden.306 Newspapers, as mentioned earlier, were used for language instruction. At 
the same time, the emphasis on their availability to the cadets indicated that the young 
nobles were also expected to develop a feeling of belonging to a wider European 
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community of the educated and the worldly, who were concerned with the affairs of 
other countries.  
The teaching of foreign languages provided ample opportunity for moral 
instruction, which was especially important since very few Russian students actually 
studied such subjects as history, philosophy, or law. The text that the cadets were 
given at their exams always had a didactic message. Andrei Kvashnin-Samarin, for 
example, had to translate into French an instructive passage on the importance of 
learning foreign languages: 
L’experience confirme tous le jous, qu’on ne peut pas parvenier à la perfection 
d’une langue, sans en avoir beaucoup d’envie. Il est done fort necessaire qu’on 
soit convainçu combien il est utile de savoir pleusieurs langues, et quand on 
est assure, qu’elles sont le moyens d’offenir toutes sortes d’emplois, on nès 
paranerai auains sois pour les apprendre.307 
 The future playwright Aleksandr Sumarokov was instructed to translate a 
passage on Henry VIII of England and his testament. According to this short text, the 
king sent his son, the future Edward VII, to study at Oxford and Cambridge, where he 
learned philosophy, politics, and seven languages.308 Prince Aleksandr Dolgorukov 
translated from Russian into German a passage on Xerxes, king of Persia. Upon 
assembling a huge army in order to invade Greece, Xerxes started crying, for the sight 
of such a multitude of men, none of whom would be alive in a hundred years, 
reminded him of the brevity of human life. For his translation from German into 
Russian Dolgorukov was assigned a passage on the usefulness of rhetorical skills. 
Thanks to these skills “mortal humans can acquire nearly immortal fame.” Besides 
being a lesson in human nature, this was clearly also a lesson in leadership:  
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Most important enterprises are sometimes brought to a happy ending by 
eloquence alone, rather than by the force of thousands of armed men, for it 
[eloquence] opens up the path to human hearts, which are harder to defeat than 
the strongest fortress and cannot be overrun by any external force. One who 
wants to influence human hearts is attempting something important.309 
Other exams contained references to the cadets’ future role in governing the 
state. Ivan Ozerov translated from Russian into French a “dispatch from Hamburg 
…dated June 16, 1739.” This dispatch represented a report from a Russian agent, who 
learned from the “latest letters from Copenhagen that the English resident there 
received credentials from his court and thus was appointed minister extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary.” According to the same dispatch, the British government had decided 
to send a “large fleet” into the Baltic in case the French decided to do so, while the 
Danish court had not made up its mind yet.310 The rivalry between the French and the 
British, the possibilities of a foreign navy making its appearance within the reach of 
the  Russian ports of St.Petersburg, Riga and Revel (Tallinn), the uncertain stance of 
the court of Copenhagen – all of these were not just fictitious circumstances, but very 
real elements of Russia’s everyday diplomatic concerns. Graduates from the Corps 
were not only supposed to be at ease talking about foreign courts, ambassadors, and 
navies, but also to assume perspectives beyond Russia’s narrowly conceived interests. 
In short, they were supposed to be members of the European elite. 
In classes in Russian and German “stylistics” the beginners took dictation, 
while the advanced students composed “letters” following special rules.311 The 
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documents often mention cadets’ ability to write “letters” as a key element in the  
study of a foreign language. In doing so they quite literally meant letters: the most 
common task advanced students were given at language exams was to compose (or 
translate) a personal letter, one in which a student was to exhibit not only the mastery 
of grammar and vocabulary, but also the mastery of appropriate forms of polite 
discourse among polished members of the elite. The students had to know not only 
how to address a superior or an equal, but also what sentiments to express. Thus, the 
letter, translated by Andrei Kvashnin-Samarin opens with “Most noble Sir” and ends 
with “Your Excellence, my most revered Sir, I remain your most humble servant.” 
The sentiments, conveyed in this letter are also very telling: Kvashnin-Samarin 
expressed proper (and properly phrased, with references to the value of friendship) 
gratitude for being invited to spend a summer at a friends’ estate (“nothing could be 
better than to spend the best time of the year with a true friend”). He, however, had to 
apologize for having to decline the offer, for duty prevented him from coming. For a 
true noble, his duty obviously took precedence even over friendship: “As you know, 
there will be an annual general examination in our Cadet Corps at the end of the 
summer, for which I have to study all through the summer with the utmost 
application.” At the end of the letter, he shows himself to be aware of the existence of 
a larger community of nobles, of which he wants to remain a polite member by 
sending best regards to all those who are able to make it to the said estate.312 It is 
hardly surprising therefore, that the books, or “authors,” used in the classroom were 
also supposed to have a certain moral message. In 1738, the cadets in the “second” 
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class “explained” [expliquent] The Adventures of Telemachus – one of the most 
important contemporary texts on moral education, the meaning of true virtue and the 
ways of attaining it.313 Another text used at the Corps, the True Politics, mentioned 
earlier, was in fact a translation by Vasilii Tretiakovskii of Nicholas Remond des 
Cours’ La véritable politique des personnes de qualité (1692) – a tract that dealt, 
among other things, with the need (for a noble) to be “useful to the public,” and with 
the issues of “talents” and “inclinations.”314   
*   *   * 
In a way, however, the attempts to create an orderly routine clashed with the 
fundamental realities of Russian noble life defined by a semi-natural economy and 
serf ownership. This conflict was most clearly embodied in the prolonged campaign 
that Lieutenant Gottfried Ieremias (the master housekeeper of the Corps, or 
Hofmeister) waged against the serf menservants (khloptsy, as they were called, or 
“lads”) described in the Corps’ documents as an embodiment of disorder, which was 
so detrimental for “true nobles.” All the enrolled cadets were housed in the 
Menshikov Palace, 8-10 cadets per “chamber,” and many of them had serf “lads” who 
lived in the same chambers and, apparently, slept on the floor by their masters’ beds. 
The fact that the “lads” lived with the cadets “in the same chamber, socialize[d] with 
them, play[ed] cards, or converse[d]” was viewed as quite inappropriate by the 
officials: it was expected that the “lads” would disrupt the prescribed, regulated way 
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of life in general and discipline in particular. According to Ieremias, the “lads” were 
“a source of much theft and are careless with fire and cause damage to the rooms and 
bring in dirt. On top of this they walk around so poorly dressed that it is scary to look 
at them.” In the dining hall the “lads” were blamed for the excessive quantities of 
meat and bread consumed during the meals and for the loss of or damage to cutlery, 
tablecloths, etc. Ieremias suggested that all the “lads” be banned from the Corps and 
replaced by a few retired soldiers who would clean the room, keep the fires going in 
the stoves for heating, and perform other chores.315 It was as a result of Ieremias’ 
jeremiads that the Corps’ chancellery issued in 1736 special Rules on how to act in the 
grand hall where the cadets dine. According to these rules, back doors to the dining 
hall were to be locked and guards were to be placed at the entry. The Corps’s own 
servants were to remain in the room after the meals until the supervisor of the table 
counted cutlery and checked the tablecloths. The “lads” were to be admitted into the 
room only with special permission from the officer on duty.316 
Overall, the ability of the Corps’ authorities to establish the desired level of 
seclusion and supervision is highly doubtful. The vision of a completely isolated and 
self-sufficient compound was slow to materialize, as was the ideal of seclusion and 
constant monitoring.317 The documents of the Corps mention numerous cases of 
cadets going to town alone and without permission, drinking, fighting, stealing, etc. 
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Nor was there effective supervision within the walls of the Corps. When a large group 
of cadets was graduating in 1736, the authorities were unable to account not only for a 
number of smaller items (like belt buckles etc.), but also, mysteriously, for five 
mattresses and three beds.318 The historian is left to wonder what young noblemen 
could have possibly done with them, and how the authorities did not notice their 
absence earlier. Consider also the case of Petr Vladislavlev, an eighteen-year old 
cadet. In 1749, while in a tavern (itself a violation of von Münnich’s rules) he met a 
certain Swiss man. After a while (and after a few drinks) the new friends went for a 
walk, and Vladislavlev managed to steal his companion’s silver watch with a golden 
chain and run away. He pawned the stolen items, lost the money playing billiards and, 
upon his return to the Corps was placed under arrest and diagnosed with a 
“suspicious” (i.e. venereal) disease. Vladislavlev was, admittedly, an exceptional case, 
yet the frequency of his transgressions make them almost routine^ between 1745 and 
1749 he was arrested and/or subjected to corporal punishment on 26 occasions: for 
going to town without permission; for playing cards; for stealing; for visiting taverns 
where he spent whatever he could earn by selling the stolen property; and for 
returning to the Corps so drunk that he “could not wake up for two days.” Moreover, 
as a result of investigation of Vladislavlev’s case, twelve more cadets became 
implicated in stealing, buying stolen goods, or not reporting such behavior.319 On the 
practical level, the vision of a regulated and orderly environment intended to produce 
well-mannered “true nobles” remained just that – a vision.  
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Chapter 7 
“Easy and Useful Subjects”:  
The Curriculum and Examinations at the Corps 
The vision of a “true” nobility to be created at the Corps implied a certain 
uniformity of acquired skills and internalized values codified in the Corps’ 
curriculum. At the same time, having established the Corps, the government solemnly 
promised to reward cadets with ranks according to “their studies and their worth.” 
This presupposed a system for assessing their progress at the Corps. And, indeed, the 
differences in student achievement were noticed, measured, and directly translated 
into ranks. Upon graduation most, as promised by the sovereign, were promoted to be 
ensigns and sub-ensigns (praporshchik and podpraporshchik), while the best students 
became lieutenants and sub-lieutenants (poruchik and podporuchik). A considerable 
number of cadets, however, were sent to the regiments as NCOs, and the worst 
students (usually those guilty of some serious offence) were to serve as privates in the 
infantry. There were further gradations, however, within each rank. Upon receiving 
commissions, the better students were assigned to the regiments of the line, became 
regimental aides-de-camp, or even aides-de-camp to various generals, while the 
weaker ones could be sent to the semi-regular regiments of the landmilitsiia guarding 
the fortified border with the Tatars in the South. The academically strongest students 
were left at the Corps as teachers. Many of them were eventually assigned to staff 
duty at the army or divisional headquarters. The presence of this very strong 
meritocratic (for lack of a better word) element in the governmental policies of the 
1730s is thus very clear. Although the authorities’ attempts to put their vision into 
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practice were not unproblematic, the Corps did function as a mechanism that allowed 
for conversion of acquired cultural skills into positions within a social hierarchy.  
*  *  * 
According to the first project for the creation of a Cadet Corps, prepared in the 
late 1720s, the proposed establishment was to be divided into two orders to teach not 
only military matters, but also “political and civil affairs.” As for the “political and 
civil” part, the project mentions only that it was to include the study of “politics,” 
jurisprudence, history, geography, and also “various state laws, which are to have 
separate professors.”  The military component was discussed in more detail. 
According to the author, the program was to include “military economics” (voennaia 
ekonomiia), “discipline, or order,” and “military action”; having mastered that, the 
young nobles were to be “taught theory, that is, the basic approaches to practice,” and 
only after that “to be used in practice.”320  
The actual curriculum at the Cadet Corps resembles this plan in many 
important ways. At the same time, the differences are also telling. The program of 
studies at the Noble Cadet Corps was very ambitious indeed, considering the general 
level of education of the Russian nobility and the complete novelty of most of the 
subjects for a young provincial nobleman of that time. According to a decree of July 
29, 1731, which announced the establishment of the Corps, the cadets were to be 
taught “Arithmetic, Geometry, Drawing, Fortification, Artillery, Fencing, Riding and 
other subjects necessary for a military career.” Some cadets, moreover, were to be 
given the opportunity to pursue civil, rather than military careers, and therefore, to 
study “foreign languages, History, Geography, Jurisprudence, dancing, music and 
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other useful subjects.”321 One might notice here the presence of such traditional 
gentlemanly skills as dancing, music, and fencing that were not mentioned in the 
original project in the late 1720s. In December, this list of subjects was repeated with 
the addition of “Grammar,” “Rhetoric” and “other such useful military and political 
subjects”: the document summed up the outline of the curriculum by asserting that 
those were the subjects that the young nobles “could have learned in foreign 
academies.” The authors of the decree promised that those able to master these topics 
would then be “worthy to serve the State and to bring honor, benefit and glory for 
themselves and for the Fatherland.”322  
Organizationally the new institution consisted of the Noble Cadet Corps, 
which was a military unit led by its commanding officers, and the so-called “Knightly 
Academy” (i.e. the direct translation of German Ritterakademie), which comprised all 
the teachers. In practice, however, the distinction between the two was soon forgotten, 
and the term “Knightly Academy” fell out of use. The composition of the faculty, 
however, emphasizes the ambitions of the Corps’ founders. According to the initial 
plans, the staff of the “Knightly Academy” was supposed to include one professor of 
mathematics, two adjuncts, and two instructors; one professor juris and one adjunct; 
professor humaniorum and an adjunct; and instructors in the humanities (who were to 
teach “style of writing [shtil’] and rhetoric, politics, genealogy, geography, moral 
philosophy, heraldry, and other gentlemanly sciences”). There were also to be 
teachers and assistant teachers of languages, including such “exotic” ones as Italian 
and English. On top of that there was to be one mechanicus with an assistant and 
apprentices, for “making various optical and mathematical instruments,” and finally, 
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six “writing masters” (three for Russian and three for German) “who also have to 
teach the basics of arithmetic.”323 
The multitude and variety of the subjects to be taught at the Corps called for 
some systematization. The founding charter of the Corps suggested that the cadets 
(and the subjects) be divided into four classes. In the fourth, or lowest class, cadets 
were to study Russian reading, writing, and arithmetic; in the third class – geometry, 
geography and “grammar”; in the second – fortification, artillery, history, composition 
and “style” in writing, rhetoric, jurisprudence, moral philosophy, heraldry and “other 
military and political sciences.” Finally, in the first (the highest) class cadets were to 
concentrate on advanced studies in one of the professional fields such as fortification, 
artillery, cavalry, infantry, or civil service.324  
This plan for dividing cadets and subjects into four classes was never actually 
implemented. Rather, the rules for the “general examination” (described later in this 
chapter) suggested another way of dividing them into groups. According to the rules, 
all the subjects taught at the Corps were split into five broad areas: 1) military drill, 
dancing, fencing, horseback riding and drawing; 2) languages and composition; 3) 
history (including “universal history” and history of the Holy Roman Empire), 
political and physical geography; 4) mathematical subjects, including arithmetic, 
geometry, mechanics, fortification, and artillery; and 5) “philosophical sciences,” that 
is, logics, moral philosophy, physics, and jurisprudence.325 
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This description rather accurately outlines the general structure of the 
curriculum at the Corps in one major respect: rather than moving from one class to 
another every year or two, cadets were expected to move up a number of separate 
“chains” of subjects. A cadet, for example, had to stay in arithmetic class until, in von 
Münnich’s words, he “completely masters one subject, so he can move to a higher 
one.”326 Upon mastering arithmetic, a cadet would move up to geometry and so on, all 
the way up to artillery. Meanwhile, in languages, he could remain in the lowest class 
all this time. Each cadet moved from one class to the next on his own, when he was 
ready. This was a somewhat unusual arrangement; it might be cautiously suggested 
that it reflected the influence of Francke who, as described in Part I, pioneered such an 
approach. There was, moreover, no fixed course of study at the Corps. Rather, cadets 
left the Corps at the age of twenty or twenty-one. By this age, the authorities believed, 
the worthy ones would have learned all they needed, and unworthy ones – all they 
could. In other words, the cadets’ comparative merit was expressed not only in their 
grades, but also in subjects they managed to move up to. 
A good example is mathematics, which was a core subject at the Corps, taken 
by all cadets without exception. Following Petrine tradition, mathematics was viewed 
as a key element in the education of a military officer, and von Münnich himself 
casually noted on the margins of one report that geometry is “necessary for every 
military man.”327 The documents of Catherine’s Legislative Commission clearly 
demonstrate that by the 1760s belief that mathematics was a sine qua non of a 
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nobleman’s education was deeply ingrained in the minds of the nobility.328 At the 
Corps mathematical subjects formed a chain of consecutive classes starting from basic 
arithmetic through geometry and various sections of trigonometry to fortification and 
artillery (and, ultimately, to “optics” and “mechanics,” which were hardly ever taken 
by any cadets). This view of a set of subjects forming an ascending scale was codified 
in the Corps’ charter, which specified that the instructors in mathematics were to 
teach “arithmetic, geometry, mechanics, architecture, fortification, geography, parts of 
physics, astronomy, etc.”329 Geometry (together with drawing) also served as an 
introduction to geodesy and mapmaking. While there were no classes in these fields 
taught at the Corps, von Münnich wanted some cadets to be sent annually for 
“practice” in the summertime, so that all graduates could potentially be used as 
geodesists if needs be. In 1737 such “practice” involved twelve cadets making a map 
of von Münnich’s estate. Some cadets later participated in making a map of 
St.Petersburg. In the 1730s graduating cadets were assigned to the construction of the 
Ladoga Canal, and in the early 1750s a large number of graduates were assigned as 
mapmakers and surveyors to the General Land Survey.330 
Yet, the teaching of mathematics was also structured in such a way that it 
became a scale for measuring one’s worth rather than a unifying cultural experience 
or common technical skill. Not only mathematical subjects themselves were arranged 
into a sort of chain, but also each subject was in turn divided into separate and 
consecutive steps. In lower arithmetic classes these steps were simply “multiplication” 
or “division.” In fortification, for example, “attacking fortresses,” “defending 
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fortresses,” and “drawing regular fortresses” were separate steps, while artillery 
consisted of “studying various types of guns,” “drawing tools belonging to guns,” etc. 
Rather than giving a student a grade for mastering each of these steps, teachers simply 
indicated how far he was able to move.  
Other subjects were taught in a similar fashion. The teaching of foreign 
languages was divided into separate, consecutive steps. First of all, passive and active 
knowledge of a foreign language were viewed as distinct skills, as was the ability to 
speak. Thus the Corps’s records contain lists of “German cadets who study Russian 
language in the morning hours, as well as reading and writing [in Russian].” On their 
way to mastery of a foreign language, cadets passed through a number of stages, 
including “learning the alphabet,” “learning to read po slogam,” “writing regulations,” 
“learning vocabulary,” “learning dialogs [by heart],” and “taking dictation.” At the 
top were such categories as “explaining from one language to another” (most likely, 
the first stage of learning to translate, explaining the essence of a given text in a 
student’s own words), “understanding [easy] authors,” “translating easy authors,” 
“translating” into and from one’s own language, and finally, translating from one 
foreign language into another. Parallel to this went such elements of mastering the 
written language as “learning style,” “learning grammar,” and “writing letters.” Once 
again, all of those were viewed not as learning techniques, but as separate stages. In 
other words, one went on to “learn dialogues” only after learning “vocabulary,” and 
taking dictation was quite separate from, and came much earlier than, learning 
grammar. Since there was no fixed course of study, it was very common and, indeed, 
normal for cadets to leave the Corps having learned the “dialogues” without ever 
making it to grammar. 
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The most striking examples, perhaps, are history and geography. In history 
(that is, the history of the Roman and Holy Roman Empires) rather than receiving a 
general overview first, the students moved from one reign to another in chronological 
order. Accordingly, their exam record instead of grades include descriptions like 
“knows up to Charlemagne,” “knows up to Titus,” or “knows up to the division of 
[Eastern and Western Roman] Empires.” In geography students began with the study 
of the globe and parts of the world. Only after this did they move on to the study of 
maps of separate European countries, so that their exam records might read “learned 
the map of Italy and moved on to Spain.” It was perhaps in reaction to this situation 
that Professor Grech emphasized in 1750 that a new geography textbook he was 
working on was 
To be written in such a way that for beginners there would be a short extract, 
or the most important places and events from the broader geography printed in 
big letters, and each land is to have a note on its ancient and medieval history, 
in other words, in what state it was in ancient and medieval times.331 
The big question, however, is what were the social implications of this way of 
organizing the curriculum. As such, it was not terribly novel. In the early 1720s Peter 
I himself initially ordered the authorities at the Naval Academy (where mathematics 
formed the backbone of the curriculum) to teach all subjects simultaneously, setting 
aside one day a week for each of them. Peter, evidently, saw the possibility to teach 
them parallel to each other. After his death, however, the Admiralty, upon the 
recommendation of the teachers from the Naval Academy, overrode this order and 
approved the teaching of mathematical subjects one after the other, as consecutive 
steps on the same ladder.332 By doing so it reproduced, in a way, the approach used in 
European universities since the Middle Ages (and practiced in Russia at the Moscow 
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Slavobic-Greek-Latin Academy and other church-run schools), where the seven “arts” 
were taught in a particular sequence as consecutive steps on one ladder, each 
preparing the way for the next one. In the case of the Naval Academy the humanities 
were replaced by similarly interlinked mathematical subjects. Equally traditional, if 
not conservative, were the absence of a regular yearly progression from one class to 
another and the practice of keeping students in one class until they achieved complete 
mastery of a given subject. The real novelty, I would argue, was combining this 
approach with the rigidly hierarchical system of the Table of Ranks. To put it simply, 
medieval universities did not award military ranks on the basis of academic progress, 
while the Cadet Corps did.  
*  *  * 
The single most important book on education and morals in the eighteenth 
century Russia was, arguably, Fénelon’s Adventures of Telemachus. It went through at 
least four separate translations and appeared in numerous editions. Its first Russian 
translation, dating from 1734, was published by the Corps in two volumes in 1747. 
Eventually, a second translation by Cadet Petr Zhelezniakov was also published at the 
Corps.333 One of the central works of the century (according to one estimate, the 
second most popular book in France after the Bible334), Fenelon’s Telemachus was the 
story of a prince who in the course of his travels came to view himself as God’s 
instrument in achieving public happiness. Included in this treatise on the nature of 
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kingship is a discussion of the nature of merit: Fenelon insists that there should be 
adopted “constant principles” and “fixed standards” for judging it. According to him, 
“the essential purpose of the government is to discern well the different characters of 
mind in order to chose and employ [men] according to their talents.”335  
This was exactly the purpose that guided the organization of the educational 
process at the Corps: an extensive system of monitoring, assessing, and examining the 
students was created in order to measure their “worth,” according to the standards set 
by the state. The Corps’s charter promised that the students would be awarded ranks 
“depending on their progress and their worth (po dostoinstvu).” On a certain level this 
approach is certainly similar to Peter’s supposedly meritocratic Table of Ranks. Yet, 
although the Table did organize all the ranks in state service hierarchically, I would 
argue that it lacked the key elements of any meritocratic system – the precise 
definition of merit and the means of discovering and measuring it. Moreover, we do 
not find in the wording of Peter’s decrees any attempt to use the occasion to admonish 
his subjects to be better servants, besides simply asserting that seniority in service and 
in social context is to be defined by rank, and not by some other criteria. In the Corps’ 
charter, however, the government explicitly pledged to take note of one’s worth and to 
measure it, thus encouraging students to apply themselves. This, in turn, required a 
system of assessment that made each person’s worth obvious to everyone, especially 
his comrades, for a just reward for one of the cadets was supposed, at the same time, 
to have a pedagogic impact on all the others. Such a system had to be carefully 
regulated and public.  
The central event in the academic life of the Corps was a periodic “general 
examination,” which served as a focus for the Corps’s various attempts to monitor and 
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assess its students. According to the Corps’s charter, the cadets were to be examined 
three times a year in all their subjects. Once a year there was to be a “general” 
examination in the sovereign’s own presence or, if the sovereign was unable to attend, 
in the presence of his “ministers, generals, and other church and secular dignitaries.” 
The sovereign, alas, never made it to the exam. Depending upon their performance on 
the exam, the cadets were to be promoted to the next class or to receive their 
commissions.336 This provision of the Corps’s charter, however, was never observed 
in practice, and there was no “general examination” until 1737. In his report to the 
Senate dated August 2, 1737, Director von Tettau337 explained the reasons for such 
negligence. The academic backgrounds of 360, who had been initially accepted, were 
so varied that it proved very difficult to divide them into classes. Some of them, 
moreover, were approaching the age of twenty, and to teach them foreign languages 
and humanities would have been, according to the common wisdom of the day, a 
waste of time and money. Therefore, they were given a sort of a crash course in basic 
subjects necessary for military men: reading and writing in their native languages, 
arithmetic, some geometry and “gentlemanly exercises” (fencing, dancing and 
horseback riding) – and were then sent into the army. Even after that, the age, origin 
(Russian and Baltic German) and previous training of the remaining cadets was still 
too diverse for them to be easily assigned to classes.  
Yet, the authorities felt a need “to turn this endless confusion into order and to 
sort all the cadets out.” Two teachers charged with this task spent all of 1733 trying to 
divide the cadets into classes, but to no avail. After this failure Captain de Bodan, 
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with the assistance of Captain de Raden,338 labored long and hard to compile a 
“general table” of the entire Corps. This “consisted of 36 tables where all 360 cadets 
were listed according to their [progress in] studies (naukam), worthiness 
(dostoinstvu), sharpness (ostrote) and seniority (starshinstvu).” After that the “ober-
professor” was charged with keeping the table up to date on the basis of monthly 
reports produced by the teachers (on the cadets’ academic progress) and officers (on 
their behavior).339 
The issue of the “general examination” came up again in 1737. On February 9 
of that year the government issued a decree, according to which all the noble minors 
were to undergo examinations at the ages twelve and sixteen (see the detailed 
discussion in the last chapter of Part II).340 As far as the Corps was concerned, this 
attempt led to another decree, issued on March 30, 1737, when the government 
announced that the cadets should also undergo an examination at the same age as all 
other young nobles. As with the other young nobles, the second examination was to 
be the day of final reckoning, when the worthy youths were separated from the 
unworthy: 
those who wasted time in hanging out (gulianii) and other inappropriate 
behavior and learned nothing should upon reaching the age of sixteen be sent 
to the Admiralty and drafted [into the navy] as sailors without right of 
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promotion. For no use is to be expected from those who did not show any zeal 
in mastering such easy and quite necessary subjects. 
This examination was viewed as an event of state importance and was meant 
to be a public display of academic merit, since it was to be held in the presence of one 
senator and teachers from the Academy of Science, Naval Academy and Engineering 
School. To make a more profound impact upon the cadets, this decree was to be read 
to them twice a week.341 Yet only three months later, on July 6, 1737, this measure 
was declared insufficient to monitor the cadets’ progress, to encourage them to exhibit 
more “zeal,” and insure the timely expulsion of those deemed incapable of 
improvement. The government decided that it was not enough to examine cadets only 
when they reached the age of twelve and sixteen, for in this case “cadets’ behavior 
and success in studies would not be known until they reached these ages, and so many 
of them could waste time or spend it in an inappropriate behavior.” For this reason “in 
order to better maintain order and to encourage cadets to study” and to make sure that 
the Corps “was useful to the State and bore due fruit to the State,” it was found 
necessary to examine all the cadets twice a year, on March 15 and September 15. In 
this case the examinations would better serve their purpose, which was to urge the 
cadets to study and to “find out who has ability for study and who does not.” The 
latter were considered unworthy of “wasting money on.”342 
In its decree the Senate charged the Academy of Sciences with drawing the 
rules and procedures for the “general examination” at the Corps. First of all, the 
teachers were to prepare reports about their students and to submit them to the 
examiners beforehand, so that at the actual exams they could compare them to the 
cadets’ performance and better decide what they had learned and “whether they have 
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fulfilled their duty.” When the day of the exam came, the cadets were to be examined 
not class by class, but rather subject by subject, so as to make their comparative 
worthiness more visible. This way, “those who show more ability in some subject as 
compared to others [cadets] could be recognized and judged according to their merit.” 
Cadets were asked questions in front of the examiners, by their own teachers, who had 
to follow the textbooks they had been using in class; occasionally the examiners were 
also expected to ask questions. The ultimate goal of the exam was to make the 
comparative merit of the cadets visible and thus to divide them into the worthy and 
unworthy ones – “to separate those cadets who have the ability for studies from those 
who do not, and to find out who applies himself and who does not.”343 
Soon, however, it became apparent that this examination format was 
impractical. In particular, the requirement that one of the senators be present at the 
exam was felt to be an onerous task for the Senate members as they had numerous 
other business matters to attend to, and also because most of them, being old Petrine 
hands and “not having the education, necessary for this examination, except for 
military drill,” were hardly competent to preside over such an event. There was only 
one person in the entire Senate, Privy Councilor Naryshkin who was considered by 
his colleagues to be sufficiently educated to make any sense of what was going on at 
the exam, but he was overloaded with other commissions. In 1740 it was decided in 
that the government should be represent at the examinations by von Münnich 
himself.344 A more serious problem was the fact that the examinations took too much 
time. The first “general examination” started on September 21, 1737, and only ended 
on December 23. In 1738 and 1739 cadets were only examined once a year, and it was 
not until 1740 that two exams were actually held in one year.345 There are strong 
reasons to suspect, however, that from the beginning the “general examination” 
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ceased to be a public evaluation and turned into an empty formality. The examination 
of 1737 was viewed as disastrously time-consuming, and so the next year, thanks to a 
“newly invented method,” the exam took only eight days. Thus on October 23 in just 
four hours, from 2 pm to 6 pm, the Corps’s authorities somehow managed to examine 
88 cadets in Russian reading and writing, 68 cadets in Russian grammar and 
composition, and 242 cadets in German grammar, writing and translation from that 
language into Russian. This newly-invented method, apparently, consisted of merely 
reading out loud and approving en masse evaluations of individual cadets prepared by 
their teachers.  
Nevertheless, the best cadets were to be given an opportunity to display their 
worthiness. Already the founding charter specified that the cadets who received 
commissions were expected to make a public speech.346 So, even though the 
examination lost its public character, the Corps’ authorities had some cadets 
demonstrate their achievements at the beginning of the exam. Cadet Adam Olsufiev 
delivered an “oration of his own composition” in French, Georg Kaiserling – in Latin, 
and Gustav Udam – in Russian. Later on Ivan Melissino and Frederick Magnus von 
Fok also delivered their “orations” in Latin, while jurisprudence examination 
concluded with “orations” delivered in German by Jackob Lilienfeldt and in Latin by 
Johann Heinrich Rosen, Heinrich Voldemar Rosen and Franz Lintmeier.347 Merit had 
to be displayed publicly, after all.
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Chapter 8 
“Genie, That Is, the Natural Inclination”:  
Nature, Merit, and the Definition of Nobility 
The two most crucial conceptual innovations evident in pedagogical practices 
employed at the Cadet Corps were the notions of natural “ability” and “inclination,” 
absent, for all practical purposes, from Petrine educational and administrative 
practices. In the late 1720s the anonymous author of the very first Cadet Corps project 
suggested to select for the study of “military action” those young nobles who “have 
genie [zheni], that is, the natural inclination” for that profession. Further on, the author 
wrote about the need to “discover the pupils’ inclinations,” which were to form the 
basis for composing the schedule of classes.348 The use of the French word is quite 
characteristic: the concept was being directly borrowed from modern European 
discourse. Indeed, the author of a contemporary French dictionary wrote in his entry 
on Génie that “Les Anciens faisoient un Deu du genie, mais parmi nous c’est un 
certain esprit naturel qui nous donne une pente à une chose. … Inclination naturel 
d’une personne.”349 For late seventeenth-century French authors, the notion of génie 
was directly linked to the notion of naissance, which, in turn, “evoked ‘moral’ 
inclination and the set of behaviors appropriate for those inclinations.”350 According 
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to Abbé Bellegarde whose book on “perfect education” appeared in Russian 
translation in 1747 as Sovershennoe vospitanie detei, “virtue is the inclination, or 
movement of the soul, towards goodness … if a man is so inclined he will not move 
away from the straight path.”351 As demonstrated in Chapter 1, this notion of 
individual abilities and inclination was a necessary element of the complex series of 
ideas that underpinned the general design of the Cadet Corps.  
In Europe, however, these concepts were more or less wedded to the notion of 
positive family influence. Traditionally virtue and martial spirit were thought to be 
passed through blood, and, thus, inherited by the nobles. However, the advent of the 
concept of honnête homme, which was defined through essentially moral 
characteristics, the nobility was able to adapt.352 As David A. Bien has demonstrated, 
the spread of Lockean ideas actually allowed noble theorists to argue that the virtuous 
environment in the noble households endowed children with virtues and inclinations 
that were unavailable to the offspring of common families.353 This was not the case in 
Russia. Theorists of the nobility, such as Saltykov and Tatishchev, abhorred the 
detrimental influence of an unreformed Russian household on the morals of young 
nobles. In fact, one of the main purposes of the Noble Cadet Corps was to remove 
noble youngsters from the family. Within such a conceptual framework, the ruthless 
application of notions of “ability” and “inclination” at the Corps undermined, it would 
seem, the notion of the nobility of birth.  
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*   *   * 
The purpose of the “general examination” at the Corps, and of the system of 
monitoring and assessing in general, was not only to measure the students’ progress, 
but also to determine who is unfit for study, to “find out who has ability for study and 
who does not,”354 or, in the words of another document, “to separate those cadets who 
have the ability for studies from those who do not.”355 Earlier, the Corps’ charter 
proposed to divide the senior cadets into specialized classes geared towards different 
branches of service according to “inclination [for a particular subject], application, 
and comprehension” demonstrated by them in lower classes.356 Thus, one’s “nature” 
was to decide one’s choice of career and one’s station in life. Cadets had to be sorted 
out, and born cavalrymen were to be separated from born civil servants. The founders 
of the Corps thought it necessary to explain, somewhat defensively, that the new 
institutions would teach “political and civil” subjects because “not every man is 
inclined by nature toward military service.”357 
That the state was willing to recognize “nature” as a legitimate excuse for a 
nobleman to pursue a civil, rather than military, career was a radical departure from 
the Petrine practice of universal and indiscriminate mobilization. At the same time, 
the authorities never offered a comprehensive definition of what the “inclination” (or 
“nature”) was. The early eighteenth-century usage of the word “nature” [priroda] and 
“natural” [prirodnyi] suggests a multitude of meanings, all of which refer to the 
notion of inborn and inherited qualities. One could be described as a Georgian, a 
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Tatar, or a foreigner by “nature,” that is by birth; it could also refer to an ethnic race. 
Alternatively, one could “remember his peasant nature” [krestianskuiu prirodu], or be 
a “natural nobleman” [prirodnyi dvorianin]. It could also refer to moral qualities, as 
one could be deemed “evil by nature,” or even a “traitor and thief by nature.”  Finally, 
“natural” might mean something inherited in a very direct, legal sense, or pertaining 
to a clan, or rod, like a “natural” family seal [prirodnaia pechat’].358 
At the Cadet Corps the notions of nature and inclination could be interpreted 
in a number of ways. Regular examinations would be held so that the cadets’ “natural 
inclinations can be seen and [they] are assigned to classes accordingly.”359 Thus, 
natural inclination could refer to “ability,” or aptitude for a particular subject, and, for 
example, Prince Aleksandr Dolgorukov is noted, among others, for his “exceptional 
understanding of languages.”360 The connection between a perceived natural ability 
and future career is most clearly expressed in the program for the training of civil 
servants at the Corps. In August 1740 Prince Trubetskoi, the Prokurator-General, 
wrote to the Senate suggesting that twenty-four cadets of “Russian nationality” be 
selected for an intensive program that due to the extreme shortage of qualified 
personnel in the civil administration. Appropriately, they were to concentrate on “the 
parts of mathematic and jurisprudence necessary for civil service” and relieved from 
other classes, military drill and other duties at the Corps so they could enter the 
service as soon as possible. Significantly, candidates for this program were to be 
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selected from among those who showed “natural inclination” for civil service.361 
Sometimes, however, the authorities’ belief in natural ability resulted in a much more 
narrowly determined future for a student. The authorities, for example, would attempt 
to groom an individual student for a specific job (and social status), for which he was 
“naturally” fit. In this case he could quite literally inherit his father’s profession. Thus, 
Fedor Pavlovskii (entered the Corps in 1739), a son of a translator at the College of 
Foreign Affairs, was accepted into the Corps at the request of that College with the 
purpose of training him as a translator. He showed aptitude for languages (besides 
Russian he spoke Turkish and Walachian), and was expected to master Latin, French, 
and Italian at the Corps.362  
Moreover, one’s “ability” (or lack thereof) could decide his future in a much 
more dramatic way. Thus, in 1750 Director von Zigheim suggested that four cadets be 
relieved from studying “civil subjects.” Two of them were described as “having 
neither comprehension, nor diligence,” while two others “besides having the 
aforementioned natural defects, also show no interest whatsoever in Latin.”363 In this 
case, the lack of interests in a subject is merged with a lack of “comprehension” and 
“diligence” and interpreted as something of a “natural defect.” On the other hand, 
Dmitrii Taganov, baptized son of a Muslim Caucasian aristocrat (murza), who had 
been sent to the Corps by the government in 1748, not only knew “Tatar,” his mother 
tongue, but also showed an “inclination for other subjects as well.” This is why the 
Senate decided to send him to the Corps, where “being under supervision he could 
further excel in his studies and also learn other civil sciences, so that later he could be 
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fit to serve at the College of Foreign Affairs.”364 After graduating Taganov was 
assigned to be a translator at the Astrakhan garrison, and in the 1780s he went on to 
become a prominent Russian administrator in the semi-conquered territory of Kabarda 
in the Northern Caucasus. 
The notion that one’s ability to study is determined by “natural,” or 
physiological causes was, of course, widespread at that time. Following the common 
wisdom of his day Tatishchev, for example, divided a man’s life into periods 
according to physiological processes in his body, which in turn determined his mental 
abilities (see Chapter 4). He wrote that the early years of life were the best for 
learning foreign languages, while after the age of twenty one was no longer able to 
study effectively, since the slowing down of the flow of liquids (or “humors”) in his 
body limited a student’s capacity to absorb new information.365 The Corps’s 
authorities followed this rule, and in 1734 von Münnich instructed the director that 
there were some cadets who were worthy, yet due to their excessive age they were 
“not receptive to any subjects besides military drill and riding.” These cadets are 
described as being well behaved and diligent, yet the sentence is short: because of 
their “excessive” age they would not be able to learn and thus must leave the Corps. 
Among those thus condemned we even find the twenty-one year old Count Martyn 
Skavronskii, the nephew of the late Catherine I, Peter I’s second wife.366 
                                                     
364 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2197, l. 121-121 ob. 
 
365 Tatishchev, Conversation,  66-67. For a short overview of the early eighteenth-century 
physiological theories see Roy Porter, "Medical Science and Human Science in Enlightenment," in 
Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, Robert Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century 
Domains (Los Angeles, 1995), 53-87. On humours in general and their influence on human behavior, 
see, among others, Noga Arikha, Passions and Tempers: A History of the Humours (New York, 2007); 
Gail Kern Paster, Humouring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago, 2004). 
 
366 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1712, l .37. 
 
165 
 
The notion of inclination, however, was not clear-cut. In general, authorities 
believed that a bad student was capable of improvement, and the purpose of the 
Corps, as mentioned earlier, was to help such an improvement by shielding a 
youngster from harmful influences, by subjecting him to discipline and regulation, 
and by “encouraging” him. This notion of potential improvement is clear in the 
discussions of whether there was any “hope” that a particular cadet might change his 
conduct. In fact, the duty of both the teachers and the company officers was to 
indicate in their reports not only the student’s grades, but also whether there was such 
a “hope.” The authorities took pains to distinguish between those who had a chance to 
improve and those who did not. In March 1753, the High Commander Prince Iusupov 
wrote to the director von Zigheim pointing out that  
It is completely unclear from the various reports and attestations I received 
from you concerning those cadets at the Corps who are unable to understand 
what is taught to them [neponiatnye] … whether there is any hope that they 
might comprehend any useful learning in the future. … [Therefore you should] 
submit immediately a comprehensive report on those mentioned earlier who 
still show no improvement, as well as on others who do not understand what is 
being taught. 
 At the end, a number of cadets were expelled from the Corps for the “lack of 
comprehension,” while ten others were warned that they should “apply themselves to 
their studies diligently and act respectably in everything.”367 Altogether, out of 59 
cadets expelled from the Corps in the 1730s-1750s for various offences and 
transgressions, twenty were expelled for their lack of abilities (eight in the 1730s, two 
in the 1740s, and nine in the 1750s). Among others, cadets were being expelled with 
the following explanations: “k naukam nenadezhen” (“no hope [for him to succeed] in 
studies”), “za negodnost k naukam” (“unfit for studies”), “za nesposobnost k naukam” 
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(“has no ability for studies”), “za neponiatie” (“lacks comprehension”). Membership 
in the new, reformed elite was thus a matter of an inborn ability, of “nature.” 
*    *    * 
Besides the absence of “ability,” students were often expelled from the Corps 
for committing serious crimes (or repeated minor offences). The authorities’ reaction 
to these crimes allows us further insights into the connection between behavior and 
“nature” in the minds of the Corps’s founders. As might be expected, young nobles 
often violated various rules and regulations – and were punished accordingly. The 
Corps’ papers for 1744 (which seems to be typical in other respects) show 220 
instances (involving 171 cadets) of officers taking various disciplinary measures 
against cadets such as various forms of arrest and corporal punishment. The most 
common offences were innocent “laziness,” as well as talking in class or in church. 
The list also includes all kinds of transgressions found in boarding schools, from 
“smoking on the porch” and “playing cards,” to spending a night outside the Corps 
and “swearing in the classroom.” On a more childish note, Osip Kakhovskoi 
“wrapped himself up with bed sheets and tried to scare the sentinels.” At the same 
time we also find instances of more serious offences, such as two cadets “breaking 
each other’s heads with stones,” or bullying, which was apparently quite widespread 
among the cadets. Grigorii Chirikov, for example, “forced another cadet to stand extra 
hours on guard,” while Petr Melessino is noted for beating up Corporal Leiman.368  
Yet, some crimes were noticeably more disturbing for the Corps’ authorities, 
and theft was, perhaps, the most serious of them all. According to Peter’s Military 
Regulation of 1716, it was punishable by death (for stealing from one’s own 
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“comrade”), or by running the gauntlet six times (if the value of stolen items was less 
than twenty rubles).369 On the one hand, these draconian provisions were never 
implemented at the Cadet Corps. On the other hand, it is clear that that in the eyes of 
the Corps’ authorities, theft was something qualitatively different from other 
transgressions, in that it was something viewed as undermining the very mission of 
the institution. 
Consider the case of Cadet Petr Vladislavlev, who was found guilty in 1749 of 
stealing from various individuals. His case led to further investigation, and as a result 
a dozen other cadets and their servants were implicated in stealing, buying stolen 
items, or knowing about these crimes and not reporting them. Some, like Sergeants 
Skripitsyn and Rossi, were demoted for a few months merely for buying “suspicious” 
items. They, for all practical purposes, were punished for negligence, for as NCOs 
they had to be aware of their comrades’ criminal activities and should have stopped 
them.370 As for the rest, however, their punishment was heavier. The Corps’s 
authorities argued that  
due to their theft, and also to other misbehavior, and lack of zeal for things 
useful, and also so that the other youth at the Corps, having observed this 
punishment, better refrain from all the kinds of mischief and behavior that are 
indecent and inappropriate for noblemen … they, as unworthy of living among 
other noblemen [iako nedostoinyie shl’akhetnogo obshchezhitiia], are liable to 
be stripped of ranks and expelled from the Corps. 
This, of course, also implied “unmerciful” beating and exile into the navy as common 
sailors or to the “faraway regiments” as privates. Those who were less guilty were 
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transferred to the St.Petersburg garrison school, or to the Artillery school. The Senate 
upheld this last sentence.371 
In this preamble we see an obvious attempt to define nobility as a lifestyle that 
requires a certain type of behavior, to instill into cadets a sense of noble honor. As 
mentioned earlier, this moral definition of the nobility was already mentioned in the 
founding charter, that demanded that the Corps’ authorities monitor the “mores, 
habits, and deeds” of the cadets, so that they “behave according to the demands of 
virtue, politeness, due humility, and honor, while lies, unfaithfulness, and other vices 
inappropriate to nobility were rooted out from them early on.”372 Cadets were 
expected to behave nobly, and that is why theft was seen to be especially appalling to 
the authorities. On one occasion, five cadets who had run away home from the Corps, 
rather than being expelled, were sent for six months to the St Petersburg garrison 
school to stay there “together with the soldiers’ children,” receiving the same food 
and money allowance as they did. Here is an attempt not so much to punish as to 
make the offenders appreciate the difference between their status and that of the lower 
ranks of society.373 Altogether in the 1730s-1750s twenty four cadets were expelled 
for bad conduct (nine in the 1730s, nine in the 1740s, and six in the 1750s). Among 
them four were expelled specifically for theft, one for running away, one for 
drunkenness, and one for marrying without permission. As for others, they were 
expelled for “bad behavior,” “inappropriate behavior,” or, tellingly, for “behavior 
inappropriate for a nobleman.” A notable example is 19-year old Ivan Sytin whose 
uniform was found to have changed its color in 1749 because he had vomited on it 
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after drinking to excess. The Corps authorities pointed out that “the above mentioned 
drunkenness, inappropriate for noble youth, cannot be tolerated,” and argued for his 
expulsion.374    
*   *   * 
Thus, similarly to one’s ability to succeed academically, one’s ability to 
observe and follow the rules of noble life was also explained by his “natural” 
inclinations. In fact, an “inclination” for unacceptable conduct and lack of 
“inclination” for studies often – although, by no means always – went hand in hand. 
In their report to the Senate concerning cadets implicated in the Vladislavlev case, the 
Corps officials pointed out that these cadets “evidently due to thinking about, and an 
inclination towards, bad behavior rather than useful learning” also turned out to be 
“negligent and lacking zeal [in their studies].” They were therefore were considered 
“unworthy of continuing their studies at the Corps among the ranks of honest 
nobles.”375 Referring to another cadet, Rusakov, authorities argued that his bad 
“inclinations” made him irredeemable: “there is no hope that he will refrain from such 
behavior in the future for after being punished many times he has not changed for the 
better …and he could not be restrained for he is hopelessly stuck in such behavior.”376 
This was a radical approach indeed. It would seem to open up the possibility that if a 
noble failed to behave in a way that was expected from an “honest noblemen,” it 
meant that he was not an “honest nobleman” by nature. In other words, nobility could 
be interpreted as determined not by the fact of being born in a certain family as such, 
but rather by “inclination.” This could not be established a priori, but rather had to be 
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discerned through continuous observation and examination. Peter I, as we know, 
attempted to force all the nobles to study. Here we see the Corps’ authorities, for all 
practical purposes, implying that those who do not want to, or cannot study, are not 
nobles at all. In France, Lockean ideas were employed by the nobility to justify its 
status. In Russia, in the absence of the notion of beneficial family influences, they, in 
fact, undermined it.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9 
The Science of Encouragement:  
Human Nature and Methods of Governing 
Given the coherence of educational policies and practices pursued at the Cadet 
Corps, it is pertinent to ask whether and to what degree the basic assumptions about 
human “nature,” abilities and “inclinations” also informed other government policies 
pursued during Anna’s reign. Furthermore, if they did, how does this change our 
overall understanding of post-Petrine history? In this chapter, I address this issue by 
focusing on the policies pursued by Anna’s government in the fields of education and 
noble service, and especially on the reform of 1736-1737. On the one hand, these 
reforms established a coherent system of registering young nobles for service, which 
also regulated their education, something that had not been done by Peter. On the 
other hand, these reforms also limited obligatory noble service to 25 years, thus 
serving as a key milestone on the road to the “emancipation of the nobility.” This 
system (with notable corrections in the early 1740s) remained in force until 1762, thus 
setting up the framework within which the Russian nobility operated for nearly three 
decades. It was also within this framework that all the key actors of Catherine’s reign 
grew up and entered service.  
These policies should also be viewed within the framework of broader cultural 
change in the 1730s in Russia that reflected, of course, a pan-European discovery of 
sensibility. In her study of the Russian poetry of that decade Elena Pogosian describes 
what she calls the "official culture of 'sensitivity'" [chuvstvitel'nosti] cultivated at 
Anna's court. Anna herself routinely displayed emotions during official events. Vasilii 
172 
 
Trediakovskii, a leading poet, in letters to his high-ranking patrons wrote about being 
"enchanted" by these dignitaries, about being "desperate" because of his inability to 
see them, etc. In his dedication to Ernst Biron, Trediakovskii described the "true zeal 
in [his] heart" that moved him to glorify both the favorite and the empress: until now, 
the poet claimed, he "venerated the virtues" of Biron silently, yet now he could not 
"contain" himself from expressing these feelings publicly, etc. According to Pogosian, 
this culture was defined by the "obligatory emotional and sincere participation of a 
subject in the ritualized political life."  Official poetry of the day (including the 
addresses presented to the empress by various individuals and institutions) 
emphasized the sincerity of civic feelings experienced by the authors: the poets 
routinely juxtaposed their own "true" and "sincere" adoration of the empress to the 
formulaic congratulations of "other" authors. In a New Year address (1736) the 
representatives of the Cadet Corps claimed that "our very nature opens our mouths to 
congratulate You and to wish You health from our sincere hearts." The cadet poets 
were sending "the muses" away: their assistance was not needed, since the muses 
were accustomed to flattery. The same feelings were also supposed to motivate nobles 
in their service. An address from the Cadet Corps, for example, emphasized the 
personal and emotional connection between the empress and her officers. The cadets 
claimed to be serving out of sincere "loyalty" and "zeal" further enhanced by imperial 
generosity towards them.377 Thus, in their focus on individual “inclinations” and the 
need to “encourage” true “zeal” in servitors the Corps’ officials were broadly in tune 
with the official culture of the reign.  
*    *    * 
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The personality of Field-Marshal von Münnich looms large in the history of the 
1730s. Besides numerous other reforms of the Russian military, introduced by him in 
the 1730s, in his capacity as the President of the Military College he also directed the 
drafting of the central documents of the 1736-1737 reform of noble service. Von 
Münnich did not produce any theoretical tracts, but one detect three key intellectual 
themes that seem to be significant for understanding his overall thinking. The first one 
is his familiarity with the works of Fénelon. In July 1712, while a young major in the 
Cassel infantry (serving with the army of Marlborough), von Münnich was severely 
wounded in battle, taken prisoner of war by the French and kept, of all places, in 
Cambrai. It was during this period that the officer got personally acquainted with 
Archbishop Fénelon and became a great admirer of his ideas and writings. 
Subsequently they even exchanged a number of letters.378 As is evident from the 
memoirs of his son, these meetings made a sufficiently strong impression on the 
future Field-Marshal.379 As we saw in the previous chapter, the Adventures of 
Telemachus was one of the key texts at the Cadet Corps (although this was not the 
only channel through which Fenelons’ ideas came to Russia). The second important 
element of von Münnich’s intellectual background was his strong Protestant piety. 
Out of 157 volumes in his library, seven were writings by Luther.380 Beginning 
in1728, von Münnich played a very active role in the affairs of the Lutheran 
congregation in St.Petersburg,381 and was, apparently, at least in some way connected 
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to the Pietist circles in both Halle and in Russia.382 Finally, with his strong interest in 
artillery and engineering, von Münnich was an avid reader of Blondel, Saint-Remy, 
and above all, Vauban.383 All of these authors were extensively used at the Corps, 
with the Russian translation of Saint-Remy being published in 1732-1733.384 Vauban, 
of course, was not only an engineer, but was also – along with Fénelon– a leading 
theoretician of the new science of government that placed an emphasis on measuring, 
assessing, and quantifying subjects, and the need for “true” virtue and moral 
restoration. These two issues were closely interconnected, for the success of any 
moral reform rested on the ability of the sovereign to know and to properly assess the 
virtues and abilities of her subjects.385  
This science of government, it appears, informed the policies pursued by von 
Münnich and his circle. Highly noteworthy in this light is a letter in French sent to 
von Münnich on November 21, 1731, by Baron Pott von Luberas, the first director of 
the Cadet Corps. Congratulating von Münnich on his latest promotion, the baron 
opined that the ability to discern and to reward abilities of his or her servants was the 
most important quality of a sovereign (“Si l’est plus grande qualité des souverains que 
de scavoir digniment distribuer les emplois de l’état.”). Further on, von Luberas 
spelled out his theory of governing. According to him, it is by justly rewarding the 
most loyal subjects that the monarch is able to encourage both them and, what is 
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important, every other honnête  homme, to serve with utmost application. Empress 
Anna, argued the Baron,  
Ne scanroit mieux faire eclarez sa haute sagosse qu’en prennant pour son 
conseill interne ceux, qui d’entre ses fideles sujets elle trouve les plus zelés, les 
plus habilis, et les plus appliqués. C’est ainsi que voyant les affairs du premier 
resort, si judiciesement soignees que chaque honéte home se ramasse s’aime, et 
s’efforce de bon coeur, de travailler pour les public, a’lenvie des autres.386 
These principles, as I have shown in previous chapters, were implemented by 
von Münnich and von Luberas at the Cadet Corps. However, this statement also sheds 
different light on other initiatives and policies pursued during Anna’s reign. Quite 
striking in this respect is a memorandum prepared by von Münnich for Empress Anna 
in 1737, in connection with the ongoing war with the Ottomans.387 This memorandum 
provides a list of all the general officers in the army commanded by von Münnich 
with short descriptions of their respective “characters.”  First on the list, for example, 
is Prince von Hessen-Homburg, who had recently replaced von Münnich as General-
Fel’dtsekhmeister. He is presented in the following way:  
He is quite hotheaded [goriach i vspyl’chiv]; does not observe any hierarchy of 
ranks, or rules of obedience, his face is pale, in action he lacks firm resolution; 
he is often sick, and thus he is not fit for service in the field. But since he knows 
the Russian language and military service well, he could be appointed either 
vice-president of the Military College, or the president of the Artillery 
Chancellery. 
The “character,” or “temperament,” and bodily characteristics (pale face and 
poor health) are combined here to determine his “fitness” for a particular type of 
service. Indeed, the language of “ability” and “inclination” as determined by one’s 
“nature” or “character,” is employed in this memorandum to the highest degree. 
Lieutenant-General Leontiev, an old cavalryman, is described as being “healthy and 
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well-built, but has neither ambition [chestoliubiia], nor desire to serve.” Thus he is 
“fit” [goditsa] for service at the Military College or at the Stables Department (“he is 
an enthusiast [okhotnik] and expert on horses as nobody else in the army”). General 
Rumiantsev “understands service, is talkative, follows orders,” yet “his inclinations 
[sklonnosti] are more towards Ministerstvo [diplomacy?] and towards civil service.” 
Major-General Arakcheev “serves willingly,” while Prince Repnin “serves with 
diligence and conducts himself well.” Brigadier Elizarov “has little inclination for 
service in the field, and he lacks agility [malo v nem zhivosti],” etc. In each of these 
descriptions von Münnich stresses the “inclinations” of individual officers – their 
willingness to perform a particular functions; appointing them to positions that match 
these inclinations appears to be a wise policy and a recipe for success.388 
Given this need for “knowing” one’s “inclinations,” a number of military 
reforms of the early 1730s acquire additional meaning as part of what appears to be 
von Münnich’s overall program of counting, measuring and regulating Russian 
officers and nobility in general. Already in the summer of 1731 he consolidated 
control over careers and promotions of all the officers (previously careers of officers 
of garrison and landmilitsia regiments were monitored by the Master of the Heraldry) 
at the Military College. He also required all officers to submit curriculum vitae each 
time they were promoted to the next officer rank, or transferred from one regiment to 
another, etc. Between 1730 and 1731 he also designed and created the office of 
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Inspector General of the army. The Inspector-General and his deputies were expected 
to visit military units all over the Empire and, among other things, inspect the physical 
fitness of all the officers and men, and to record their origins, career history, size of 
their land- and serf-holding, etc. 389  
*    *    * 
Another key personality that, in many regards, defined the policies of Anna’s 
reign was Heinrich Johann Friedrich (a.k.a. Andrei Ivanovich) Ostermann (1686-
1747), who eventually became known as Count Ostermann.390 A son and grandson of 
Lutheran pastors, Ostermann studied at Jena, but was forced to flee after killing a 
fellow student in a drunken quarrel. Having joined Russian service as a secretary and 
translator, Ostermann was noticed by Peter for his fluency in a number of European 
languages (including Russian), and for his writing skills. By the early 1720s 
Ostermann had become the second most important figure at the College of Foreign 
Affairs. After Peter I’s death he managed to make himself indispensable to the new 
rulers of Russia and, thanks to his legendary political skill, survived all the coups and 
counter-coups of the period. In 1731 he became one of the three members of the 
Imperial Cabinet, the highest governmental body designed by him personally. One of 
the other two members was Ostermann’s nominal superior at the College, the seventy-
year old Chancellor Golovkin, the other being Prince Cherkasskii, a participant of the 
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events of 1730 and one of wealthiest landlords in Russia, yet commonly regarded by 
contemporaries as a political nonentity (see Chapter 5). This effectively  made 
Ostermann the chief minister of the reign.    
Ostermann knew European governmental practices exceedingly well. During the 
second half of Peter’s reign he actively participated in drafting some of the most 
important pieces of Peter’s legislation, including the General Regulation and the 
Table of Ranks. In the process, he was actively involved in extensive study of 
European (to a large degree, Prussian) laws.391  
No less importantly, since July 1720, Ostermann had officially been charge of 
the education of future emperor Peter II.392 The program of studies composed under 
his direction in 1727, and officially approved by the Supreme Privy Council, reflected 
many of the educational ideas and practices described in previous chapters. It 
provided an hour-by-hour schedule of the entire week, including specific times for 
lessons on languages, ancient and modern history, geography, some mathematical 
studies and dancing. The lessons on modern history were to be based on Pufendorf 
and were to include discussions of the reigning families in neighboring lands, or in 
other words, the “forms of government, their strengths and weaknesses.”393 Each day 
was to begin with a prayer and to include some reading from the New Testament.394 
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As for pedagogic theory, the document began with the statement that “the hours for 
studies and hours for entertainment ought always to follow each other.”395  
Overall, Ostermann was one of the most well-read persons in Russia, with only 
Feofan Prokopovich and Prince D.M. Golitsyn of the Supreme Privy Council, 
perhaps, equaling him. More specifically, however, his library (also one of the largest 
in Russia) included - besides Hobbs, Spinoza, Grotius, and others - such titles as 
Instruction for Bringing Up Children, The Science of Behaving in Society, Natural 
Morals, Rules on How To Educate a King, On New Rules for Upbringing Children, 
and The Short Method for Teaching Geography, which were directly relevant, of 
course, to his duties as the overseer of Peter II’s education. His library also included 
the works of Erasmus and Locke.396 In an earlier version of his program for Peter II’s 
education he explained, moralistically, that “History is the miracle of the world. One 
part of it serves for entertainment and satisfying our curiosity… The other serves as 
an example for emulating good and avoiding evil.”397 Ten years later, in 1740, he 
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see SK #575.. According to J.L. Black, it was a “plea for a new kind of ruler… Implicit in this 
document is the modern assumption that effective rulers are not made in Haven, rather they must be 
taught the techniques of overlordship.” Note, however, that the order to print it “as soon as possible … 
without any delay” was issued on December 1731, after Peter II’s death’; Ostermann’s role in 
supervising the preparation of this text is mentioned in the title. A history textbook prepared for Peter II 
was also published; its title was Sokrashchenie drevneishei statskoi istorii, ot nachala veka d srednikh 
vekov, dlia opotreblenia Imperatora Petra II (not listed in the Svodnyi katalog).  N.I. Likhareva, “Iz 
istorii pedagogicheskoi mysli (Voprosy metodiki istorii v Rossii XVIII veka),” in K 25-letiiu ucheno-
pedagogicheskoi deiatel’nosti I.M. Grevsa. Sbonik statei (St.Peterburg, 1916), 446-450; Black, 
Citizens, 65, 186 (notes 53, 54); Winter, Halle, 180-187.  
 
396 Luppov, Kniga v Rossii v poslepetrovskoe vremia, 180-195.  Unfortunately, we know the 
content of the early eighteenth-century Russian libraries mostly due to the fact that their owners were at 
some point arested and prosecuted. The clerks who compose the inventories of their confiscated 
properties did not care to provide exact titles. Instead, in case of boks in foreign languages, they wrote 
down approximate transliterations or, as in this case, even more approximate translations of the titles 
into Russian. Thus in many cases it is imposible to recognize, which book are we talking about.   
  
397 Quoted in Vagner, “Osterman,” 39. The original documents related to Peter II’s education 
are in: RGADA, f. 2, op. 1, d. 26; f. 11, op. 1, d. 398. 
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wrote that “nothing is as important for the state as good schools.”398 Apparently, he 
also stood behind the reform and expansion of the so-called “garrison schools,” 
undertaken by Anna’s government in 1732.399  
Ostermann’s views on governance and rulership are explained in a 
memorandum he prepared in 1740 for Princess Anna, the mother of the infant 
emperor Ivan VI and, briefly, the regent. This memorandum exists in a full version 
and also in the form of short notes – probably, an outline or a draft.400 Here I quote the 
first few points in the outline – the rules that Ostermann recommended the Princess 
should follow: 
[1] Fear of God. 
[2] Clemency and forgiveness. 
[3] Love for justice and conduct thereof. 
…. 
[6] Not to forget to reward with ranks and offices those people who are worthy 
[dostoinykh] and meritorious [zaslugi okazavshikh] 
[7] To listen to everything and to study everything [Vse slushat’ i vo vse 
vnikat’].401 
                                                     
398 “Predstavlenie general-admirala grafa Andreia Ivanovicha Ostermana v 1740 godu...," in 
Kashpirev, Pamiatniki novoi russkoi istorii, Vol. III., 261. 
 
399 Ibid, 265; PSZ #6188. According to the decree, there were to be 4,000 pupils in all of these 
schools, 82 pupils at each of 20 regiments stationed in the Baltic provinces and 30 pupils at each of the 
29 regiments in the other provinces. Officers from these regiments were acting as instructors, teaching 
arithmetic, artillery and engineering, and military exercises. Although plans for instruction of children 
under the auspices of military units were made in 1721, by the 1730s system seem to have been in 
disarray. Originally, the concept of “garrison schools” was invented in Prussia within the context of 
confessional tensions. The first school for the children of court servants and garrison soldiers of 
Calvinist faith, as separate from an elementary school for the local (Lutheran) populace in general, was 
established in Potsdam as early as 1662. By 1720s, however, Friedrich Wilhelm I was expanding these 
basic teaching arrangements into a universal system by ordering a garrison school to be founded 
wherever a regiment was posted. Dorwart, The Prussian Welfare State, 174-175. 
 
400 “Predstavlenie general-admirala grafa Andreia Ivanovich Ostermana v 1740 godu..," in 
V.V. Kashpirev, Pamiatniki novoi russkoi istorii: Sbornik istoricheskikh statei i materialov. Vol. III. 
(St.Peterburg, 1873), 257-277; "Zapiska dl'a pam'ati grafa Andreia Ivanovich Ostermana," in Arkhiv 
kniazia Vorontsova, Vol. XXIV. (Moscow, 1880), 1-5. 
 
401 “Zapiska,” 1. 
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These rules are elaborated in the longer version. According to Ostermann, the 
first three are relevant and sufficient for dealing with the masses, especially if “love 
for justice” is displayed periodically by issuing manifestoes. For dealing with the state 
servants, however, different rules were needed. First, the ruler needs to be able to 
discern their qualities, that is, to judge them by their deeds. Besides, servitors need to 
be encouraged by giving them opportunities to demonstrate their zeal. Thus, 
Ostermann suggests that the Senate and the Colleges submit weekly or monthly 
reports, which would be examined either by the regent personally, or by a specially 
appointed person. This attention, he believes, would “encourage” [pobudit] the 
governmental departments to be more “attentive.” In a similar vein, Ostermann argues 
that the nobles do not enter naval or civil service, because there were fewer 
opportunities for promotion there. Therefore, nobles serving in the navy and in the 
bureaucracy should be “encouraged” [pridat’ revnovania]. According to Peter I’s 
system, each governmental bureau was administered by a board. Ostermann, however, 
suggested putting each member of these boards in charge of separate sub-departments. 
According to his plan, boards members should have an area of personal responsibility, 
which would give each of them the opportunity to display their “diligence and zeal” 
[prilezhaniie i rachenie], and thus would encourage him.402 Indeed, in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1730 crisis Ostermann advised empress Anna that it was 
“appropriate” to reward her most loyal supporters “regardless of seniority or other 
circumstances, so as to encourage [ankurazhirovaniia] others.”403  
*    *    * 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
402 “Predstavlenie,” 258, 267, 270. For Ostermann’s attempt to implement this reform by 
dividing up the Senate into specialized departments, see Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie, 75.  
 
403 Quoted in Troitskii, Russkii absol’utizm, 125 
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The idea of limiting the term of obligatory noble service was mentioned in the 
proposals submitted in 1730, although it was by no means a universal concern; none 
of the proposals suggested completely abolishing obligatory service.404 Did these 
proposals influence decision-making in the 1730s? After the crisis was over, the idea 
was brought up again in the documents of Anna’s government in 1731, in the report 
prepared by the so-called Army Reform Commission (Voinskaia komissia) – a panel 
of generals convened to work out proposals for reforming the army and reducing its 
expenditure. The commission, directed by von Münnich, was concerned, among other 
things, with the creation of a heavy cavalry, or cuirassiers, in Russia. To this end, the 
Commission proposed to give the nobles an opportunity to limit their service to 25 
(or, in some circumstances, even to six) years by volunteering for service in the 
cuirassier regiments, by supplying these regiments with appropriate horses and 
recruits from their estates, and/or by paying a lump sum of 150 rubles.405  
Thus, it was von Münnich who was the first to suggest limiting the turn of 
obligatory service for the nobility.  This suggestion was blocked, however, by the 
Senate, which argued that such a limit would contradict Petrine policies. Besides, the 
Senate believed that, given an opportunity to buy a reduction of mandatory service, all 
the nobles would use it, even those for whom it would mean financial ruin. As a 
result, the nobles would “live at their homes in all sorts of idleness and laziness, 
without any good studies and sociability [obkhozhdenia].”406 This is a typical Petrine 
attitude. The same argument is repeated in the anonymous memo found in the papers 
                                                     
404 “Dokumenty o vosshestvii na prestol Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny,” in Kashpirev, 
Pamiatniki novoi russkoi istorii, Vol. III, 5, 7. 
 
405 The work of the Military Commission is discussed in detail in: Petrukhintsev, 
Tsarstvovanie, 141-146. The shortage in Russia of sufficiently large horses to carry a heavily armed 
cuirassier was a problem that Anna’s government tried to tackle throughout the 1730s.  
 
406 PSZ Vol.44, Part 1, 81-83; Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie, 141-146, 157-158.  
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of Artemii Volynskii, a minister of the Cabinet between 1738 and1740 and a member 
of the younger generation of Peter’s lieutenants. Its author, writing, evidently, during 
the crisis of 1730, also opposed the rumored abolition of obligatory service for the 
nobility on the grounds that the nobles would all immediately abandon their posts (he 
expected that poor nobles would in such cases resort to brigandage, for lack of other 
means of subsistence).407 Note also that von Münnich’s was the second of its type: the 
first one, led by Field-Marshal Prince M.M. Golitsyn, formerly of the Supreme Privy 
Council, did not suggest any changes in the system of noble service. This time, von 
Münnich, a foreigner, failed to obtain “concessions” for the nobility because of the 
opposition from the Senate, staffed with Russian noblemen.  
The next time the government turned its attention to this problem was in 1736. It 
appears that the immediate reason for this was the outbreak of war with the Ottoman 
Turks.408 Preparation for fighting led, naturally, to the mobilization of resources, both 
financial and human. It is in this context that on May 3, 1736, the Cabinet ordered the 
Military College and the Master of the Heraldry to “submit a report immediately: how 
many noble minors have presented themselves [for service] in regiments and 
[provincial] towns since 1732, and [how many] of them were enrolled as privates.”409 
                                                     
407 The memo bears Volynskii’s remarks, but the text itself is written in different handwriting. 
"Perepiska A.P. Volynskogo 1729-1730 gg.," in Rossiia i zapad: gorizonty vzaimoponimania. 
Literaturnyie istochniki XVIII veka (1726-1762). Vypusk 2 (Moscow, 2003), 742-743; Stroev, 
Bironovshchina, Part 2, 17. 
 
408 For an overview see A.K. Baiov, Russkaia armiia v tsarstvovaniie imperatritsy Anny 
Ioannovny: Voina Rossii s Turtsiiei v 1736-1739 gg. 2 vols. (St.Petersburg, 1906). 
 
409 SIRIO, CXIV, 187. Overall, throughout the year the Cabinet repeatedly request “urgent” 
and “immediate” reports on the number of students at the Academic Gymnasium, and on the number of 
poor cadets at the Corps learning German and Latin (February 25) of the number and status of noble 
minors in Siberia (July 19); on the numbers and profiles of schoolchildren in towns without garrisons 
(and therefore, without  garrison schools), and on the number and background of students at the Naval 
Academy (August 19); on the number of students at the Engineering School (August 24), etc. Ibid, 91, 
333-334, 390, 402. 
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Throughout the following summer the Cabinet repeatedly occupied itself with finding 
suitable candidates to fill junior officer vacancies.410  
Another factor was, probably, the proposal submitted in that year to Ernst Biron, 
the favorite of the Empress. Its author suggested giving officers extended leaves to 
manage their estates and also to introduce a limited term of obligatory service, 
although he does not specify the length. The authorship of the proposal has not been 
established, but the original is written in German. Biron had it translated into Russian 
for the Empress, who, in turn, forwarded it to the Cabinet.411 Note, however, that in 
1736 the composition of the Cabinet changed. A year earlier Pavel Iaguzhinskii was 
brought back from his semi-exile in Berlin and was made a member of the Cabinet. At 
that point, according to V.N. Stroev, Ostermann lost some of his influence and nearly 
ceased attending the Cabinet meetings. In April 1736, however, Iaguzhinskii died, and 
Ostermann assumed all the affairs of the Cabinet.412 It is reasonable to suggest, 
therefore, that the Cabinet turned his attention towards the issue of noble service not 
only because of the war, but also because Ostermann finally got an opportunity to put 
his ideas into practice. In the following months he repeatedly took a personal interest 
in the issue of noble service.413 As with the establishment of the Cadet Corps in 1731, 
the decision to limit noble service to 25 years was taken, therefore, not within the 
context of some unspecified political pressure from the nobility, but, rather, as a result 
of interplay of personal agendas. 
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412 Stroev, Bironovshchina, Part 2, 26. 
 
413 On July 23, von Tettau, director of the Cadet Corps, was ordered to present a report to 
Ostermann personally. On August 26, the Naval Academy was ordered to present to Ostermann a 
“detailed list” of its students. SIRIO, CXIV, 346, 408. 
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The reference to the year 1732 in the request for information, sent out by the 
Cabinet on May 3, 1736, is explained by the fact that early in 1732 a decree 
confirmed that all the nobles were to register for service with the Master of 
Heraldry.414 On March 8 of the same year, however, a manifesto declared that poor 
and landless nobles (malopomestnye and bespomestnye) were to be exempt from this 
rule, since the obligation to travel to the capital was excessively burdensome for them. 
Instead, they were allowed to fulfill their service obligation by directly enrolling in 
army regiments in their own localities.415 As a result, however, the government lost 
track of a large number of young nobles. Moreover, the overall system of registration 
of noble minors for service in the early 1730s seems to have become increasingly 
malfunctioning.416 Thus, the requested reports from the Military College and the 
Master of Heraldry were not forthcoming. 
On May 6, 1736, the government reacted by issuing an imperial decree. This 
decree noted the lamentable tendency of young nobles and children of other 
categories of servitors (non-noble officers, soldiers, and servitors of “old ranks”) to 
avoid service, “and there is nothing good to be expected from that, for idleness is the 
root of all evil.” The document, basically, confirmed the obligation to register for 
service, giving December 31 of that year as the deadline and demanding that local 
officials submit monthly reports on the progress of registration. On August 29, the 
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415 PSZ #5976. 
 
416 On this point see, for example, A. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, Dvor'anstvo v Rossii ot 
nachala XVIII veka do otmeny krepostnogo prava (Kiev, 1912): 79-80. Even cursory study of the 
Heraldry’s papers for that period confirms this point: in July 1732 the senator had to request 
instructions on what to do with those young noble who actually presented themselves at the Heraldry – 
whether they should be examined at the Senate, or forwarded to the Cabinet. PSZ #6127. The low 
quality and inconsistency of registration records from this period has significant practical implication 
for my discussion in Part III of this dissertation. 
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Senate confirmed this decree, admitting that up to that point it had not had much 
effect.417 On December 31, 1736, however, there appeared a Manifesto that, together 
with subsequent decrees, established the new rules of noble service, which, with little 
alteration, remained in effect until the “emancipation of the nobility” in the 1760s.418 
According to the decree, a noble father could choose one among his sons to stay at 
home to manage the estate, with a provision that he would learn reading, grammar, 
and some mathematics in order to be qualified for civil service. Other nobles still had 
to enter obligatory service, but were allowed to retire after 25 years. 
A month later, however, this decree was supplemented with another one meant 
to “clarify” the manifesto of December 31, 1736. Such clarification was, apparently, 
urgently needed: in January 1737 the Master of the Heraldry repeatedly asked the 
Senate for instructions on what to do with the young nobles arriving to the capital, as 
they were required by the earlier decrees. At first, the Senate was clueless and asked 
for instructions from the Cabinet; a few days later the senators ordered their staff to 
prepare a memorandum on the existing laws on this topic. Finally, a senior staffer was 
send to the Cabinet with inquiries and reported back the following 
[as instructed] he has asked … Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich Cherkasskii to 
issue a resolution regarding the Senate’s report on the noble minors. [Prince 
Cherkasskii] deigned to declare that there will, indeed, be a resolution on this 
matter, and he also ordered the staffer to ask Count Andrei Ivanovich 
Ostermann regarding the same issue. [The staffer went to see Ostermann] and 
declared that His Excellence [Count Ostermann] likewise ordered him to 
report to the Senate that there would, indeed, be a resolution regarding this 
issue. 419 
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419 Zhurnaly Pravitel’stvuiushchego Senata za 1737 g. Part 1. (Moscow, 1910),  40, 46, 58, 
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We know that the drafting of the decree establishing a system of examinations for 
young nobles was already under way in the Military College under the guidance of 
von Münnich.420 Judging from their remarks, the members of the Cabinet knew this, 
but did not believe it necessary to share any details with the Senate. At the end, the 
design of the new system of noble service with its extensive examination and 
schooling requirements was decided between von Münnich and Ostermann. 
The decree of February 9, 1737, established a comprehensive system intended to 
compel the nobles to study, and in that way it was clearly following the principles of 
Petrine policy. 421 The goals of the sovereign in issuing the decree were, apparently, to 
achieve “perfect benefit to the State” by making sure that not only “all the nobles 
were educated, and fit for military and civil service,” but also that they were “making 
diligent efforts towards this end.” According to the new regulation, when a young 
noble reached the age of seven, he was to register with the Master of Heraldry in 
St.Petersburg, or with their local governor. Then he was to come for a review at 
twelve. By that age he was supposed to master reading and writing. At that time he (or 
rather, his father) had to make a choice. If he had 100 male serfs or more, he could 
keep his son at home and promise that by the time of the next review he would learn 
arithmetic, geometry and, characteristically, the basic tenets of Orthodoxy. Those who 
owned less than 100 male serfs could only keep their sons at home if they could prove 
that the boys actually had already begun studying arithmetic and geometry. Otherwise 
these poorer nobles (or those whose fathers would not promise to organize home 
schooling for them) were to be enrolled in state schools.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
420 Kalashnikov, “Ofitserskii korpus,”168. 
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The entire procedure was to be repeated when the young nobles reached the age 
of sixteen. This time, however, the review was to take place in the capital and the 
subjects to be studied were geometry, fortification, and history. However, the young 
nobles who stayed at home for studies but did not master the prescribed program were 
at this point to be drafted into the navy as common sailors, without the right of 
promotion. The fourth, and final, review was to take place at the age of twenty (for 
those, of course, who were not already serving as sailors by that time). At this point 
the young nobles were finally ready to enter service. 
The system of noble service introduced in 1736-1737 reaffirmed, of course, 
many principles of Petrine policy towards the nobility. At the same time, one finds 
here a number of themes that it shares with other policies of Anna’s reign, and which 
set it apart from Petrine governmental practices. One of them is the focus on formal 
examinations, to which all the nobles of the realm were now subjected. The other is 
giving the nobles the opportunity to choose. As we saw, in 1731 the Military 
Commission hoped to attract volunteers to the cuirassier regiments. The same 
principle was applied at the Cadet Corps. Rather than pressing young nobles into it, as 
Peter would have undoubtedly done, the government called on volunteers. This was a 
sufficiently noticeable feature of the new institution to be specifically pointed out, for 
example, by Tatishchev in his letter to J.D. Schumacher, the librarian of the Academy 
(“the recruited cadets are to be volunteers, [only those] who wished [to study]).”422 
Further on, the principle that the choice of career was to be determined by the students 
themselves (or, by their “inclinations”) was widely followed (or at least proclaimed at 
the Corps). Finally, the decree of May 6, 1736, reaffirmed this principle as a basic 
rule, pointing out that the government created schools and paid “salaries” to the pupils 
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so that noble children could “study whatever science they have the inclination for.” 
Further on, it instructed local officials to enroll noble teenagers into army and garrison 
regiments “according to their wishes,” while younger noble minors were to study 
“grammar and other sciences, whichever they themselves might desire.”423 Likewise, 
the decree of February 9, 1737, stipulated that the choice of schools was to be based 
“on their inclination … whichever they appear to have ability for.” (One might, 
perhaps, also quote here the advice given by Ostermann in 1740 regarding a 
construction project that “one can achieve more, and [at a] faster [rate], and at lesser 
costs with workers who are voluntarily employed”).424 
Finally, one finds in the decree of February 9, 1737, the full package of ideas on 
“encouraging” nobles to display “diligence” through observation and just reward. The 
decree stipulated that  
it is to be strictly observed that those who made more progress in their studies 
and display a diligent effort, were also be the first to be promoted into the 
[officer] ranks, and thus be rewarded for their diligence in studies. The decrees 
are to be sent to their place of service with a detailed description [of their 
achievement at the Corps], so that others, having seen that, were urged towards 
similar diligence and zeal and refrained from soul-damaging running around and 
other indecencies. 
Note also the need to refrain from idleness and “indecencies,” which are 
conceptualized as “soul-damaging.”   
It would be fair to suggest, therefore, that the reform of noble service in 1736-
1737 was really intended as a reform of the nobility, not as a concession to it: what 
looks like generous grant of freedom of choice was, in fact, a strategy for social 
engineering. The motto on the Corps’ banner is a case in point. The banner bore a 
picture of a double-headed eagle, of course. In one of the eagle’s claws can be seen 
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the symbols of military power, in the other are the symbols of learning (scrolls, books, 
geometric tools, etc.). The motto read “Ot oboikh shl’akhetstvo,” which can be 
translated as Nobility Comes From Both [Sources], or, perhaps, as Both Are the 
Sources of Nobility.425 Whether it meant that the cadets were noble in two senses 
because of their mastery of military exercise and non-military sciences, or that non-
military learning was no less noble and ennobling than the military, the motto was 
clearly meant to challenge some existing notions of the nobility.  
Indeed, back in 1731 the Corps was regarded by von Münnich as something of 
an experiment and a first step towards greater reform. In 1731 he believed it to be 
unwise to expand it further “because of the novelty of this affair,” until the Corps 
“comes into good order” and acquires some “experience as such an establishment.” At 
the same time, he suggested that a period of study at the Corps should eventually 
become the one and only way of obtaining a commission, “while others, who had not 
studied there, were not to be made officers” under any circumstances.426 Although his 
position on this issue seems to have relaxed, and this principle was not codified in the 
1736-1737 laws, their purpose was the same: only educated nobles were to be 
accepted as members of the elite, while those who had no “inclination” for study were 
to be banned to the navy for life. 
*    *    * 
It is hard to tell to what extent von Münnich understood that his drive to 
fashion the “true” nobility of morals and manners was a challenge to the existing 
nobility of birth. In 1731, upon being appointed the head of the Military College, von 
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Münnich issued an order explicitly prohibiting promotion of commoners to officers’ 
ranks under any circumstances. By the end of the decade, however, he was accused by 
his rivals of abusing his office by excessively promoting commoners to commissioned 
ranks. Inspector-General von Gokhmut complained in 1739, for example, that officers 
of non-noble birth had multiplied in von Münnich’s army: 
[They] have very unruly, wild, and coarse mores [nrav imeyut zelo buinyi, 
svirepyi i grubyi]. They indulge the soldiery in everything, except for matters 
of service regulations and drill, where they treat soldiers extremely harshly 
through exercise and punishment … which sometimes results in maiming and 
even death of young soldiers and recruits. 
Non-noble officers also, allegedly, were especially prone to abuse the local 
populace, especially the womenfolk, and tolerate abuses committed by their soldiers. 
They drank excessively and disobeyed their superiors, except for von Münnich 
himself. Von Münnich, however, was unapologetic. He forcefully asserted his 
prerogative to promote whomever he considered worthy, and his intention to do so in 
the future (as commander-in-chief, he was given the necessary powers by the 
Empress). At the same time, he added:  
Even though many of them [officers of non-noble birth] are coarse by birth [po 
porode], still I would rather prefer this coarseness to the timidity, laziness, 
ignorance of military regulations, and lack of military skill displayed by some 
nobles.427 
What is evident here is the tension between different notions of nobility in von 
Münnich’s thinking. He seems to be saying that the nobles are different from the 
commoners in their manners (the nobles are less “coarse”), and that this difference 
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of the St.Petersburg Infantry,  who informed his superiors in 1732 that he had under his command 23 
NCOs of noble birth, each of whom had served for at least seven years. Yet none of them is to be 
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comes from “birth.” And yet, in the very next sentence he proceeds to castigate the 
nobles for their lack of martial spirit and “zeal” for service.  
In this context it is worth briefly turning to the discussion of Peter III’s 
Manifesto of 1762, which famously gave the nobility the right not to serve at all. 
Various theories have been put forward to explain why exactly Peter III would ever 
issued such a document.428 One reason, traditionally disregarded by historians as 
empty window-dressing, was suggested in the Manifesto itself. For a comparison, I 
will fist quote at length the anonymous 1730 memo from Volynskii’s papers. The 
authors commented on the rumors regarding the alleged plans of the Supreme Privy 
Council to grant “freedom in service” to the nobility. He admitted:  
To serve under coercion [v nevol’u] is hard; yet, if complete freedom is given, 
you know as well as I do, that our nation [narod] is not ambitious at all [ne 
chestol’ubiv], but rather lazy and not industrious. So, if there is no certain 
coercion [prinuzhdenia], even [the poorest nobles] would not want to earn 
honor and subsistence, but would rather prefer to stay at home. 
In this case both the state and the nobility would be ruined, for “we” would be 
forced to promote former serfs to positions which are appropriate for us only (for the 
nobles). These serfs would take all “our” places, and the army will fall apart, for the 
soldiers would be so indulged by these non-noble officers as to make them “more evil 
than the strel’tsy.”429 
 In 1762, however, the Manifesto on Noble Freedom began with a reference to 
Peter I who, “as not only Europe, but also most of the world knows,” labored hard to 
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743. 
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“lift Russia to perfect mastery of military, civil, and political affairs.” To achieve 
these goals, however, Peter had to improve “the main Member of the state,” that is, 
the nobility. The emperor had “to get the nobility accustomed and to give it to 
understand the benefits enjoyed by [the nobilities of] the enlightened Powers.” This 
included inviting the nobility to join the military and civil service, and to study in 
Russia and abroad.  The nobles resented and resisted this “invitation,” and so the 
sovereign had to use coercion and harsh laws. Now, however: 
As We observe with great pleasure, and as every true son of the fatherland 
cannot but recognize, [these measures] resulted in innumerable benefits. Their 
coarseness is eradicated in those previously indifferent to the common good; 
ignorance is transformed into sound sense … To sum up, noble thoughts have 
resulted in unlimited loyalty and love toward Us, great diligence, and perfect 
zeal toward our service taking firm root in the hearts of all true Russian 
patriots. Therefore, we do not find it necessary to continue the coercion that 
has been hitherto needed.430 
In other words, the mission of creating a “true nobility” was declared 
accomplished. At the same time, the decree did not declare that the nobles would no 
longer serve: on the contrary. Its authors firmly expected them to “honestly continue” 
service with even more “zeal” and “diligence.” It could be argued, perhaps, that this 
Manifesto was, as much as anything else, a response to the failure of Elizabeth’s 
government to ensure proper registration of the nobility for service (this failure is 
discussed in more detail in Part III). After repeatedly granting amnesty to the nobles 
in the 1740s and the 1750s, Elizabeth finally ordered the Senate to figure out what 
could be done to ensure compliance. The answer formulated by the Senate in 1761, 
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however, amounted to a dismantling of the 1736-1737 system and allowed the nobles 
to skip studies with minimal punishment.431 
Were Peter III’s advisers suggesting a different solution – a turn from coercion 
to motivation, as practiced in the 1730s? Following the line of reasoning introduced in 
the 1730s, the nobles, it was hoped, would be encouraged to serve by a display of 
Imperial largess towards them. The few lazy and insufficiently virtuous ones were to 
be punished by naming and shaming: all the loyal subjects were ordered to “despise 
and humiliate” them and not to tolerate them in “public gatherings.”432 Incidentally, 
all the nobles who had less than 1,000 m.s. were still expected to enroll their sons in 
the Cadet Corps, which was newly expanded to 600 students.433 
                                                     
431  RGADA, f. 20, op. 1, d. d. 212, ll. 1-4. 
432 PSZ  #11444, articles 7, 9. 
 
433 As a Grand Duke and the heir to the throne, Peter was appointed in 1759 the high 
commander of the Cadet Corps. This was especially significant for him since Friedrich II, his role 
model, as a heir to the throne commanded the Berlin Cadet Corps. Documents show that he 
immediately became involved in its affairs: only two weeks after his appointment Grand Duke 
indignantly pointed out various violations of rules and regulations at the Corps, such as chronic 
underfunding to the overall amount of 250,000 rubles, or “enlistment of grenadier cadets in the 
musketeer companies,” etc. It is hard to tell from the documents how much of Peter’s activity and 
rhetoric was his own, and how much of it was inspired by Aleksei Melgunov and other Corps’ 
graduates in his retinue. Many of Peter’s initiatives, however, display the same interest in moral 
improvement, discipline, and strict meritocracy that was the trademark of von Münnich ’s project. 
Already on March 8, Peter – “for better improvement of cadet behavior” – ordered the Corps’ 
authorities not to allow young nobles stay overnight in town. Cadets who had parents in the capital 
were to visit them for three hours maximum at a time, only in their free time, and only in daytime. 
Further, Peter instructed “that nobody should count on any protection or recommendations, and should 
only expect to be treated at the general examination according to his learning, worthiness, and good 
behavior.” Those cadets who “dare to seek recommendations from outside” were to be “punished 
severely.” Symbolically, Peter orders to have the Corps’ back garden cleared, trees planted in 
greenhouses, and a full-size marble statue of Mars together with 68 busts of ancient characters 
(including Cicero, both Catos, Cesar, Sulla, Scipio, Brutus, and others) to be placed there. Besides, the 
Grand Duke bought for the Corps a marble statue of Peter the Great which was put in a purpose-build 
bay of carved and gilded wood. Myl'nikov, Iskuchenie chudom, 46-50; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d.3378, 
ll. 2, 11, 13, 29; d. 3120,  ll.1, 3, 16. Another project initiated at that time was the compilation of a 
biographical dictionary of the Corps’ officers and graduates. Imiannoi spisok vsem byvshim i nyne 
nakhodiashchimsia v Sukhoputnom Shliakhetnom Kadetskom korpuse Shtab-, Ober-ofitseram i 
kadetam. S pokazaniem kto iz onykh s kakimi udostoinstvami v kakie chiny vypushchen i v kakikh 
chinakh nyne. Chast’ 1 (St.Petersburg, 1761). 
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Upon overthrowing Peter III and acceding to the throne, Catherine II did not 
immediately confirm the manifesto, thereby causing some anxiety among the nobility. 
Instead she appointed a commission to review the document and the status of the 
nobility in general “in light of the changed situation of the state and education of the 
well-born youth.” In its report in 1763 this commission repeated the same assessment 
of the nobility’s progress found in the Manifesto, but perhaps, in even starker terms. It 
agreed that given the “poor upbringing of the nobility,” Peter I 
could not create a good army except through direct coercion, forcing those to 
serve who, not having in them deep-rooted ambition for knowledge and 
studies, and not realizing that service produces ambition, and ambition leads to 
service, did not understand their own glory and therefore avoided service, 
preferring their ancient tranquility and seclusion in their houses and estates to 
acquiring fame.  
Now, however, “the nobility is so much moved by its love for honor 
[liubochestiem] that there is not the slightest suspicion… that it would revert back to 
its former lack of diligence for service.” The task was, therefore, to “invent such laws, 
under which noble freedom would be combined with zeal for military and civil 
service, coming from no other source than the ambition [chestoliubia; literally love of 
honor] ingrained through upbringing [vospitania], not restricting in any way the 
freedom of the nobility.”434 The rhetoric, that was supposed to explain a new way of 
mobilizing the nobility for state service, was being used to legitimize the need for 
granting “freedom” to the nobility.  
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prohibiting nobles from buying new estates unless they serve for at least seven years. Ibid, 26. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
On the most basic level, I argue in Part II that in the 1730s Anna’s government 
pursued policies that, taken together, could be interpreted as a program for moral 
reconstruction of the Russian elite. As I show, such key ministers of the reign as von 
Münnich and Ostermann were, apparently, well versed in the contemporary Western-
European theories of virtue, nobility, and education. As a result, they not only made 
conscious and coherent efforts to create an “honest,” or “true,” nobility [istinnoe 
shl’akhetstvo] out of the existing Russian elite, but also employed to this end a wide 
range of modern disciplinary techniques, largely unknown in Russia in the days of 
Peter I. This also meant that, according to von Münnich and Ostermann, one had to 
govern not by coercion (although there was plenty of coercion, too), but by 
“encouraging” people through discerning their abilities, by appointing them to those 
positions that fit their “inclination,” and by justly and publicly rewarding “diligence.”  
I am calling, therefore, for a reconsideration of the relationship between the 
state and the nobility in the reign of Anna. As I show in the introduction to Part II, 
both the establishment of the Cadet Corps and the limitation of obligatory service for 
the nobility to 25 years (as well as some other measures) are viewed traditionally as 
an echo of the demands presented by the nobles in 1730. I argue, however, that these 
measures were a result of a new understanding of the “science of governing,” not any 
desire to accommodate the elite. The key to successful governance was now the 
ability to motivate the nobles, to “encourage” them to display the virtues and zeal for 
service, that were the trademark of any proper nobility and of any successful state. 
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This argument has two further implications. First, it complicates our traditional 
understanding of post-Petrine administrative institutions and political culture. The 
work of Peter I’s institutions required, it has been argued, “officials capable on the 
basis of formal, general, rational regulations within the framework of a highly 
organized bureaucratic hierarchy.”435 One wonders, though, whether this implied 
rationalization and bureaucratization of the early eighteenth-century administrative 
culture should be viewed as too much modernization on our part. It appears that 
Anna’s government, as far as it operated on the basis of any theoretical assumptions at 
all, followed a much less mechanistic set of principles that stressed individual virtue 
and need to govern through “encouragement,” and the manipulation of the noble’s 
“zeal” for service. 
Secondly, putting the consistent efforts of Anna’s government to give the 
nobles some choice within the context of this “science of governing” allows us to 
move away from a simplistic picture of the nobility fighting for its freedom against 
the oppressive state – and slowly “awakening” from its Muscovite “lack of 
conscience” in the process. If one takes into consideration the “science of governing” 
presented here, the picture might be quite different. The goals of the government and 
the leading members of the elite were fully compatible with those of Peter I. In 
particular, the government was not at any point planning to relax the service 
obligations in any way. Its actions were driven, rather, by a different understanding of 
how to achieve the goals of making the nobility perform its assigned duty. In the 
process, however, the government did give the nobility some leeway. So, rather than 
talking about the elite suddenly and inexplicably switching from being obedient 
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Petrine servitors to being liberty-loving aristocrats, we are dealing here with gradual 
transmutations within the very same discourse.      
Another conclusion concerns the role of ideas in the early eighteenth-century 
politics. The recent trend in historical works has been to emphasize the role of clan 
networks and kinship ties in early modern Russian history. I attempt to show, 
however, that ideas did matter. Perhaps, these networks and ties were, indeed, 
important in 1730, as Valeria A. Kivelson argues, or in other periods, as pointed out 
by David Ransel and Paul Bushkovitch. It is also true, of course, that fiscal 
considerations were terribly important in determining the policies of Anna’s reign, as 
N.N. Petrukhintsev has recently argued. Yet, I demonstrate in this chapter that at least 
some of the leading ministers of the 1730s appear to be driven in their actions by 
things as ephemeral as the notions of human nature and human behavior, and by a 
desire to create a “true” nobility.  
This emphasis on ideas does not mean, of course, that von Münnich, 
Ostermann, and their colleagues and rivals, were ideologues and dreamers. On the 
contrary, it is within the context of very hard-nosed politicking and bureaucratic 
rivalries that this “science of governing” was utilized, articulated, and, perhaps, even 
formulated.  This is evident in the catalogue of his generals’ characters compiled by 
von Münnich in 1737.436 The Field-Marshal might have taken the science of 
discerning abilities and inclinations very seriously. His descriptions, however, were 
clearly geared toward very practical ends. In the passage quoted earlier, for example, 
he was trying to rid himself of Hessen-Homburg. Overall, von Münnich was trying to 
get four of the senior generals of his army recalled. Von Münnich commended only 
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General Keith, a Scot who enjoyed the special trust of the Empress; two of his own 
clients, von Lowendahl and von Shtofel; and finally, Karl von Biron, the favorite’s 
brother, who is described as “zealous and doing his duty in service [revnosten i 
ispraven v sluzhbe], brave and calm in action.” 437 
Even if one goes beyond the level of specific intrigue, I would suggest that the 
language of ability and inclinations gave von Münnich significant leverage over his 
rivals and subordinates, once the Field-Marshall appointe himself the supreme judge 
of human nature. At the Cadet Corps this science of human nature was used to assess 
and “sort out” teenagers. It was not sufficient that the cadets receive good grades: they 
also had to demonstrate “diligence” and “inclinations,” while their transgressions 
might or might not be deemed to reflect their unredeemable wickedness. Now these 
instruments were applied to the entire army. Von Münnich remarked, for example, of 
Brigadier Voieikov that he “understands service and conducts himself very well.” 
And yet, the overall judgment was reserved for now: “his character is not [yet] 
known” to the Field-Marshal. Still, such a blatant use by von Münnich of his favored 
concepts for political goals does not make them somehow invalid. I propose that it 
was possibility to employ theoretical notions as a weapon in the power struggle that 
created “demand” for them and allowed them to shape the political and cultural 
realities. It is possible to argue, perhaps, that “Westernization” itself became 
sustainable and successful as a project largely because the concepts and practices 
associated with it were utilized by individual actors for their practical goals. 
Whether, and to what extent, these notions informed Russian concepts of 
nobility and the thinking of the majority of Russian nobles in later decades of the 
century, is an issue that requires a separate study. In chapter 8, and also in the 
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Epilogue, I present some evidence to indicate that this “science of governing” 
remained operational between the 1740s-1750s, both at the Corps and outsidet. In Part 
III of this dissertation, however, I examine the reactions of the Russian nobility to the 
program of social disciplining in the 1730s by looking at the decisions made by every 
young noble of the realm – the decision whether or not to study. 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
“So That My Young Years Be Not Wasted For Nothing”: 
 The Nobility and Education, 1730s-1750s 
Cadet Nikolai Mel’nitskii did not want to study at all. Announcing the creation 
of the Corps, the government invited volunteers to enroll, but Mel’nitskii argued that 
he was not exactly a volunteer – at least, not an informed one. As he explained in 
1732, he was enrolled by his relatives in Moscow, “without truly knowing the essence 
and the rules of this Corps, and studies it consisted of.”  Now, however, he realized 
that the Corps “consisted of advanced and numerous studies [sostoit v vysokikh i 
mnogikh naukakh].” So, Mel’nitskii argued, he was not exactly fit to be a cadet. First, 
he was too old to study; second, he was “of a weak nature [prirody slaboi]” and had 
“a not-inconsiderable disease” causing him to “loose his memory”; and third, he was 
“hopeless for understanding the studies,” having learned to write “with great hardship, 
and even that imperfectly.”438  
It is remarkable, indeed, how Mel’nitskii (or those who wrote on his behalf) 
manipulated here the official rhetoric of “nature,” referring to his “hopeless lack of 
ability” and to the notion of correlation between age and fitness for study, in order to 
achieve his own goals. It is even more remarkable that his goal was to get out of the 
Corps and be transferred into the army: he explicitly asked for that. Given the realities 
of the 1730s, it went without saying that he was to be transferred as a private: rather 
than mastering the “advanced and numerous studies,” this nobleman preferred to 
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serve as common soldier in the infantry. Mel’nitskii’s story, then, raises questions 
regarding the relationship between the state and the nobility in early eighteenth-
century Russia. On the one hand, it appears to confirm the conclusion I drew in 
chapter 5 regarding the meaning of the demands and proposals presented during the 
crisis of 1730. I argued that by suggesting that “the nobles not be drafted, against their 
will [nevoleiu], as sailors and other demeaning [podlye] and low ranks,” and that 
“special cadet companies” be established, the Supreme Privy Council was, in fact, not 
offering concessions to placate the nobility, but proposed a program for reforming the 
elite. Indeed, the Mel’nitskii case suggests that service as a private in the army was 
not viewed by him as “demeaning” (service in the navy, admittedly, was another 
matter). The Supreme Privy Council was clearly not speaking on Mel’nitskii’s behalf.  
On the other hand, Mel’nitskii’s case seems to fit suspiciously well the 
traditional picture of passive society/elite dominated, manipulated, and shaped by the 
state. No “traditional consultative relations” or “negotiation” between the elite and the 
monarchy is apparent here; nor is Mel’nitskii protected by any sort of kinship 
and/patronage network. The only option left for him is to attempt to avoid the 
disciplining impulses of the intrusive state by maneuvering his way out of the Corps 
and by relying on the weapons of the weak, foot-dragging and manipulation of the 
official discourse. Yet, as the following chapters make clear, at the end of the day 
some nobles did end up studying at the Corps, and did so voluntarily. In general, a 
desire to study might not necessarily appear to be something problematic. If one 
considers, however, that a few years earlier the nobles seem to have resisted Peter’s 
attempt to impose a Westernized education on them, and that – as the following 
chapters also show – they continued to do so in the 1730s, the decision of some nobles 
to join the Corps deserves further investigation. In a way, to ask about reason that 
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brought them to the Corps is to ask why and how the “Westernization” project 
became sustainable in Russia.  
The “search for society” has traditionally been one of the central themes in the 
historiography of Russia, and it is still relevant today.439 This is especially true as far 
as the eighteenth century is concerned. Indeed, the entire period starting with the reign 
of Peter I up to the accession of Catherine II in 1762 remains in this regard a vast 
lacuna. In the 1760s, the elections of the deputies to the Legislative Commission and 
their subsequent debates became an important occasion for views of the nobility to be 
expressed and recorded in the cahiers of its delegates. As far as the earlier period is 
concerned, however, historians in their attempts to find manifestations of agency on 
the part of the elite in the post-Petrine period refer, basically, to the actions and 
demands of the nobility only during the crisis of 1730, that is, to half a dozen 
documents hastily written in circumstances of great political uncertainty, urgency, and 
agitation, plus a dozen or so descriptions of these events by foreign envoys. Historians 
have very few memoirs, and even fewer personal letters that could be used to 
reconstruct the views and attitudes of the nobility in the post-Petrine decades. The 
existence of society as somehow distinct in its reactions, aspirations, and interests 
from the state apparatus in early eighteenth-century Russia remains assumed, but not 
proven. 
In this chapter, I address the issue by using data from the archive of the Corps 
and also from the governmental bureaus (first and foremost, the Heraldry) to study the 
attitudes of the nobility toward education and different types of careers, which I treat 
as a proxy for their attitudes toward the Petrine project in general and as a window 
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unto the relationship between the elite and the state in general. As I demonstrate in 
Part II, Anna’s government believed it advisable to give the nobles some leeway to 
choose their career path according to their “inclinations.” The hope was that this 
would help induce them to serve with more “zeal” and “diligence.” This assumption 
was codified in the decrees of 1736-1737, which remained in force throughout the 
1740s and 1750s as well. Nobles indeed got an opportunity to choose between various 
schools and branches of service, thus creating a situation that allows me to observe 
their choices and preferences directly. In their applications to the Corps young nobles 
did not write why they decided to join it, and what the education meant for them 
socially and culturally. Still, by studying these choices within their social context 
(family background, various types of resources, including social networks), I am able 
to look for evidence of agency on their part vis-à-vis various requirements and rules 
imposed by the state. Their reactions to these opportunities tell us about social 
dynamics in post-Petrine Russia, opportunities for social mobility, and the limits of 
such mobility. More broadly, I address in this chapter the boundaries of autocracy, the 
constitution of the elite, and the social uses of education.  
Primarily, however, I am interested in the ways in which the actions of single 
individuals are shaped by larger social processes and, in turn, shape these processes 
and move them forward – especially in a period of a large-scale cultural 
transformation. Thus, speaking about Westernization, I will not be looking into the 
question of whether the views and ideas of post-Petrine nobility were, indeed, 
evolving (not least because my sources do not allow me to say much about the 
subject). For my purposes, it is enough that the nobles willingly accepted (or rejected) 
certain norms of behavior, agreed (or declined) to participate in certain institutions 
that were central to the campaign of social disciplining introduced in the 1730s and, 
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more broadly, to the Petrine project. Specifically, I am interested in why some of them 
voluntarily agreed to receive that kind of secular, utilitarian, non-traditional (for 
Russia) education that Peter in previous decades spent so much effort forcing upon 
them.440 This question, I believe, is central for our understanding of how, when, and 
why the Petrine project (and similar projects of state-sponsored cultural 
transformation) became self-sustainable.  
In this case my focus on the individual dictates the methodology. Rank-and-
file nobles did not leave letters or diaries, and official records that serve as my sources 
are almost the opposite of being narrative. Therefore, my approach in Part III is based 
on treating their recorded actions as choices and on attempting to interpret these 
choices within their social context, as could be deduced from official documents.  I do 
my best to let my subjects speak with their own voice whenever it could be heard 
through the formulaic dryness of petitions and records. That, however, does not 
happen as often as one would like. I am also aware of two other major pitfalls inherent 
in this approach. First, I realize that the elements of social context I attempt to tease 
out of my sources are no more than random glimpses of early eighteenth-century 
social reality. Second, I realize that in the absence of my subjects’ own voice I, in 
fact, ascribe certain meaning to their actions. I hope, however, that “through judicious 
                                                     
440 In this section I rely on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “cultural capital,” which I treat as an 
important factor shaping individual choices made by nobles. My understanding of change in society is 
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use of inference and induction, one can profile the likely principles and operating 
assumptions of both collective entities and relatively inarticulate individuals.”441 
In chapter 10, I address the question of how much room for choice the young 
nobles had in the post-Petrine period. I discuss how the policies and rules, analyzed in 
the previous chapter, worked in practice, and how the nobility reacted to opportunities 
presented by these policies and rules. Specifically, I show how the process of 
application/admission to the Corps was organized. The state expected to fill the ranks 
of the cadets with volunteers, rather than force nobles into the new school. So the key 
question here is whether that was how the selection for the Corps (and for other 
schools and branches of service) worked. If young nobles indeed had real 
opportunities to express their educational and career preferences and act these 
preferences out, that would be the most obvious possibility for them to exercise their 
agency vis-à-vis the norms promoted by the state. 
In chapter 11, I discuss the social composition of the student body at the 
Corps. If  admission to the Corps was voluntary, one might expect a certain self-
selection process to take place, reflecting differences in attitudes toward education as 
a way of starting one’s career compared to alternative paths available to young nobles 
at the time. I look for these differences in career preferences by studying the family 
background of incoming cadets and also by comparing the family backgrounds of the 
incoming cadets to that of young nobles who chose other schools or other modes of 
starting their service.  
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In chapter 12, I turn to the other major area where one might expect to find 
evidence of agency on the part of the nobility. From the age of seven young nobles 
were expected to follow a prescribed program of home schooling that reflected the 
state’s priorities. The same priorities were embedded in the curriculum of the Corps. 
In this section I examine the educational records of cadets prior to entering the Corps 
in order to find out the degree to which they deviated from the prescribed program, 
and if they did deviate substantially, whether these deviations formed any consistent 
patterns. Similarly, I study their education records at the Corps itself to see if they 
exhibit any preferences toward particular subjects. Finally, in chapter 13 I attempt to 
explain the choices and preferences exercised by young nobles by exploring the role 
of various resources available to families (patronage networks, connections, and 
opportunities provided by service, etc.) in shaping their educational decisions and 
preferences. This analysis allows me to offer some suggestions regarding the scope of 
individual agency in post-Petrine Russia and the contribution of this agency to the 
sustainability of the “Westernization” project.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 10 
Filling the Ranks: Freedom of Choice in post-Petrine Russia 
“This decree of ours is to be published and made known for all of the nobility, 
so that the volunteers (zhelaiushchie) would come to the Senate [to sign up for the 
Corps],” – read an imperial decree of July 29, 1731, announcing the foundation of the 
Corps.442 As I show in Part II, this call for “volunteers” was a radical departure from 
the Petrine habit of filling the schools, bureaus, and branches of service by arbitrarily 
drafting a required number of candidates: the government was actually looking for 
those willing to study at the new school. This change of policy was further reflected in 
the new rules of entering state service established at the end of 1730s that gave  
nobles a right to choose between alternative ways of studying (at home, in “garrison” 
schools, at the Cadet Corps and similar schools) and starting one’s service (in the 
guards, in the field army, or at the Corps). In this chapter I discuss how this policy 
was implemented in practice, how much room for choice it actually gave to the 
nobles, and how the nobles reacted to these opportunities.  
On August 9, 1731 Count Iaguzhinskii, the Procurator-General of the Senate, 
ordered the Master of the Heraldry to supervise the enrollment of the “volunteers.” By 
mid-November, however, the new institution had attracted only twenty four 
students.443 The first to sign up, on August 16, was Aleksandr Novosiltsev, son of a 
Privy Councilor and senator. The next day he was joined by the Protasov brothers, 
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Iakov and Ivan, whose father was a retired colonel; he had a considerable estate (450 
male serfs), and resided in Moscow. Ivan Polev signed up three days later; his father, 
a major, was dead, and he had no serfs whatsoever. Two more young nobles also 
signed up on the same day. One was Andrei Pozniakov, son of the chief of the 
St.Petersburg police, the other – Mikhail Bakhmetev, whose father was a mere ensign 
in the navy yet belonged to an old and established noble family. Later Nikifor Maslov 
joined the Corps: his father, an ennobled commoner, became ober-prokuror of the 
Senate late that year. He was followed by Aleksandr Voeikov, son of an Actual State 
Councilor and former ober-prokuror of the Senate; and Evgraf Tatishchev, son of 
Vasilii Taishchev. There was clearly no discrimination against less prominent nobles, 
such as Davyd Stupishin, son of a zhiltets (a pre-Petrine rank) who owned a mere 
twenty six m.s. Still, the volunteers who showed up in the first few months in order to 
enter the Corps generally represented the families of prominent upper-mid-level civil 
servants and/or well-established, but not particularly illustrious, noble clans. 
Tatishchev, as we know, actively supported and promoted formal education for the 
nobility as a matter of principle; the fathers of some of these first cadets, especially 
Novosiltsev and Maslov, had been close collaborators of Peter and might be suspected 
of sharing Tatishchev’s views. Overall, however, the number of volunteers was 
clearly unsatisfactory from the government’s point of view:  the number of candidates 
that it had managed to attract was a far cry from the nearly two hundred students 
planned for the new school. The call for volunteers was not answered. 
A few months later the overall direction of the Corps was assumed by von 
Münnich, and just few days after his appointment the authorities attempted to re-
launch the enrollment campaign. A new proclamation, issued on December 4, urged 
volunteers to sign up “without any delay.” On a rhetorical level, this decree further 
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emphasized the reasons for the creation of the Corps and its importance for the well-
being of the state. On a practical level, however, it also spelled out in more detail 
various characteristics that were supposed to make the Corps more attractive, 
including its location, accommodation in the Menshikov Palace, its curriculum, etc. 
Importantly, it also declared that successful graduates would receive officer 
commissions and NCO ranks without having first to serve as privates (the original 
decree did not state this explicitly). Intuitively one would think that it would make the 
Corps especially attractive to the lower nobility, who could not expect to receive 
promotion through connections, for example. Of a great practical importance was 
another provision, also aimed at the less wealthy nobility. Rather than having to travel 
to the capital in order to sign up for the Corps, young nobles were now allowed to 
enroll in both St.Petersburg and in Moscow, and also in the regional capitals of the 
Baltic provinces, in Riga and Reval.444  
In addition to these measures meant to facilitate the enrollment process, the 
Empress took steps to stress her special disposition toward the Corps. Among other 
things, in December 1731 prospective students were invited to sign up not at the 
Senate, but directly at the Court through the Aide-de-Camps (General-Ad’utant) of 
the empress. The other step was the decision to send to the Corps a number of 
imperial in-laws: Ivan and Martyn Skavronskii, Ivan and Andrei Gendrikov, and 
Andrei and Ivan Efimovskii (all of them relatives of Catherine I, Peter I’s second 
wife), as well as Vasilii Lopukhin (a nephew of the emperor’s first wife, Evdokia). 
Besides, in December 1731, the government also sent to the Corps a dozen young 
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nobles – pages of two recently deceased female members of the imperial family.445 
These were emphatically not volunteers: these young nobles were already in service, 
and so the government simply transferred them as it saw fit. A number of these ex-
pages were characteristically doubtful whether staying at the Corps would indeed be 
good for their careers. In a short while they began petitioning to be transferred 
elsewhere. Alekseii Pushchin complained that it was somewhat of an “offence” to be 
sent to the Corps instead of getting a commission in the army where he could “better 
observe all sorts of rules in general, and to prove [him]self in active service, and to 
learn military regulations.” Some of these young nobles wrote about being 
disadvantaged compared to their peers (“brothers,” in the words of another ex-page, 
Prince Fedor Lobanov) in the army, and claimed to be unfit for study due to their “old 
age” that weakened their “comprehension” (Prince Lobanov was only seventeen in 
1731). The language of their complaints is strikingly similar to the official discourse 
on age, human “nature,” and ability discussed in Parts I and II.446 This is only one 
instance of the cadets using and manipulating official language in order to achieve 
their own goals. 
Taken together, these measures produced the desired results: the number of 
applicants sharply increased – so much so that already in May 1732 von Münnich was 
in a position to ask for an expansion of the Corps from 200 to 360 cadets. By June the 
Corps had 282 cadets, 223 of them “Russian.”447 However, that was achieved at the 
price of quality. Overall, it took the authorities some time to sort the young nobles out 
                                                     
445 These were Tsaritsa Evdokia, recently released from the nunnery, where Peter confined her 
after their divorce, and Empress Anna’s own younger sister, Praksovia. Luzanov, Sukhoputnyi 
shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, 5.  
 
446 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1632, ll. 70-71 ob, 87.  
 
447 Luzanov, Sukhoputnyi shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus, 31.  
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and to remove those deemed unfit for study. Authorities were evidently eager to get 
the Corps started, so up to a quarter of all cadets from the first intake were over 
twenty years old, and thus considered unfit for study by the standards of the day. The 
teachers did their best to rush these young men through some basic training and send 
them off to the army.448 Others, though accepted into the Corps, turned out to be quite 
simply unfit physically. The commanding officer of the 2nd Company reported in 1732 
that three of his cadets should have not been at the Corps at all. Those included Ivan 
Glebovskii who “had lost his mind and talks nonsense (sovsem zaviraetsia),” and Ivan 
Chikhachev who “has sickness in his hands (rukami skorben) and cannot handle a 
gun.” Whereas these two young men were declared unfit physically, another, 
Aleksandr Kireevskii, was being dismissed because of his unsatisfactory morals: he 
has “escaped twice, committed certain thefts, and behaves inappropriately [ne po 
nadlezhashchemu] in his quarters.”449 Clearly, admission rules and procedures were 
neither clear, nor sufficiently rigid at this point: authorities just wanted to get the new 
school up and running and so needed to fill the ranks at pretty much any cost. 
In later years, however, finding the number of acceptable applicants necessary 
to fill opening positions became less of a problem, especially since the Corps also 
needed fewer volunteers - it only had to fill the vacancies left open by graduating 
cadets. Overall, according to a register, compiled by Corps officials in the 1760s, it 
accepted 1773 students in the period from 1731 to 1763, that is, approximately 30 to 
100 new cadets a year.450 One should note that the concept of a yearly “intake” is 
artificial: the Corps’s officials did not think in terms of yearly quotas for admission 
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(or graduation); applications were accepted and considered, and the students enrolled 
into the Corps on an ongoing basis. Some young nobles, however, were even accepted 
sverkh shtata, i.e. on top of the normal complement, at their own expense. It is not 
clear, however, how many nobles were so desperate to educate their children at the 
Corps as to be ready to cover their expenses (costs of living in the capital and buying 
a uniform): those “extra” students were not listed as a separate category on the Corps’ 
rolls, and eventually moved into the “normal” vacancies. We know, though, that those 
were not necessarily the richest nobles: among those willing to study at their own 
expense we find, for example, Ivan Chirikov, the son of a mere “collegiate 
secretary”451 who had no serfs whatsoever.452  
Details of enrollment procedures varied over time, but in general young nobles 
seem to have had to follow roughly the same path in order to join the Corps. After the 
new system of registration for service was established in 1736-1737s, they all had to 
present themselves at the Heraldry. Their names and personal information were 
recorded, and these reports eventually found their way into the Corps’ yearly 
registers, which are the main source for this study. In these reports young nobles 
reported their name and age; their father’s name, rank, branch of service, and also 
whether he was retired or dead; the number of male serfs in their family’s possession, 
and also the districts where they had estates; their previous education, that is, whether 
they could read and write, knew arithmetic, and anything besides that, in most cases 
foreign languages or geometry. The registration procedures at the Heraldry changed 
slightly over time, and the records reflect the authorities’ attempts to collect more 
information, specifically, to make the young nobles report their ancestry and list their 
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relatives currently in service.453 Officials at the Heraldry checked whether the minors 
were indeed were nobles or officers’ children (applicants had to bring a witness to 
certify their nobility), whether they were physically fit,454 and whether they fulfilled 
the minimum educational requirements. The rest of the information could not be 
verified immediately; only in the case of serious doubts were inquiries made with the 
local authorities, or with the bureaus and the regiments where the fathers of the young 
men allegedly served.  
The Noble Cadet Corps’s charter did not provide any criteria for accepting or 
rejecting the applicants. The decisions, in fact, were often made on the highest level: 
applications to the Corps had to be forwarded to the highest authorities for approval. 
At various points the decision-making body was the Senate, the Cabinet, or the 
empress herself. The Senate and the Cabinet not only made the calls, but even 
inspected young nobles in person: for example, in January 1734, a typical order to 
send two young nobles into the guards, three – into the army, and one more – into the 
artillery was personally signed by Anna after these youngsters were examined by the 
Cabinet.455 At the same time, neither the Heraldry, nor the Cabinet, nor the Senate had 
much information on the number of openings in the schools or regiments. In 1732, for 
                                                     
453 Unfortunately, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, and some of the yearly 
registers contain only bits and pieces of this information. In practice, reports filed by young nobles (and 
consequently, the entries in the yearly registers) were far from complete. Scholars note the overall 
breakdown of the system of registration of  young nobles for service in the first half of the 1730s (see 
Kalashnikov, “Ofitserskii korpus,” 167; Romanovich-Slavatinskii, Dvor’anstvo v Rossii, 79-80), and 
indeed for 1731-1732 we do not have any personal data on the incoming cadets whatsoever: the register 
lists their names and age only. The only exception here is the list of the first twenty four cadets who 
signed up for the Corps in the fall of August-November 1731. Overall, we have fairly fragmentary 
information for the 1730s, and that is why my conclusions about 1730s are based on a pooled data from 
1736-1737 and some scattered examples from the earlier years.  
454  There does not seem to have been any rigorous medical examination: apparently all were 
declared fit who had no obvious physical defect, or did not claim to be unfit; in the latter case a medical 
professional might be summoned.  
 
455 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 135, l. 28. 
 
215 
 
example, the Semenovskii Guards sent to the Heraldry an acerbic “memo” that the 
last group of young nobles arriving from the Heraldry had to be enrolled into the 
regiment outside of the normal complement and without pay, and thus the Heraldry 
was not to send any more recruits until specifically requested.456 In general, young 
nobles were sent to the guards, to the schools, or to the Military College that were to 
accommodate them: the Heraldry forwarded orders received from above, politely 
asking to be informed of the young nobles’ eventual appointments.457  
*   *   * 
An opportunity for young nobles to express their preferred career choices 
while coming for a review at the Heraldry was an accepted practice throughout the 
1730s, and these preferences were recorded together with the rest of the personal 
information. Surprisingly, the available data suggest that this was not an empty 
formality. In a sample of young nobles registered at the Heraldry in 1745 a vast 
majority of them were assigned to schools and branches of service according to their 
expressed preferences. More than two thirds of those young nobles who wanted to 
serve in the Guards ended up in these elite regiments, usually in those to which they 
specifically applied. In a similar manner, almost all the young nobles who wanted to 
study at garrison schools and the bulk of those who applied to the elite schools in the 
capitals were granted their wishes.458  
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457 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 135, l. 47. 
 
458 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 305. The extremely unpopular Naval Academy was, however, a 
significant exception. It accounts, for example, for the majority  (14 out of 20) of youngsters who 
wanted to be in the Engineering School or the Corps of Engineers (the documents do not always make 
a clear distinction between these two bodies), but ended up elsewhere. The Heraldry register for 1745 
mentions thirty three young nobles who were sent to the Naval Academy, and only five of them were 
volunteers – the rest wanted to be in the Artillery School (2), Cadet Corps (2), Guards regiments (5), 
the field regiments (5), and the engineers (14). The Naval Academy was, apparently, the only branch of 
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So, admission to the Cadet Corps seems to have been organized predominantly 
on the voluntarily basis (there were some exceptions in 1732), and rejections were 
surprisingly few. On November 10, 1736, for example, the Corps’s director sent to the 
Heraldry a list of forty four young nobles who “over the course of the current year” 
came to the Corps and asked to be admitted. The director, however, insisted that 
nobody could be enrolled into the Corps without a personal decree (imennoi ukaz) 
from the Empress and so asked the Heraldry to refer the matter to the Cabinet and 
request it to be resolved. On December 3, the Cabinet (A.I. Ostermann and Prince 
Cherkasskii) made its decision: out of forty four volunteers, thirty were enrolled into 
the Corps. There does not seem to be a clear rule that might explain the selection; in 
any case, about two thirds of those left out eventually appear on the Corps’s rolls 
anyway, some already in the same year, but most - in 1737-38. The case of the 
Pustoshkin brothers, Ivan and Petr, presents, however, a useful illustration of the 
limits to this freedom to choose: the brothers were selected by Colonel Eropkin, an 
architect, to be his apprentices. The only reason for selecting them seems to have been 
the age of the brothers, and indeed, at eleven and nine years old, respectively, they 
were the youngest in the group. How Eropkin came to learn about the brothers and 
their age is not clear; still he pointed out that “due to their age they are not fit for any 
service, except for study,” while he, Eropkin, had lots of work and few apprentices. 
The Cabinet granted his request.459  
*    *    * 
                                                                                                                                                        
service, and definitely, the only school, which was provided with students in a good old Petrine 
fashion, by means of governmental decrees. 
 
459 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 183, ll. 405-408, 416. Eropkin was himself a member of an 
established noble family, who was arbitrary chosen to study architecture by Peter I. That, however, has 
not precluded him from becoming successful in this field and playing an important role in building 
St.Petersburg. In 1740 he was beheaded in connection with the Volynskii affair.  See N.V. Kaliazina, 
E.A. Kaliazin, "Petr Eropkin," in Zodchie St.Peterburga. XVIII vek (SPb, 1997), 156-190. 
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It seems relatively clear, therefore, that the nobles had considerable freedom to 
choose the Cadet Corps. The question is how free they were to choose the opposite 
option, that is, not to study at all. The system of service introduced in 1736-1737 
required that all of them study, in one way or the other. As I mentioned earlier, in the 
1740s-1750s the government of Elizabeth repeatedly amnestied the young nobles. 
Indeed, according to S.M. Troitskii, overall, from 1743 to 1750, 8753 young nobles 
came for a review at the Senate and the Heraldry. After the review, 801 of them were 
sentenced to various forms of punishment prescribed by law for skipping a review, or 
coming late for it. Out of them, 725 young nobles were condemned to serve as 
privates without right of promotion, 58 - to be sent to the navy as sailors “forever,” 
and 18 were to be exiled as settlers to Orenburg. At the end of the day, however, only 
92 were punished, the rest were pardoned by the Empress on the recommendation of 
the Senate.460 In June 1745, for example, the Senate decreed that Stepan Salov be sent 
into the navy “forever.” Yet already in July it was decided to let him instead stay at 
home until age sixteen in order to study arithmetic and geometry. Another example is 
Nikolai Sharygin who came for his first review in June 1745. He was already sixteen 
years old, and although literate, he had not studied anything besides reading and 
writing, so he was in clear violation of the law on two accounts. Sharygin justified his 
failure to come for a review earlier and also to study prescribed subjects by two facts. 
First, his father died (although that happened only in 1743, so it could not really 
account for his failure to register for service earlier); second, already before his 
father’s death Sharygin was allegedly stricken by a “sickness of the legs and head” 
(nozhnoi i golovnoi bolezniu). Sharygin claimed that a relative of his, a certain 
Mikhailo Voznitsyn, registered him with the Penza provincial authorities and reported 
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his illness in 1743 (“and which month it was, I don’t remember.”) Sharygin insisted 
that as soon as he recovered, that is, in May 1745, he went to the Heraldry. Penza 
province, however, could not find records of Voznitsyn’s visit, nor could Sharygin 
produce any certificate or letter to that effect. In July the Senate (predictably, one 
would think) banished Sharygin to the navy forever; in September, however, the 
Senate reconsidered and sent Sharygin to study at the Naval Academy instead.461  
Note, however, that Sharygin’s behavior could not be explained by poverty 
preventing him from traveling to capital: in fact, he came from a distinctly mid-level 
family: he had 150 male serfs in Arzamas and Penza districts; his grandfather was a 
stol’nik (a reasonably high pre-Petrine rank), his father – an infantry captain. I would 
argue that the failure to observe the law was as much a result of a choice made by the 
family, as of anything else. A review of the sources shows that those young nobles 
who eventually volunteered for schooling, as a rule, dutifully observed the law and 
reported for their first review at age seven. Those who asked to be sent v sluzhbu (into 
the army) most often came for their first review only in their teens, thus condemning 
themselves to starting the service as army privates. I would argue that not coming for 
a review or not studying was also a choice: nobles who were not interested in studies 
and promotions simply avoided review as long as they could, and then came to the 
Heraldry fully expecting to be sent as privates to the army and treating it not so much 
as a punishment, as an acceptable and, probably, preferable option.  
The data in this chapter show that the government in general followed its 
declared policy of letting the nobles choose their own careers. There was no 
guaranteed freedom of choice, of course: the practical needs of the state or the whims 
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of the monarch and her top ministers always took precedence. If such a decision was 
made, there was no room for negotiation. These occasions, however, were as rare as 
they were unpredictable. In general, the Heraldry, for example, appeared neutral in its 
attitude: there is no evidence that it took any institutional position on how the young 
nobles should be distributed among various branches of service. Similarly, even when 
there were formal rules, they were usually vague and seem to have never been applied 
rigorously. Once again, that was the case only when  there was no pressure on the 
institution to fulfill a certain task – for example, to provide some schools or regiments 
with a certain number of recruits. As a result, young nobles in most cases had ample 
opportunities to exercise their career and educational preferences by making choices 
while under review in the Heraldry. The vast majority of nobles, however, were not 
interested in opportunities to get an education for free and earn a commission by the 
age of 20 by applying themselves to their studies.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 11 
Living chestno, chisto i neubogo:  
Wealth, Rank, Birth, and Career Preferences of the Russian Nobility 
The idea that the post-Petrine Russian elite was not a homogeneous entity 
comes from the contemporaries themselves. The documents of the crisis of 1730 
imply a number of distinctions, in particular, between the “prominent,” or aristocratic 
(znatnye) families and the rest, and also between the so-called generalitet462 and 
shl’akhetstvo.463 These groups are mentioned as constituencies, which were to present 
the proposals and to approve the final arrangements, and it was the issue of their fair 
and equitable representation in this final arrangement which, apparently, produced the 
most disagreement and discontent during the crisis. The “proposal of 364,” for 
example, called for the highest officers of state to be elected by “the generalitet and 
shl’akhetstvo.” At the same time, the shl’akhetstvo itself, it appears, was not uniform 
in the contemporaries’ eyes either. The “proposal of 13” calls for “making a 
distinction between the old and the new shl’akhetstvo,” while Senator I.A. Musin-
                                                     
462 The generalitet included approximately 170 individuals who held general officer ranks and 
equivalent ranks in civil and other branches of service. These individuals occupied top positions in 
government agencies and in the provinces, and led armies and deliberated in the Senate; they included 
the wealthiest individuals in the realm and, Petrine reforms notwithstanding, came overwhelmingly 
from the old Duma families. The generalitet, it is important to note, was category that was used both by 
the state agencies and by contemporaries themselves, but was not a formally recognized legal or 
administrative entity. For a detailed study of generalitet of 1730, see Meehan-Waters, Aristocrats and 
Servitors; for a recent appraisal of her study, see Kurukin, Epokha, 183-185. Note also that generalitet 
as a social category does not seem to be used beyond the immediate post-Petrine years.  
 
463 The word shl’akhetstvo, derived from the Polish sczliahta, was first officially used as a 
term by Peter himself in 1712, and in the 1720s-1730s became a common way of referring to the 
nobility The term came to be used since before Peter there was no generic term for nobility: the 
Russian dvor’anstvo (singular dvor’anin) was technically one of the lower ranks of the pre-Petrine 
service class; thus, a boyar was not a dvor’anin. Note that throughout the 1730s-1740s shl’akhetstvo is 
used interchangeably with the Russian dvor’anstvo, and later the borrowed term was completely 
replaced by the Russian one. Pavlov-Silvanskii, Dvor’anstvo v Rossii, 224-225.   
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Pushkin suggested that the members of the future governing body be selected from 
“among those with a pedigree (famil’nykh), among the generalitet, and among the 
prominent (znatnoe) shl’akhetstvo.”464  
Historians traditionally insist that it was the need to satisfy the aspirations 
voiced by this shl’akhetstvo in 1730 that motivated Anna’s decision to establish the 
Corps as well as to limit the term of obligatory service to twenty five years.465 A study 
of the signatories of the “proposal of 364” by I.V. Kurukin shows that they indeed 
were “the mainstay of the Russian state … officers and civil officials who occupied 
mid-level positions in the army and in the state apparatus.” Over half of them held 
ranks from captain to colonel, and almost half had somewhere between 100 and 500 
serfs.466 At the same time, none of these categories was ever officially recognized by 
the state, and besides the documents of the crisis itself, there is not much evidence as 
to the very existence of these groups. Were there, indeed, any meaningful divisions 
within the elite – any groups that might be distinguished from each other by their 
attitudes, self-perceptions, common interests, and shared pattern of behavior? Do their 
signatures reflect anything besides the fact that were present in Moscow – or, perhaps, 
that they were of high enough rank so that the key participants of the crisis cared to 
invite them to rubber-stamp the projects?  
In this chapter I focus on one particular element of the attitudes of the elite. I 
examine the family backgrounds of incoming cadets in an attempt to identify any 
consistent patterns in educational and career preferences of Russian nobles. 
Specifically, I focus on three key elements of elite status in early-modern Russia – 
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465 For example, Anisimov, Rossiia bez Petra, 293; Kamenskii, Ot Petra, 246-248.  
 
466 Kurukin, Epokha, 185-186.  
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wealth, rank, and birth (aristocratic lineage). In other words my goal here is to 
establish whether the young nobles interested in opportunities provided by the Corps 
formed a distinct group within the elite, and if they did, to place this group on the 
social map of early-modern Russia. Since, as I showed in the previous chapter, the 
nobles joined the Corps more or less voluntarily, my question here is who among the 
Russian elite was, so to say, “voting with their feet” for Westernization.  
*   *   * 
Wealth was a key characteristic of an eighteenth-century Russian nobleman 
for a number of reasons. In pre-Petrine Russia servitors received land and serfs from 
the state depending on their position in the service hierarchy; wealth was largely a 
function of rank. In the post-Petrine period one’s legal standing as a noble gave one 
the right (in the second half of the eighteenth century, an exclusive right) to own land 
and serfs, and thus possession of assets of a certain type in many ways shaped his 
identity. Also, one’s wealth supposedly had an impact on access to a “Western” 
education and way of life, once again, increasingly important for a noble identity in 
the eighteenth century. Wealth, measured as the number of male serfs (“male souls”) 
was an important indicator of one’s status from the official point of view as well, so 
the entering cadets, among other things, were normally asked about their family 
wealth.467  
The categories of wealth that are traditionally used by historians are suggested 
by contemporary documents. The officially accepted poverty line for nobles seems to 
                                                     
467 On the role of serf ownership in the noble identity, see Elise Kimmerling Wirtschafter, 
"Legal Identity and the Posession of Serfs in Imperial Russia," Journal of Modern History 70, no.3 
(1998): 561-587.  On the evolution of serfdom in the eighteenth century, see Jerome Blum, Lord and 
Peasant in Russia From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1961), 414-441; Mironov, 
Sotsial’naia istoriia, Vol.I, 360-415.  
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have stood in the early eighteenth century at around twenty m.s. For example, nobles 
with less than 20 m.s. were exempted from the requirements to travel to the capital for 
a final review at the Heraldry, and from paying a certain fee upon retirement, while in 
1740 is was decreed to enroll them into the less prestigious regiments of the line, 
rather than into the Guards. When the Senate in 1737 drafted regulations for assigning 
young nobles aspiring for a civil careers as apprentices, or iunkery, to various 
governmental bureaus, it proposed that only the youth with no less than 25 m.s., be 
assigned to the central agencies, since they were able to maintain themselves 
“honorably, cleanly, and not miserably” (“chestno, chisto, i neubogo”).468 In other 
words, the government not only attempted to identify the poverty level (and therefore, 
the stratum of the nobility eligible for lenient treatment) – it also suggested a linkage 
between one’s lifestyle (as defined through wealth) and standing within the elite. In a 
way, here it reversed the Petrine logic. Whereas Peter demanded, for example, that all 
nobles with certain wealth build houses in St.Petersburg and send their sons to the 
Naval Academy or to the guards, now the government suggested that only nobles able 
to live nobly would be eligible for certain positions.  
Another significant watershed appears to have stood at 100 m.s. A decree 
issued in 1737 provided that the most prestigious apprenticeships at the Senate would 
be reserved only for the young nobles with more than 100 m.s. who could afford an 
appropriate lifestyle.469 Similarly, the 1736 Manifesto that set the rules for registering 
young nobles for service implied that the fathers who owned 100 m.s. were wealthy 
                                                     
468 PSZ # 6488, 6949, 8081, 7201. According to the Manifesto of 1762, retiring nobles with 
less than twenty m.s. were to officially certify that that they would not later apply for pension on 
account of their poverty.  
 
469 PSZ #7171. Note also that Anna’s government called for enrolling in the Guards those 
nobles who “have sufficient means [dostatok] to support themselves while in the Guards.” Officers of 
the Guards were now required to arrive for guard duty at the palace on their own well-bred horses. 
Quoted in Kurukin, Epokha, 41. 
 
224 
 
enough to teach their children arithmetic, geometry, and foreign languages.470 The 
next gradation of wealth could be deduced from a letter to Peter I from the Military 
College, which suggested the possession of 100 households (around 400-500 m.s.), as 
a definition of “prominent” (znatnoe) nobility.471 Finally, the Military Commission of 
Field-Marshall von Münnich suggested in 1731 that the owners of 1,000 m.s. were so 
rich that they should pay a double fee for an exemption from service.472  
                                                     
470 PSZ #7171, 7201. This understanding of a divide between the wealthy and the poorer 
nobles had a long history. Already in the seventeenth century servitors had to have more than 24 serf 
households (approximately 80 to 100 m.s.) to serve in the “hundreds,” or traditional noble cavalry 
militia, whereas the deti boiarskie with less than 24 households were drafted as foot soldiers into the 
“New Type regiments,” that is, into the standing army. I.E. Vodarskii, Naselenie Rossii v kontse XVII-
nachale XVIII veka: Chislennost’, soslovno-klassovyi sostav, razmeshchenie (Moscow, 1977), 62.  
 
471 PSZ #4588, n.9. This definition, as we already noted, was not accepted by Peter.  
 
472 Romanovich-Slavatinskii, Dvor’anstvo v Rossii, 194-195. This gradation (20 – 100 – 500 – 
1000 m.s.) is used in the majority of works. See, for example, N.M. Shepukova, "Ob izmenenii 
razmerov dushevladeniia pomeshchikov Evropeiskoi Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII - pervoi polovine 
XIX v.," in Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy. 1963 (Vilnius, 1964); Kahan, “The 
Costs of Westernization”; Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia. Vol.I, 89. Faizova uses a more extensive list 
of categories, but that does not make much sense: the difference between an estate, say, of 40 and 70 
m.s. was too small to have any meaningful impact on one’s way of life. Of course, the official data 
might be misleading: profitability of estates differed depending on their location, quality of land, and 
quality of management.  In his unpublished dissertation Gleb Kalashinikov cites fascinating examples 
of correspondence between two officers and their bailiffs in 1728-1731. Vasilii Obukhov, of the 
Nizhegorodskii Infantry, owned mere 27 m.s., yet he received from his estates hundreds rubles 
annually and kept eight horses and seven  serf menservants. Dmitrii Kalugin, of the Novotroitskii 
Dragoons, owner of 96 m.s., received from his estates in the Moscow region only 20-30 rubles per 
year. Kalugin complained to his bailiff that due to the latter’s negligence he could not afford to buy 
footwear for his manservant, or even meat. See Kalashnikov, “Ofitserskii korpus,” 113-114. Neither 
were one’s serfs his only source of income. Already in the second half of the seventeeth  century the 
income from one’s estate was often substantially complemented with a salary, a pension, or with illegal 
profits derived from abusing one’s office. Another source of income was, of course, marketing of 
various goods produced on the estates, notably alcohol, which guaranteed good returns on minimal 
investment and was much easier to store and transport than grain and other agricultural products. See 
Kahan, “The Costs of Westernization,” 55-60.  Unfortunately, there exist no studies of the actual 
budgets of the eighteenth-century noble families that would take into account all these potential sources 
of income. Note, for example that the father of Ivan Chirikov had no serfs whatsoever, yet he was 
willing to keep his son at the Corps at his own expense. At the same time, the Lvov brothers, Fedor and 
Petr, though nominally the owners of 160 m.s. complained of their inability to afford living in the 
capital on their own and to buy a uniform. The Khovanskii princes, heirs to a fortune of thousands of 
serfs, explained their failure to report to the Corps in time by the lack of funds due to the “great debts” 
left by their father. See RGVIA f. 314, op. 1, d. 2251, l. 34; d. 2197, ll. 9, 106.  Moreover, the Russian 
nobles stubbornly adhered to the traditional practice of multiple inheritance, which meant that quite a 
substantial fortune might have been reduced to total non-significance only one generation later. One 
should also remember that the nobles reported not the actual number of the serfs working on their 
estate, but rather the number recorded during the last census, which might have took place ten years 
ago. That makes the data on the petty nobles especially ambiguous: a noble who nominally owned 
twenty m.s. might well have had 40 serfs working his land – or close to zero. With all these reservation, 
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The distribution of landlords according to the number of serfs in their 
possession in early eighteenth-century Russia is shown in Table 3.1. The data put the 
efforts made by the post-Petrine government to create a “true nobility” and its concern 
with the ability of young iunker’s to maintain an appropriate lifestyle into broader 
perspective: in fact, over half of all Russian nobles were well below the government-
recognized poverty line. Only about 40 percent of all nobles were in a position to 
maintain themselves “honorably” enough to be apprentices at the central government 
bureaus, and less than twenty percent (actually, less than ten percent in 1727) could 
afford the lifestyle that was considered appropriate for a iunker at the Senate.  
Table 3.1  
Distribution of Landlords According to the Number of Serfs in Their 
Possession in the Eighteenth Century473 
Number 
of Male 
Serfs 
Number and Percentage of Landlords 
1727 1762 1777 
% Number of 
landlords, 
thousands 
% % Number of 
landlords, 
thousands 
- 20 60.6 38.3 51.0 59.0 41 
21-100 30.8 20.5 31.0 25.0 18 
101-500 7.7  
5.7 
15.0 13.0  
11 501-
1000 
0.6 2.0 2.0 
1000 + 0.3 1.0 1.0 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Kalashnikov still finds in his work that only the officers with 150 – 200 m.s. tended to own multiple 
horses and to have serf  menservants. Kalashnikov, “Ofitserskii korpus,” 114. 
473 Kahan, “The Costs of Westernization,” 45; Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia. Vol. I, 89 (for 
1727 and 1777).  
 
226 
 
Against this backdrop the most striking feature of the Corps’s student body is 
that incoming cadets as a group were significantly wealthier than the Russian nobility 
in general. However, really wealthy cadets (with over 1,000 m.s.) were not numerous: 
there were no more than few of them in a normal yearly intake. For example, in 1750 
among the new students there were two Khovanskii princes (4,800 m.s.), Prince Ivan 
Golitsyn (4,000 m.s.), Baron Pavel Shafirov (1,580 m.s.), two Zinoviev brothers 
(1,300 m.s.) and Aleksei Kozhin (1,150 m.s.).474 In the intake of 1752 there was only 
one cadet with over 1000 m.s., Vasilii Kolychev (1,500 m.s.). In 1737 the intake 
included Ivan Golokhvastov (1,400 m.s.), the Titov brothers (1,800 m.s.), and Prince 
Aleksandr Dolgorukov (2,500 m.s.) Yet these magnates were clearly an exception.  
The majority of cadets were coming, in fact, from the “upper-middle” nobility – from 
among those who were not super-rich, yet able, according to the governmental 
definition, somehow to maintain an “honorable” and “clean” lifestyle. In the three 
decades under study half, and sometimes over 60 percent, of the students came from 
families with over 100 m.s. For example, the father of Appolon and Lev 
Pronchishchev, an army major, owned 260 m.s. in Bolkhov and Elets districts, while 
Sergei Mansurov inherited from his father, an assessor at the College of the Mines, 
400 m.s. in Tula, Livny, and Moscow districts.475  These strata of the nobility were 
highly overrepresented in the student body. In fact, there were quite a few years when 
half of all the new students had between 100 and 500 m.s. The nobles with 21 to 100 
m.s. comprised the second most numerous group: they normally supplied about one 
third of the incoming cadets. Among them we find such young nobles as Prince 
                                                     
474 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2259. 
 
475 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1987.  
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Aleksei Putiatin, son of an army major and the heir to a modest estate of 95 m.s., or 
Andrei Neledinskii, whose father, a lieutenant, owned 75 m.s.476 
At the same time, the presence of the poorest nobility was limited, but not 
marginal: it accounted, roughly speaking, for 10 to 20 percent of the intake. In 1750 
four incoming cadets had no serfs at all, although one of them had some land. In 
addition, Osip Chelishchev had twenty m.s., and two Georgian émigré princes, Egor 
Andronnikov and Stepan Eristov, had five “households” (about 15-20 m.s.) each. In 
1752 there were three incoming cadets who had no serfs whatsoever, and three more 
cadets had seven, seventeen, and twenty m.s. respectively. Yet, given the absolute 
dominance of this group among the Russian nobility in general, the numbers make it 
clear that the poorest stratum was terribly underrepresented at the Corps.  
The Corps’s student body thus appears to be highly homogenous in terms of 
wealth; this homogeneity is noticeable from the very beginning and holds throughout 
the entire period under study. Changes in percentage distribution of cadets according 
to the number of serfs in their possession do not form any clear pattern over the years, 
while significant fluctuations from one year to another (ten percentage points and 
more) are quite natural given the small size of the sample.  
The data clearly show that the Corps was an elite unit that drew mostly the 
sons of well-to-do nobility: they were not rich in absolute terms, or if compared to the 
magnates, yet they still belonged to the top strata of the elite. It is useful to compare 
the Corps’ student body to the Guards – the elite regiments, which were formed by 
Peter the Great477 and took active part in palace revolutions of the eighteenth century. 
Peter specifically required that young nobles start their service as privates in the 
                                                     
476 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178. 
 
477 The Horse Guards, however, were formed by Empress Anna in 1731. 
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Guards and received commissions in the regiments of the line only after such an 
apprenticeship, so the guardsmen as a group offer a natural sample for comparison. 
(The distribution of guardsmen according to their wealth is shown in Table 3.4). It 
appears that these numbers once again emphasize the predominance of the “upper-
middle” nobility in the Cadet Corps: the share of the poorest nobles (twenty m.s. and 
less) among the private guardsmen could be well above 50 percent whereas at the 
Corps it has never risen above 23 percent and usually stayed below 20 percent.  
Table 3.2  
The Noble Cadet Corps and the Noblemen of the Guards, 1740s-1760s478 
 Percentage Distribution of Nobles 
- 20 21-100 101-500 501- 
Cadet Corps, lowest to highest, select 
years from 1745 to 1763479 
8.2 to 23.1 16.0 to 38.6 29.0 to 53.6 1.2 to 18.0 
Semenovskii Guards, total 
(officers/privates), 1743 
36.6 
(3.6/43.6) 
35.3 
(21.8/35.1) 
18.8 
(58.2/13.6) 
9.4 
(16.4/7.7) 
Semenovskii Guards, total 
(officers/privates), 1761 
51.6 
(1.9/79.4) 
21.5 
(13.2/16.7) 
18.5 
(54.7/2.3) 
5.4 
(30.2/1.6) 
Preobrazhenskii Guards, officers/ 
privates, 1761-1762 
4.8/48.8 13.6/34.3 47.6/14.5 33.0/2.4 
Horse Guards, total (officers/ 
privates), 1757 
41.1 
(2.7/65.8) 
31.1 
(13.5/30.1) 
12.3 
(32.5/2.7) 
15.5 
(51.3/1.4) 
 
                                                     
478 Iu.N. Smirnov, "Osobennosti sotsial’nogo sostava i komplektovaniia russkoi gvardii v 
pervoi polovine XVIII veka," in Klassy i sosloviia Rossii v period absol’utizma (Kuibyshev, 1989), 
103-105; RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 305; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 2130, 2197, 2251, 2259, 2283, 2223, 
2621, 2729, 2845, 2976, 3199. 
 
479 For years 1745, 1747-52, 1754, 1755, 1757, 1758, 1763. 
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*   *   * 
Rank, or chin, was another all-important element of the early eighteenth-
century noble identity. In 1722 Peter introduced what is traditionally considered one 
of the most important among his reforms – the so-called Table of Ranks. This Table 
replaced the Muscovite service titles with a regularized system of ranks encompassing 
all the positions in all the branches of service and organizing them in a 
straightforward hierarchical way by putting each position and rank in one of the 14 
categories (classes); a commoner reaching a position that belonged to the 14th (lowest) 
class in the military, or of the 8th class in the civil service was automatically 
ennobled.480  
Analysis of the ranks of fathers who sent their sons to the Cadet Corps gives 
results very similar to those described in the previous section. In terms of their 
fathers’ ranks, the Corps’s student body predominantly represented mid-level elite, 
well-established nobles, while the highest- and the lowest-ranking families occupy 
relatively marginal positions. The sons of civil and military officers with the ranks 
above colonel accounted for up 12 percent of the yearly intake, but in absolute 
numbers they were never represented by more than 6 cadets; sometimes their number 
dropped down to 0. In 1747, for example, the generalitet was represented (in the 
overall intake of 35) by four Epishkov brothers, sons of a deceased brigadier-general. 
In 1757, there was only one son of a relatively high-ranking officer, Ivan Bakhmet’ev, 
whose father was a brigadier-general and the komendant of St.Petersburg.  On the 
other hand, the lowest-ranking nobles (who were by far the most numerous category 
among the nobility in general) were never able to supply more than 17 percent of all 
the entering cadets, and sometimes they accounted for as little as 2-3percent of the 
                                                     
480 For the Table of Ranks itself, see PSZ #3890.  For a detailed analysis, see Troitskii, Russkii 
absol’utizm,  47-154.  
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intake. In 1747 there were only two such cadets in the entire intake: Vasilii Razladin, 
son of an army NCO, and Dmitrii Potemkin, whose father served in the Smolensk 
gentry militia. In 1757 there were 6 sons of NCOs among the new cadets. The father 
of two cadets, the Davydov brothers, was a retired gardemarin (cadet officer) in the 
navy, while the father of two Lavrov brothers had never served at all.  
The majority of cadets, however, came from the families of commissioned 
officers (and their equivalent in the civil service), with the field officers usually, but 
not always, managing to send slightly more cadets to the Corps. Quite often these two 
categories combined accounted for 80 percent, or even 90 percent of the entering 
cohort. For example, Vasilii Redrikov’s father was a retired army captain. Vasilii 
Chebyshev was a son of an army lieutenant-colonel; Aleksandr Trubnikov – of a 
naval captain.481 To sum up, the Corps predominantly attracted the sons of the middle 
strata of the ruling elite – those who led regiment, battalions, and companies; served 
as the senior staffers in the governmental agencies (below the president and vice-
president of the Colleges); or were appointed as voevody (district administrators). 
*   *   * 
The third key element of elite status had to do with birth. In her study Brenda 
Meehan-Waters demonstrates the existence of continuity between the pre-Petrine and 
post-Petrine elite. Although there were a few highly visible commoners (and/or 
foreigners) among the closest lieutenants of Peter and his successors, descendants of 
the old Duma families still overwhelmingly dominated the generalitet.482 
Nevertheless, by mid-eighteenth century conservative authors, notably Prince 
                                                     
481 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178. 
 
482 See Meehan-Waters, Aristocrats and Servitors. 
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Shcherbatov, increasingly complained about the increasing numbers of “newcomers” 
among the elite. It remains to be seen, however, whether this resentment was a result 
of “remembering,” so to say – i.e. of the nobility asserting their traditional identity – 
or of construction of the “ancient Russian aristocracy.” I would suggest that there was, 
at the very least, an element of both.  
In 1730 Prince D.M. Golitsyn of the Supreme Privy Council suggested 
creating a separate legal category of the old aristocratic families (famil’nyie, or staryie 
familii), as opposed to the nobility at large; similar themes appeared in some other 
documents of the crisis.483 It is tempting, of course, to interpret them as sign of an 
aristocratic opposition to the autocracy. Yet, only three years after the crisis none 
other than von Münnich himself attempted to use at the Corps a standard 
questionnaire to record the family background and ancestry of incoming cadets. 
Among other things, they were asked (Question #4) to answer whether they could 
“demonstrate on … paternal and maternal sides sixteen noble families” introducing in 
Russian practice the standard Western European definition of nobility as “four 
quarters” of noble blood. The standard answer was, however: “Sixteen noble families 
[besides my immediate relatives] I am unable to show due to my young age.” 
Question #5 was about the coat of arms. The standard answer was similar to the 
previous one: “I cannot report anything about my coat of arms at this point, unless I 
get some clarification on that from my father.”484 As in the case of education, the 
demands presented by the elite in 1730 seem to have reflected not so much the 
feelings and aspirations actually shared by the nobility, as the desire of the leading 
                                                     
483 Kamenskii, Ot Petra, 217. 
 
484 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 1678, 8011. As mentioned earlier, in the early 1730s von 
Münnich insisted that only nobles could receive commissions. 
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members of the elite to construct a “proper” nobility on a Western European model – 
the desire that also motivated Anna’s government. 
The use of the questionnaire seems to have been abandoned at the Corps 
almost immediately after its introduction. Yet, a few months after Anna’s death, on 
February 11, 1741 (i.e. already after the overthrow of Biron’s regency, when the 
government was directed by an unstable duumvirate of von Münnich  and 
Ostermann), the Heraldry received an order to prepare a “thorough register of all the 
[prominent] families” in the realm. It was also to prepare a list of all the files in the 
archive of the Razr’ad (pre-Petrine department in charge of keeping genealogical 
records, assigning nobles to service positions, distributing land grants etc.). The 
Heraldry clerks were to calculate how many of the Razr’ad files were catalogued, and 
how many were not, to work towards compiling a complete catalogue, and to keep the 
archival records “in good order.”485  
By the end of the year the clerks produced a list of genealogical records 
arranged by such categories as “Boiars,” “Okol’nichie,” “Princely families,” “Duma 
noblemen,” “Genealogies with coats of arms.”486 The Heraldry authorities, moreover, 
wanted not simply a list of genealogical records, but a catalogue describing the 
content of each document, and producing such catalogue turned out to be easier said 
than done. During the previous three decades the records in question were, apparently, 
considered nearly useless: they were kept in poor conditions and rarely, if ever, 
                                                     
485 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 241a,  l. 56. 
 
486 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 241a,  ll. 57ob – 58. It is noteworthy that the categories of 
nobility employed by the Heraldry archivists referred to such recently imported attributes of nobility as 
“coats of arms” introduced by Peter, but otherwise divisions and degrees of nobility were based on pre-
Petrine service ranks. When the Heraldry officials received this report, however, they got also really 
interested in such documents mentioned in it as the “service registers [knigi razbornye] of nobles and 
deti boiarskie, the lists of immigrant [noble] foreigners, and the Poles, and the Crimean Tartars, and the 
records of their baptisms and salaries … and the land and salary registers for nobles and deti 
boiarskie,” etc., in other words, in the entire range of pre-Petrine service records. 
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consulted. As the clerks explained, “According to the [1711] decree of … Peter I 
abolishing the Razr’ad, all the Razr’ad documents were taken to the lower chambers 
of the former Razr’ad office where they stayed until 1714. That year all these 
documents were taken to the old government warehouse [staryi kazennyi dvor] and 
stored there in big cases.” Only in 1737, after the big fire of Moscow, were the 
documents taken to the Senate archive in one of the Kremlin buildings. As a result, 
many files were damaged: archival clerks reported, for example, that the genealogy 
(skazka) of boiar Aleksei Semenovich Shein “written by his own hand, has rotted 
down,” while that of Semion Pleshcheev “lacks the beginning,” etc. Most importantly, 
the Heraldry clerks had no idea how complete these records were: “it is unknown, 
who had submitted [their genealogical records], and who had not.”487 Compiling the 
register of existing genealogies proved to be exceedingly hard: apparently, there was 
only one very old clerk who still remembered how to work with these documents.  
Meanwhile, the government changed, the infant emperor and his mother the 
Princess-Regent were overthrown and exiled, as were von Münnich  and Ostermann. 
Nevertheless, the interest in genealogical records did not subside – archival workers 
repeatedly received orders to finish the register “urgently,” “as soon as possible,” 
“without delays,” etc. Finally, in 1744 they were ordered to submit monthly reports on 
their progress. This urgency was driven, apparently, by sudden demand among the 
prominent noble families for their genealogical records. On April 19, 1743 the Master 
of Heraldry instructed the archival clerks to send to St.Petersburg genealogical 
records for the Vorontsovs and the Iushkovs; this request was based on a decree from 
the Empress Elizabeth herself. In June there came a request for the Zheliabuzhskii’s 
genealogy, later that year for that of the Novosiltsevs and the Naumovs, in January, 
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1744 – for that of the Choglokovs. Subsequently similar requests came for the 
genealogical materials related to the Khitrovos, the Apraksins, the Nashchokins, and 
others.488  
As the Master of Heraldry explained in April 1746, “members of [prominent] 
families request information from their genealogical records submitted to the Razr’ad, 
and some even [request] copies.” The records that for decades had been kept in total 
neglect in cases at a warehouse were now to be stored under seal and copied only in 
presence of the senior clerk.489 When P.M. Bestuzhev-Riumin and G.P. Chernyshev 
were created counts in 1742, the Heraldry requested from the archive copies of their 
genealogical records submitted to the Razr’ad in 1686. Apparently, from that moment 
on archival research regarding the origins of the ennobled or elevated family became 
standard practice. Significantly, Bestuzhev and Chernyshev also submitted copies of 
ancient acts mentioning their ancestors dating 1489 and 1554, respectively. Both of 
these documents were later proven by historians to be forgeries.490 
It is significant, perhaps, against this backdrop, that in 1763 among the forty 
nine Russian (as opposed to the Baltic or Ukraninan) applicants, nine could recall the 
rank of their great-grandfathers: and seven of them were claiming to be descendants 
of stol’niki; two more mentioned a stol’nik as their grandfather.491  In 1762 out of a 
sample of seventy incoming Russian cadets, thirty six were able to specify their great-
grandfathers’ ranks. Allegedly, ten of them were descendants of stol’niki, four – of 
colonels, and four more – of striapchie and stremiannye (lower court ranks). 
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490 Khorunzhenko, Dvorianskie diplomy, 152-153. 
 
491 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 3198. 
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Furthermore, four more claimed stol’niki and two – striapchie as their grandfathers.492 
In other words, by the early 1760s at least 1/3 of the incoming cadets were claiming to 
be descendants of the upper-middle strata of pre-Petrine elite. 
*   *   * 
The data presented in this chapter suggests that already in the 1730s there was 
a deep cleavage between the upper stratum of the elite and the masses of the nobility 
regarding their interest in, and involvement with, education. It is indeed striking how 
different as a group the young nobles aspiring to join the Corps were from those 
wishing to study elsewhere, and especially, to join the guards, or the army. The 
median number of serfs owned by young nobles in the 1745 sample who asked to be 
sent to garrison schools was a pitiful 5.5 m.s.; the median number of serfs owned by 
those who wanted to join the Guards was 10 m.s. Even the Engineering School could 
attract only poor nobles: the median number of serfs owned by those who wanted to 
study there was only 15, although among them, unlike among the aspiring guardsmen 
and garrison school students, there were two young men whose families owned over 
100 m.s. The concentration of scions of reasonably high-ranking and well-born 
families among the cadets also appears to be quite significant. 
There were exceptions, of course, and we see a number of landless and serf-
less nobles actively seeking admission into the Corps. Yet, the data suggest that 
already in the 1730s there was a strong correlation between the wealth and status of a 
noble family and the career (and educational) preferences of its sons. The data in this 
chapter show that the vast majority of the nobility was manifestly not interested in 
educational opportunities offered by Anna’s government, and passively resisted 
                                                     
492 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 3162. Here the references to the pre-Petrine past were intertwined 
with new imperial mythology: Pavel Izvol’skii found it necessary to emphasize that his grandfather was 
a strem’annoi to Peter himself. 
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attempts to discipline it into a “true nobility.” At the same time, in the immediate 
post-Petrine period there existed a numerically small, but qualitatively significant 
group of nobles that willingly “bought into” this project. It is possible to argue, 
perhaps, that the relative success and institutional sustainability of the Cadet Corps, as 
compared the Petrine attempts to educate the nobility, is explained by this willing 
cooperation of the top strata of the elite. 
 
 
 
Chapter 12 
“I Wish To Study Foreign Languages, Dancing, and Fencing”: 
Educational Preferences of the Russian Nobility 
In the 1730s, as a part of broader campaign to create a “true nobility,” the 
government attempted to impose on the nobility a specific educational program. This 
program was spelled out in much more detail and applied much more systematically 
then it was ever done under Peter; it was imposed on the entire nobility, not only on 
the students at the Noble Cadet Corps. The decree of February 9, 1737 (discussed in 
detail in chapter 9) established the mandatory sequence of studies prescribed for all 
the young nobles.493 According to this decree, all noble minors had to “truly and 
completely” know how to read and write by age of twelve. In the next four years those 
nobles who wished to keep their sons at home had to undertake to educate them 
according to a specified curriculum. That curriculum included “besides the foreign 
languages, which they could study if they so desire, and also, self-evidently and most 
necessarily, the laws and rules of our Orthodox faith [zakony i artikuly nashey very], 
also Arithmetic and Geometry.” Foreign languages were thus declared optional, while 
the state, in line with Petrine emphasis on “technical” education, required and 
promoted the study of mathematic (to be learned “fundamentally” [s osnovaniem]). 
Those who managed to master this program by the age of sixteen could delay entering 
the active service by four more years and to stay home studying geography, 
fortification, and history. Those who failed to learn arithmetic and geometry 
“fundamentally” by sixteen were to be sent to the navy as sailors “forever.”  
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The question is the degree to which the nobility choose to follow this 
curriculum (or was able to do so). In this chapter I attempt to discern patterns of 
educational preferences that might have existed among the post-Petrine nobility and to 
determine whether these patterns conformed to the officially prescribed educational 
program, or deviated from it. Specifically, I will focus on two groups of subjects - the 
study of foreign languages and acquisition of social graces, such as dancing, fencing, 
etc. - that occupied an important place in the Corps’s curriculum, but were not 
included in the sequence of studies mandated for the nobility.  
Overall, the cultural level of an average early eighteenth-century Russian 
noble is hard to assess. We still know little about education and, broadly, speaking, 
the cultural life of the rank-and-file Russian nobles of the period due, among other 
things, to a lack of sources on schooling received at home and at the garrison schools. 
Whether the nobles had any choice at all – it terms of educational opportunities 
available for them – is not immediately obvious. Certainly, many of them explained 
their failure to conform to the state-imposed educational requirements by the absence 
of teachers and schools. Fedor Baikov noted apologetically in 1737 that all he could 
learn at a garrison school in Velikie Luki was arithmetic, “and there was nobody there 
to teach other subjects.”494 The memoirs, if they describe any educational 
arrangements at all, likewise present a sorry picture of ignorant, drunken, boorish 
teachers and their lazy, unruly, and equally boorish pupils. At the same time, although 
it seems clear that in the immediate post-Petrine decades the Russian nobility was 
quite uneducated by the standards of the most advanced European countries, yet it 
was not quite as illiterate as it has been portrayed both by historians and by some 
eighteenth-century critics. In his study of the cahiers of Catherine’s Legislative 
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Commission of 1767, Robert E. Jones found that 16 percent of their signatories were 
illiterate, and in some districts their share was as high as 50 percent.495 However, 
recent studies that use larger samples show that, on average, illiteracy might have 
been less common. Overall, in the early 1760s roughly 8 percent of Russian nobles 
retiring from the military service were illiterate, while nearly half (47.2 percent) could 
read, write, and knew arithmetic, and the rest (i.e. over 40 percent) had some formal 
schooling.496  
Arcadius Kahan in his influential article on the “costs of Westernization” drew 
attention to the fact that given the distribution of wealth among the eighteenth-century 
Russian elite, only a few nobles could ever become “Westernized,” that is, be able to 
afford the level and quality of consumption that defined the way of life of the Western 
European nobility. Among other things, Kahan argued that private “Westernized” 
education was beyond the means of all but, perhaps, the leading few hundreds of the 
noble families. According to his estimates, “the direct costs of tuition for gentry 
education in the latter decades of the eighteenth century amounted to about 100 rubles 
per male pupil, or, including room and board, to about 150 rubles per year.”497 
Michael Confino suggested an even more terrifying price of 300 rubles per year for a 
private tutor at the end of the eighteenth century, which, as he demonstrates, would 
                                                     
495 Jones, The Emancipation, 59-60. 
 
496 Faizova, Manifest, 53. Gleb Kalashnikov comes to roughly similar conclusion for the 
1720s-1740s. According to him, 71 percent of the officers were literate, 13 had some “limited literacy,” 
and 9 percent were illiterate or could sign only their names. Note that Kalashnikov’s figures include 
also commoners (which presumably pushes the share of the illiterate up) and foreigners (which 
presumably pulls it down). Kalashnikov, “Ofitserskii korpus,” 129. 
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have made education accessible only for a tiny minority of noble families (those with 
more than 540 male serfs, according to his calculations).498 
That is probably too high a threshold for Westernization. V.S. Khvostov 
indeed recollects that having retired after the end of the Seven Years’ War (1756-
1763), his father returned to his estates and found his children’s education 
unsatisfactory. So, he proceeded to “mail order” from St.Petersburg “a German 
teacher for 300 rubles per year, which was not easy given our poverty.” Note, 
however, that he nevertheless could afford it, although he owned a mere 100 m. s.499 
In the late 1720s Vasilii Tatishchev indeed paid 100 rubles a year for the education of 
his son – but Tatishchev the younger was sent to be schooled in Riga, and that sum 
covered also room, board, and necessary dress.500 Apparently, there were also much 
cheaper ways to get an education. Ivan Annenkov, a wealthy and quite Westernized 
(he Gil Blas and similar books in his library and exchanged letters French and 
German with his son) nobleman from Kursk, a remote frontier district at that time, 
mentions in his diary at least four foreign tutors (“Petr Deforzh, a Frenchman,” “Iagan 
Gerts, a foreigner,” “a foreigner Ivan Ivan’s son Tsvinker, residing at the bishop’s 
house,” and “a Frenchman named Andrei Stepan’s son Gotre”). The quality of this 
education might have been questionable, yet it was available even in the Kursk 
backwater: these pedagogues undertook to teach small groups of noble children for 2 
to 4 rubles per month per person.501 No doubt, overall Kahan’s point is well-taken: 
                                                     
498 Michael Confino, “Histoire et psychologie: A propos de la noblesse russe au XVIIIe 
siecle,”  Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilizations, no.6 (1967): 1163-1205. 
 
499 V.S. Khvostov, “Zapiski,”  Russkii Arkhiv 1, no. 3 (1870). 
 
500 Tatishchev, Zapiski, pis’ma, 143. 
 
501 I.P. Annenkov, “Dnevnik kurskogo pomeshchika I.P.Annenkova,” in Materialy po istorii 
SSSR. Vol.V. Dokumenty po istorii XVIII veka (Moscow, 1957), 713, 742. For evidence of, apparently, 
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education was a rare commodity in the mid-eighteenth century. Yet, perhaps, it was 
not as rare and inaccessible, as the nobles themselves would want the authorities to 
believe.  
How exactly the nobles used these opportunities, and what they learned, when 
they learned anything at all, is even less clear, though. For that reason the data on their 
prior education provided at the Heraldry by the future cadets and the young nobles in 
general is very welcome indeed. Unfortunately, the records from the 1730s are 
extremely fragmentary, and the entries for individual cadets often contain no 
information besides their name and age. Even at the end of the decade many cadets 
failed to specify their level of education at all. Not all of them bothered to write down 
even the formulaic pisat’ i chitat’ obuchen (“learned reading and writing”), although 
the law clearly required them to be literate. By the end of the 1740s the records 
improved significantly, and in the last decade under study we have a nearly complete 
set of records, with all the incoming cadets dutifully reporting their previous 
educational achievements.  
These records, though, are based on reports submitted by the nobles at the 
Heraldry, so the data are self-reported, and the question of their  reliability must be 
raised. Conveniently, in 1750 the Corps had actually decided to verify these reports by 
examining its incoming cadets (Table 3.3).502 Surprisingly, we find very little 
exaggeration: in the vast majority of cases the applicants actually knew the subjects 
they previously said they did, although, perhaps, not as well. In fact, a significant 
number of applicants underreported their educational achievements: the examiners 
                                                                                                                                                        
quite sustainable private schools run by German teachers already during the reign of Peter I in Kazan’ – 
a large, but also quite remote city – see Shcheglov, “Dve sankt-peterburgskiie shkoly.” 
502 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2259. 
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found out that 19 cadets demonstrated some expertise in German and 12 – in French, 
but only 10 and 6 young nobles, respectively, reported proficiency in these languages 
in their applications. And only 3 young nobles were caught in an attempt to blatantly 
mislead the authorities, i.e. to report some knowledge of a subject of which, it turned 
out, they actually knew “nothing.”  
Another difficulty has to do with interpreting the measures of knowledge 
found in the records. In their papers young nobles simply listed the subjects they had 
previously studied, so we cannot be sure what was actually meant by “learned 
German” in a given case. The examiners in 1750 likewise reported the results in 
purely descriptive terms, so the meaning of “mediocre French” or “good German” is 
exceedingly vague.  
Table 3.3  
Previously Studied Subjects Reported by Incoming Cadets and the 
Results of Examination at the Corps, 1750 (no. of cases = 58)503 
 
 
Reading and 
Writing 
 
 
Arithmetic 
 
German 
 
French 
 
Geometry 
55 17 10 6 6 
53: 
13 – “good” 
16 – 
“mediocre” 
5 – “some” 
19 – “poor” 
2 – “nothing” 
26: 
4 – “good” 
5 – “mediocre” 
17 – “some” 
1 – “nothing” 
19: 
2 – “mediocre” 
15 – “some” 
2  - “poor” 
2 – “nothing” 
12: 
2 –“good” 
9 – “some” 
1 – “mediocre” 
1 – “nothing” 
3: 
1 – “good” 
1 - “mediocre” 
1 – “very 
basic” 
1 – “nothing” 
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Thus, given the nature of the sources, an attempt to do a more sophisticated 
quantitative analysis of the educational records would be inappropriate. Yet it 
certainly makes sense to present an educational profile of incoming cadets and to trace 
their changes over time. First of all, in spite of the legal requirements, most young 
nobles in the 1730s never moved beyond basic literacy (Table 3.4). Surprisingly, 
relatively few cadets report their mastery of arithmetic: overall, no more than 1/3 of 
the cadets mention it in their applications. To some extent this is probably due to 
underreporting: clearly, some students simply choose not to mention arithmetic in 
their papers. It is hard to believe, for example, that the Pavlov brothers, who 
transferred to the Corps in 1736 from the Gymnasium of the Academy of Sciences, 
did not know basic math. The same applies to Prince Pavel Tsitsianov, who prior to 
entering the Corps studied, among other things, physics and “mathematical 
geography,” yet does not mention arithmetic in his application. At the very least, this 
willingness to “forget” to mention a subject expressly required by law is indicative of 
the quality of enforcement of that law.  
Table 3.4  
Subjects Studied by Nobles Prior to Coming to the Corps, 1730s504 
 
 
Year 
Number of Cadets 
with Record of Prior 
Education (Size of 
Intake) 
 
Arithmetic 
 
German 
 
French 
 
Other Subjects 
(Number of 
Cases) 
 
1736 
 
48 (71) 
 
2 
 
13 
 
1 
Geometry 1 
Latin 1 
1737 30 (78) 4 6 4 Geometry 1 
1738 31 (110) 8 6 2 Geometry 1 
1739 13 (37) 5 5 1 English 1 
Artillery and 
Geometry 2, 
Turkish 1, 
History and 
“Morals” 1 
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244 
 
 
No less striking is how few cadets reported previous knowledge of geometry. 
It might reflect, of course, the limited educational opportunities available to the 
majority of nobles, and also the underreporting, described earlier. But even these two 
factors cannot explain the fact that in 1736-1739 we find only one (!) cadet per year 
boasting the mastery of geometry. After all, the very same young nobles somehow 
found ways to learn foreign languages and did mention them in their records. Yet 
geometry, despite its supposed usefulness in state service, was not among their 
priorities. It is significant that geometry and arithmetic were technical subjects 
prescribed and promoted by the Petrine state. These were considered to be the key 
disciplines for naval officers and artillerists, and they formed the core of the 
curriculum at schools set up by Peter. It also was the first “advanced” subject that the 
nobles were expected to master according to the decree of 1737. True, the entering 
cadets were not required to know arithmetic and geometry by law:  they choose to 
enter a school, not to stay at home, and this norm did not apply to them. Still, the very 
limited spread of geometry might also suggest that the state failed to impose its 
educational preferences on the nobility. Arithmetic and geometry simply do not seem 
to have commanded much prestige among the young nobles: wealthy and highly 
educated youngsters either failed to mention geometry and arithmetic among their 
educational achievements, or did not bother to study these subjects. None of the 
nobles who mentioned geometry in 1736-1738 - for example, Fedot Nazimov, son of 
an ensign in the garrison troops, or Prince Aleksand Koltsov-Masalskii, also son of an 
ensign – seem to belong to the top strata of the elite.505 The only cadet in the 1739 
intake who mentioned geometry, Mikhail Shcherbachev, did not have any choice but 
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to learn it: he transferred to the Corps from the Moscow artillery school.506 This 
disregard of geometry is emphasized by the fact that the study of foreign languages, 
first and foremost German, seems to have been far more common, even though it was 
not required by law. In 1736, one in four incoming cadets knew German, in 1737-
1739 – one in three. That is a significant number, especially if we take underreporting 
into account: these numbers indicate that study of foreign languages was becoming 
ordinary for young members of the elite. It already was the norm for the children of 
the top-ranking officials, such as Vasilii Chebyshev, son of the head of the Postmen 
bureau (Iamskaia kantseliaria), or Pavel Olsufiev, son of Oberhofmeister at the Court. 
In the following decades the situation remained essentially the same. Overall, 
the level of education among young nobles had risen by the 1750s, at least, according 
to self-reported data, while their educational preferences became even more 
pronounced (see Table 3.5, also Tables 3.6 and 3.7). In 1750 barely half of incoming 
cadets knew arithmetic, and only 9 among them turned out to have “good,” or even 
“mediocre” knowledge of it. A third of the young nobles, however, had some 
knowledge of German, and a quarter - of French. Furthermore, three cadets had 
studied some Latin, and one  - “drawing.” Geometry was, effectively, marginal: only 
two young nobles were able to demonstrate acceptable level of proficiency in the 
subject (and none whatsoever managed to learn even the basic of history, or 
geography).  
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Table 3.5  
Subjects Studied by Nobles Prior to Coming to the Corps, 1750s507 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
Educational 
Records 
(Number of 
Entering 
Cadets) 
 
Arithmetic 
 
German 
 
French 
 
Other 
Subjects 
 
1757 
 
85 (89) 
 
24 
 
18 
 
12 
Geometry 5, 
“Drawing” 2, 
Geography 1 
 
1758 
 
45 (47) 
 
22 
 
12 
 
9 
Geometry 6, 
Latin 6, 
Geography 1, 
Greek 2 
 
1763 
 
47 (53) 
 
13 
 
6 
 
8 
Geometry 1, 
Latin 2, 
Italian& 
“Drawing” 2 
 
These data indicate, it seems, the existence of persistent educational 
preferences among the nobility. This point is further confirmed by the data reflecting 
the educational choices made by young nobles while at the Corps. As mentioned in 
Part II, the curriculum there was built around a number of parallel sequences of 
subjects – but otherwise the cadets had quite a lot of leeway in choosing their 
subjects. The tables below shows that the optional (according to the decree of 1737) 
foreign languages were at least as popular as geometry. True, German was the native 
language for many of cadets, so the great popularity of French is especially indicative. 
The most popular subjects at the Corps were, however, dancing and fencing, not 
mentioned in the decree of 1737 at all, while the officially prescribed advanced 
subjects (history and geography) were taken by very few students. 
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Table 3.5  
Number of Cadets Taking Various Subjects at the Corps in 1737508 
 
Subject 
Number of 
students 
enrolled 
Number of 
separate classes 
in this subject 
Morning hours 
Fortification and geometry 119 4 
Geometry 103 4 
Artillery 7 1 
Philosophy and jurisprudence 11 1 
Latin for German students 24 1 
Latin for Russian students 16 1 
French 206 4 
Russian language 56 1 
German language 217 3 
Russian writing 63 1 
German writing 150 3 
Horseback riding 70 3 
Fencing 131 1 
Afternoon hours (not every day) 
Mechanics and fortification 12 1 
Geometry 170 5 
                                                     
508 Materialy dlia istorii imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 446-450. 
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“State history” and philosophy 7 1 
“Universal history” and geography 142 2 
French language 45 1 
Russian “style” 50 2 
German “style” 117 5 
“Fundamentals” of German “style” 
and orthography 
30 2 
German writing 163 4 
Russian writing 41 1 
Arithmetic 187 6 
Drawing 368 4 
Fencing and Advanced Horseback 
riding 
97 1 
Dancing 359 1 
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Table 3.7  
Number of Cadets Taking Various Subjects at the Corps in 1738509 
 
Subjects 
Number of 
students 
enrolled 
Number of 
separate classes 
in this subject 
German (writing, “style” and 
orthography) 
582 11 
Russian (writing, grammar, reading, 
“explication”) 
156 2 
Arithmetic 197 6 
Fortification and geometry 
(“German geometry” and “Russian 
geometry”) 
199 6 
Latin 40 3 
French 186 4 
Artillery 5 1 
Universal history 65 1 
History 58 1 
Geography 126 2 
Philosophy and jurisprudence 10 1 
Drawing 304 3 
Dancing 238 2 
Fencing and Advanced Horseback 
riding 
186 2 
History and jurisprudence 
(advanced, with Professor Grech) 
8 1 
 
The key question here is how these educational preferences were shaped. 
Kalashnikov finds that 15 percent of all the military officers in the 1740s began their 
career at the Cadet Corps, and the wealthier officers were more likely to have had 
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studied there.510 Faizova likewise concludes that the wealthier a noble, the more 
chances he had to be educated in general and, in particular, to have what she calls 
“higher education,” i.e. to be a graduate of the Noble Cadet Corps, Artillery and 
Engineering School, or Naval Cadet Corps. Overall, according to Faizova, the share 
of the illiterate was the highest among the nobles who had between 1 and 10 m.s., 
while it was only 1 percent among those who had between 70 and 100 m.s. Among 
the noble who had over 100 m.s., illiteracy was nonexistent, while the share of those 
who had formal schooling in this group was as high as 68-75 percent. Faizova finds 
that the wealthier nobles (over 100 m.s.) got “higher education” (studied at the Cadet 
Corps or similar schools) twice as often as those with 21 – 100 m.s. and 15 times as 
often as those with 1-20 m.s.511 
Table 3.8  
Wealth and Education of Retired Noblemen, 1762-1777512 
No serfs 1-10 m.s. 11-20 
m.s. 
21-69 
m.s. 
70 – 100 
m.s. 
101-500 
m.s. 
501-1000 
m.s. 
Over 
1000 m.s. 
 
18.1% 
 
9.5% 
 
12.5% 
 
28.3% 
 
55.1% 
 
68.7% 
 
69.2% 
 
75% 
 
I would argue, however, that it would be wrong to interpret these numbers as 
simply reflecting the fact that education was not available to the poorer nobles 
because of their limited means. As I demonstrate in the previous chapters, wealth was 
not a prerequisite for entering the Cadet Corps, and its absence was not necessarily an 
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511 Faizova, Manifest, 53. 
 
512 The share of nobles with advanced formal education (Cadet Corps and similar schools) in a 
given wealth bracket. Faizova, Manifest, 53. 
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insurmountable obstacle. True, traveling to the capitals was expensive. But hundreds 
of young nobles made it to the Heraldry, yet still preferred to enroll in the guards or in 
the army, not in the schools. So it seems, we are dealing here not so much with 
educational opportunities, as with educational preferences of the nobility. As I show 
in the next chapter, individual choices were often situational, yet, at the end of the 
day, they formed patterns, which in time have a tendency to turn into norms. See, for 
example, the huge popularity of languages and such subjects as dancing or fencing 
(although the choice of subjects at the Corps was significantly constrained by the 
structure of the curriculum). It is not surprising, therefore, that for Petr Bukhvostov, 
applying to the Corps in 1741, viewed its curriculum in a somewhat one-sided 
manner. “In the past year [1]740, in January, I was enrolled, according to my wishes, 
into the Engineering Corps as a student and learned arithmetic up to substraction,” – 
Bukhvostov wrote. – “Yet, currently no languages and other sciences are taught there, 
except those related to engineering. I am, however, a noble from the Novgorod 
district, and I am fourteen years old, and I wish to study foreign languages, fencing, 
dancing, and other sciences specified in the Charter of the [Cadet] Corps.”513  
The Petrine vision of an educated noble as a qualified technician useful to his 
Fatherland was expanded by the Corps’s founders into a broader ideal of a “true 
nobility” that included, besides technical knowledge, also social graces, and 
disciplining of the body. The law also established a clear sequence of studies, 
prescribed for nobles. Yet the vast majority chose to disregard this program 
completely and never went beyond basic literacy, opting instead for going into the 
army as privates. Those nobles who were allowed by law to stay (and study) at home 
almost never did so, signing up instead for the Corps, while those who could not 
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actually afford home education, avoided going to school as long as they could.  There 
was a sharp divide between the two groups in that those nobles who had some 
advanced knowledge invariably opted for the Corps or some other school, while 
among young nobles who preferred army service one virtually never meets any 
youngsters who report knowledge of geometry, foreign language, or any other 
advanced subject. Yet, those young nobles who chose (or were able) to study beyond 
basic literacy appear to have done it on their own terms. Rather than following the 
curriculum prescribed by the state, they followed different educational trajectories. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 14 
Networks of Change: Individual Strategies  
And the Westernization of the Elite 
The data presented in the previous sections show that the “Westernization” of 
the Russian nobility was not a uniform process; some families chose to buy into it, 
while others did not. What drove these choices? What is remarkable about the choices 
described in the previous chapters is that the top strata of the elite actively supported 
Westernization by enrolling their sons into the Cadet Corps and other schools, while 
the lower nobility equally actively avoided these institutions, preferring careers in the 
army that were less alien to their traditional models of life and service. One way to 
understand educational and career choices and preferences exercised by nobles is to 
consider them within a wider context of social capital (in this case, position within 
various types of networks and hierarchies) and cultural capital (in this case, specific 
types of skills, knowledge, and cultural experiences and exposures) accumulated in 
their families.  
*   *   * 
The Petrine revolution extracted a heavy toll on the subjects of the Empire, 
and the nobility was no exception. By the end of Peter’s reign the elite, as is well-
documented by historians, was exhausted by hardships associated with the mandated 
life-long service in a standing army permanently at war, and by the arbitrariness and 
ruthless enforcement of Petrine policies in general. Biographies of the cadets reflect 
this exhaustion. Significantly, a very large share of young nobles, including the 
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incoming students of the Cadet Corps, had fathers who were either dead, or already 
retired, that is, already very old or crippled. One result was that that they were not 
around to supervise the education of their sons and to pull strings to launch them on 
their careers. The starting positions of retirees’ sons were, probably, also significantly 
weakened. Cadets do mention the death of their fathers as the reason for going into 
the Corps, and indeed in 1737 out of 47 incoming cadets on whose fathers the data are 
available, 15 were orphans and 14 were sons of retirees. With the passage of time, a 
certain relaxation of rules of retirement under Anna made the life of nobles easier, and 
the situation improved. Still, in 1748, out of 98 incoming cadets 17 were the sons of 
retirees, although only 3 had already lost their fathers. In 1751, the numbers were 15 
and 2, respectively (out of 58 incoming cadets).514  
One consequence of the Petrine revolution was the sudden disruption of 
traditional patterns of promotion, enrichment, and, in general, transfer of family status 
from one generation to another. The data show a great deal of continuity between pre- 
and post-Petrine elite, yet on the individual level the transition appears anything but 
smooth and effortless. This is emphasized by the fact that the correlation between 
wealth and rank among the fathers of entering cadets was relatively low. In pre-
Petrine Russia the size of one’s land- and serf-holding more or less corresponded to 
one’s service status, as the state awarded estates to those promoted to higher ranks. 
Under Peter, however, this practice was discontinued, and indeed, the data on the 
cadets’ families shows that the most high-ranking among them were not necessarily 
the wealthiest ones, and the wealthiest did not necessarily hold the highest ranks. 
Specifically, we find among the cadets a significant number of those whose fathers 
belonged to the old noble families, but did not do all that well under Peter. Thus, 
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Aleksei and Nikolai Liapunov, who joined the Corps in 1736, came from a highly 
prominent non-titled provincial noble family with claims to a princely lineage. Their 
father owned 600 m.s., yet he was a mere NCO in the guards. Similarly, Ivan Neielov 
and Ivan Shenshin, sons of privates in the guards arriving at the Corps the same year 
as the Liapunov brothers, inherited from their fathers 230 m.s. and 500 m.s., 
respectively. Both the Neielovs and the Shenshins were ancient provincial noble 
clans. Moreover, one finds among the incoming cadets a number of young nobles 
whose fathers never gained any rank at all under the Petrine system and were listed 
with their pre-Petrine ranks. In 1736 alone one finds no less than 8 such youngsters: 
the fathers of Aleksei and Lev Shatilov (126 m.s.), Iakov and Tikhon Kvashnin-
Samarin (82 m.s.), Fillip and Iakov Eremeev (36 m.s.), Vasily Boltin (350 m.s.), and 
Nikolai Gnevashov (147 m.s.) all “served as nobleman” (v drorianakh), i.e., in the 
gentry militia.515 Some of them belonged to established provincial clans and while not 
rich, possessed estates that put them in the top strata of the Russian elite. Yet they 
found themselves outside of the new service hierarchy and faced very real prospects 
of losing their elite status, especially as their landholdings were to be split among the 
numerous heirs.  
Indeed, looking at the Corps’s rolls it is hard to find families that were secure 
in their elite status. Overall, by the end of the year 1732 there were no less than 
twenty-five princes of Riurik and Gedeminas lines at the Corps, including four 
Volkonskiis, four Golitsyns, and two Dolgorukovs, as well as two Cherkasskiis. Yet 
none of them really belonged to the very top strata of magnates and dignitaries. The 
Cherksasskii brothers, for example, were not directly related to Prince Alekse 
Cherkasskii of the Cabinet. Rather, the two cadets were the sons of General Prince 
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Aleksandr Bekovich-Cherkasskii, who was killed, together with his entire 
detachment, during the fateful expedition to the Central Asia in 1717.516 Four 
Khovanskii brothers, who were in theory the owners of 4800 m.s., complained in 
1755 that they had to stay in Moscow “since after the passing of our father, Prince 
Vasilii Petrovich Khovanskii, we, the aforementioned, together with our brothers have 
great debts which we cannot pay any time soon, and therefore, due to the lack of 
means, we were not able to leave [for the Cadet Corps].”517 Perhaps significantly, one 
does not find at the Corps any members of such clans as the Naryshkins, or the 
Empress’s own cousins, the Saltykovs.518 
   There were other scenarios that imply the link between the desire of a young 
noble to study at the Corps and the insecure position of his family. These scenarios 
were not necessarily a product of an overall social and cultural shifts. It is significant, 
perhaps, that both Ivan Davydov and his cousin, Aleksei Melgunov, were sent to the 
Corps in 1737, exactly the same year in which their uncle and father, respectively, 
Petr Melgunov was dismissed from his job at the Kamer-kollegiia in connection with 
a politically motivated case of Prince D.M. Golitsyn.519 Ivan Pozniakov asked to be 
                                                     
516 A.N. Popov, Snoshenia russkikh s Khivoiu i Bukharoyu pri Petre Velikom (St. Petersburg, 
1853). 
 
517 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2197,  l. 106. 
 
518 Empress Anna's father, Peter I’s half-brother and co-ruler Tsar Ivan was married to a 
Saltykov, and the Empress recognized them as her immediate family; Peter I’s mother was a 
Naryshkin. Characteristically, the Skavronskiis, the Gendrikovs, and the Efimovskiis, enrolled by Anna 
into the Corps in 1731-1732, although formally royal in-laws, were in fact of very low origin and did 
not have firm connections among St.Petersburg and Moscow aristocracy. Upon the death of their aunt, 
Catherine I, their only link with the royal family was Tsarevna Elizabeth (future Elizabeth I), who was 
not only of questionable legitimacy (born before her parents’ marriage), but also somewhat of Empress 
Anna’s rival for the throne. The young parvenus’ position at the court was, therefore, more than 
precarious in the 1730s, and enrolling them into the Corps might have meant an attempt to get them out 
of the Empress’ sight as well as to remove them from the influence of their family. Vasilii Lopukhin, 
another royal in-law at the Corps, was a nephew of Peter’s first, disgraced wife, Evdokia Lopukhin.  
 
519 RGADA, f. 286, op.1, d. 178; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 1729, 1753. Prince D.M. Golitsyn 
of the Supreme Privy Council was, accused, among other things, of improperly promoting his relative, 
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admitted into the Corps since his parents were under arrest and “falsely accused.” 
Ivan claimed to have had no other relatives and to be “under no supervision.”520   
The Corps also attracted cadets with a “non-traditional,” i.e., non-noble 
background, whose families achieved significant upward mobility under Peter and 
now wanted to solidify their membership in the elite. The father of Petr Molchin, for 
example, had been an elected member of a merchant-run self-governance body that 
was set up by Peter, but subsequently disbanded (the so-called Glavnyi magistrat). 
Having become members of the elite thanks to their achievements in unconventional 
fields, they wanted to launch their sons on “normal” noble careers as officers. The 
same is probably true of the court servants of noble origin who sent their sons to the 
Corps. Among them we find Ivan Levanov (son of the Empresses’ valet, or 
kamerdiner), Ivan Golokhvastov (son of gof-iunker), Ivan Isakov (son of a 
stremiannoi konyukh), Aleksei Koloshin (son of a kelermeister), and others. Although 
nobles by birth, these court servants normally did not have any serfs. Yet they were 
better able to appreciate the importance of acquiring the necessary social skills and 
eager to use their access to court patronage to place their sons at the Corps. Often 
these boys were admitted to the Corps outside of the normal procedure, by a special 
decree.521  
Characteristically, Domenico Trezzini, the famous Petrine architect, also sent 
his son to the Corps, as did a number of prominent medical doctors. Cadet Osip 
                                                                                                                                                        
an official of the Kamer-kollegiia. Petr Melgunov, though dismissed from the Kamer-kollegiia, 
eventually got another appointment. Troitskii, Russkii absol’utizm, 134. 
 
520 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2523, l. 42. 
 
521 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 2130, 2845; RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178. 
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Trezzini was representative of that category of foreigners in Russian service whose 
status was still somewhat undefined, although their ranks made them members of the 
nobility. Some of them were recent arrivals, others came from the families that 
immigrated to Russia back in the seventeenth century and were well Russified (as 
highlighted by their use of the patronymic – see “Petr Petrovich Meller,” for 
example). Although often qualified as “foreigners,” they were clearly separate from 
the Baltic nobles with their corporate institutions, and unlike the Baltic nobles, they 
opted for integration into the Russian elite. In 1755, for example, we find five such 
cadets: Zakhar von Litskin (son of a deceased major-general), Sebastian Tsimmerman 
(son of the Corps’ riding teacher), Karl Vare (son of deceased regimental doctor), 
Ludolf August de Briegere (son of a deceased lieutenant-colonel), and Christian von 
Likhnovskii (son of a captain). Many of them were originally of doubtful nobility, 
none of them had any land – and only one of them (von Litskin) knew his father’s 
native language (German). All of them, however, knew arithmetic, and Vare also 
knew history and geography.522 Such cadets as Karl Peter DeBodan (son of major-
general in artillery and former teacher at the Corps), Gotlib von Zaltsa (son of Stats-
kontora vice-president), Fedor Emme (son of Actual State Councilor, vice-president 
of the College of Justice and chief judicial officer of the Guards), Ignaty Teils (son of 
a “chief doctor”) appear to be members of a quintessential Imperial elite, having no 
homeland except for the Empire’s chancelleries, and no wealth except for their ranks, 
expertise, and connections. 
*  *  * 
Thus, the choices made by young nobles entering the Corps can be seen as 
elements of a strategy to overcome vulnerabilities by using the resources at their 
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disposal. Even small things counted, such as, for example, having a brother or a 
relative at a particular school. Major Mikhail Danilov notes in his memoirs that he 
was enrolled in the Artillery School in Moscow by his elder brother; when transferred 
to St.Petersburg, his brother arranged to take Mikhail along.523 For incoming cadets it 
was also quite common to have a brother, a cousin, or some other relative at the 
Corps: quite often entire clans, it seems, sent their young generation to study at the 
same school in the same year.524 For example, Ivan Pisarev coming to the Corps in 
1733 (son of a major in the dragoons, 120 m.s.) was related to the Efimovskii 
brothers. Petr Krenitsyn coming to the Corps in 1734 (son of a kamerir, a financial 
clerk at a governmental bureau, equivalent of lieutenant) was a cousin of two other 
cadets, Fedosei Baikov and Rodion Gor’ainov, etc.525  
It was helpful, of course, if the father resided or served in St.Petersburg, as 
was the case with Rodion Gor’ainov or Ivan Koptev. That, obviously, gave additional 
opportunities to the sons of various officials serving in the government bureaus. The 
father of Ivan Chirikov was a relatively humble secretary, and had no serfs. Yet he 
was willing to send his son to the Corps at his own expense: young Chirikov lived in 
the capital anyway, so enrolling him into the Corps would have incurred only limited 
additional cost.526 At the very least, if a family resided in one of the capitals, it solved 
                                                     
523 Danilov, "Zapiski,” 309-310. 
 
524 Note the terribly localized character of the Russian nobility. For example, in 1750 only 10 
out of 39 incoming cadets had estates that were located in more than one district, none had estates that 
span two or three districts, and only one cadet’s father had villages in four districts. The same is true 
for other years as well: in 1736/37, 30 cadets out of 51 on whom the data is available, had their estates 
in one or few adjacent districts; in 1745 it was the case with 33 out of 37, in 1755 – 23 out of 33. 
Whether this local character of the nobility contributed to emergence of some regional identities it a 
difficult question that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 2197, 3198.  
 
525 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 1678, 1712. 
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the problem of having to travel for a review at the Heraldry, which was also 
expensive.527 
If a father resided or served elsewhere, it seems to have been quite difficult for 
him to accompany his son to St.Petersburg. Meanwhile, bureaucratic procedures took 
time: normally, at least a few months elapsed between one’s registration at the 
Heraldry and his final acceptance into the Corps. So it was really important for a 
provincial family to have a senior relative, or a patron, in the capital, one who could 
supervise the boy, help him find his way in the chancelleries, guide him through the 
process of entering the Corps, and quite simply, provide him with lodging. It was 
especially helpful, of course, if that relative or patron was a person of some stature: 
not necessarily a dignitary, but at least a man of a respectable rank and some 
connections. For example, the father of Petr and Mikhail Iazykov, Major Fedor 
Iazykov of the Tambov Dragoons, was stationed on the fortified line in the southern 
steppe. The Iazykovs’ estates were also located far from the capital - in the Murom 
district to the east of Moscow, and in the Arzamas and Alatyr districts on the middle 
Volga, still a frontier. Their male relatives were either retired or stationed with various 
regiments all over the Empire. Luckily, the boys could be entrusted to a family friend, 
a colonel who was an official with the palace stables.528  
                                                     
527 It is, unfortunately, impossible to tell to what degree distance from the capital was a factor 
in nobles’ choice of a career. In their applications the young nobles reported the districts and provinces 
where their fathers had estates, not where they actually resided. The state, as I have mentioned, 
recognized that an obligation to travel to the capital might be excessively burdensome for poorer 
nobles. However, judging by the data, reported by the cadets, it seems that in spite of the year-to-year 
variations, the cadets were coming to the Corps from all the regions of the European Russia, the central 
provinces around Moscow usually supplying a slightly larger share of applicants. In 1750, for example, 
out of thirty nine cadets twelve had estates from the central region around Moscow, ten – in the North-
West (Novgorod and adjacent districts), five - in the “middle North,” nine – in the Black Earth Region. 
RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2259. Cf. Raeff, The Origins, 45-47. 
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That was the case not only with the aspiring cadets, but pretty much all 
younger nobles entering the service. A certain Petr Neledinskii, for example, had two 
brothers, one of whom, Iakov, was a captain in the landmilitsiia in the Ukraine and 
another, Osip, a private in a so-called “Senate Company” in St.Petersburg: young Petr 
went to serve in the Senate Company. Likewise, it appears that the majority of 
youngsters aspiring to be guardsmen had some relatives or friends in their future 
regiments. Iater years these friends or relatives, among other things, testified to the 
noble birth of the young servicemen.529 This example also emphasizes that it would be 
wrong to suggest that poorer nobles did not enroll into the Corps because they could 
not afford to travel to the capitals: for in these cases young nobles were already in the 
capital, yet they demonstrated no interest in the Corps as a possible career, opting 
instead for regiments where they had friend or relatives, even if they were mere NCOs 
or privates. 
The best option, though, was to have a patron. When the subject of patrons and 
patronage in the eighteenth-century Russia comes up one normally thinks about the 
great magnates, court favorites who procured for their followers great estates and high 
ranks.530 Yet, in fact, the practice of patronage was widespread among the lower and 
middle nobility as well. It was not unusual for poorer nobles at that period to send 
their children to the houses of wealthier relatives, even quite distant ones, where they 
would be educated together with the patrons’ own children. Among the first 24 cadets 
who signed up between August 9 and November 19, 1731, no less than five boys, all 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
529 RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 305, ll. 272-272 ob, 406 ob. 
 
530 On patronage in the eighteenth-century Russia see: Geoffrey Hosking, "Patronage and the 
Russian State," Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 2 (April 2000): 301-320; David L. Ransell, 
"Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia," in Klientelsysteme im Europa der Fruhen 
Neuzeit, edited by Antoni Maczak and Elizabeth Mueler-Leuckner (Munich, 1988): 214-224. See also 
Kivelson, “Kinship Politics/Autocratic Politics.”  
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of them orphans, lived at the houses of patrons. Ivan Karaulov (son of lieutenant-
colonel, 158 m.s.) lived at the house of Ivan Annenkov, member of the board of the 
Stables Office (Koniushennyi prikaz). Ivan von Meisner (son of a major, no serfs) 
resided at the house of Lieutenant-General Prince Ivan Bariatinskii.  
*   *   * 
Patronage and connections were important not only because they provided 
physical access to various types of careers: they were also instrumental in shaping 
decisions to attend a school by giving access to teachers and to an environment, in 
which learning and social skills were appreciated for their own worth and  also as a 
stepping stone to a career. A great magnate might allow his client to live in his house 
and to study together with his sons. A mid-level officer might be an advisor, a role 
model, a teacher. Ivan Polev, for example, had lost his father, a major, and had no 
serfs, yet Ivan boasted of knowing German. That, most likely, is explicable by the fact 
that he lived at the house of Prince I.Iu. Trubestskoi. The late father of Nikolai 
Choglokov was a lieutenant-colonel and left his son only 70 m.s. Yet his son was 
literate and knew German: he lived at the house of General Gezenius’ widow. Karl-
Ulrich Sternshants (son of general-major) lived at the house of Privy Councilor 
Aleksei Makarov, Peter’s trusted secretary, in 1731 – president of Kamer-kollegia; 
besides German, young Sternshants knew also some French. Both Nikolai Choglokov 
and Karl-Ulrich Sternshants joined the Corps in the same year with the sons of their 
benefactors - with Petr Gazenius and Petr Makarov.531 Coming to the Corps a few 
years later, Ivan Davydov knew both French and German, thanks to the fact that he 
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lived at the house of his uncle, Colonel Petr Melgunov, a high-ranking civil official, a 
prokuror at the Kamer-kollegiia, a fiscal authority, and studied with his children.532  
Patronage and other social networks were especially important since, as the 
records of young nobles show, there were very few opportunities to buy education in 
the period under review. The magnates had a chance to teach their children at home, 
and that probably explains the fact that so few of them went to the Corps. Yet, as a 
rule, even the wealthiest among the incoming cadets did not complete the state-
prescribed course of home study. In fact, the few cadets who came to the Corps in the 
1730s-1740s with some knowledge of really advanced subjects, like fortification, 
history, or geography, usually acquired it at the Gymnasium of the Academy of 
Sciences or at other state schools. Such was the case with the Pavlov brothers, who 
came to the Corps from the Gymnasium in 1736, or with Mikhail Shcherbachev, who 
learned “geometry and parts of artillery” at the Moscow Artillery School before 
transferring to the Corps in 1739. In later years the newly founded Moscow 
University played the same role for Mikhail Burtsov (1758, 100 m.s.), Ivan Kolychev 
(1760, 200 m.s.), Aleksandr Iakushkin and Petr Khvoshchinskii (1763, 150 and 200 
m.s.).533 All of them were relatively well-to-do, yet their superior education was 
obtained at state schools, not at home. 
Educational opportunities and educational preferences were thus shaped to a 
large extent by one’s service and social connections: these provided both the means to 
acquire education, and the incentives to do so by enabling fathers to appreciate the 
importance of skills in question. It is hardly by chance that the two Shishkin brothers 
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applying to the Engineering School in 1745 stayed at the house of I.A. Bibikov, a 
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineers.534 Fedor Smolianinov also went to the 
Engineering School in 1745. At the Heraldry he reported that his father, though a 
supervisor of the fisheries in Astrakhan, was a retired major. The fact that he was the 
son of a mid-ranking military officer gave Fedor access to army engineers at the local 
garrison. So he was able to learn “arithmetic with appropriate parts of geometry, and 
also enough of fortification,” and to present a certificate to that effect “personally 
signed by engineering officers of field and company grade.”535 Similarly, Sergey 
Nakovalnin was able to present at the Heraldry a letter certifying his expertise in 
geometry and signed by two army engineers, a lieutenant-colonel and a second 
lieutenant, because his father was a colonel and a commanding officer of the Nezhin 
garrison in the Ukraine. Upon examination at the Corps Nakovalnin’s expertise in 
geometry was found to have been exaggerated, to put it mildly, by his father’s 
obliging colleagues.536 The sons of Russian officers posted in the Baltic provinces 
tended to pick up some German. In 1732 three incoming cadets whose father’s 
regiments were stationed in Estland (Molchanov, Shatilov, Travin) all knew some 
German. In 1749 it was the case with Petr Chelishchev (his father was posted in 
Narva).537 One might notice that the educational and intellectual outlook of a leading 
eighteenth-century memoirist, Andrei Bolotov, was absolutely crucially shaped by his 
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535 Yet he went on to graduate successfully, to become a teacher at the Corps, to translate a 
geometry textbook and to edit the first collected works of Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich. RGADA, f. 
286, op. 1, d. 305, ll.324. Gavriil Derzhavin describes in his memoirs how in the early 1750s his father 
had a land surveyor under his command, from whom the future poet “got an interest for the engineering 
science.” 
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stay first, as a boy, with his father’s regiment in Estland, and later, as a young officer, 
in occupied Konigsberg.538 
Knowledge of foreign languages, however, was not limited only to the 
wealthiest nobles. On the contrary, one finds a large group of cadets who seem to 
have “inherited” the ability to speak foreign languages. These were the children of 
civil servants or technical specialists for whom knowledge of foreign language was 
directly related to their professional duties. As a consequence, they were better able to 
appreciate the importance of that particular skill, and either taught their children 
themselves or had access to somebody who could teach them. For example, Aleksei 
Sukmanov’s father was a secretary at the Recruiting (Rekrutskoi) chancellery (100 
m.s.), Petr Bakunin’s – at the College of Foreign Affairs (no serfs), Mikhail 
Tikhomirov’s – assistant shipwright (15 m.s.), Iakov Nasonov’s – a captain assigned 
to the department in charge of building and maintenance of the Imperial palaces (30 
m.s.). A similar case is Ivan Levanov (5 serf menservants, no land). His father, though 
a nobleman, was a valet at the Imperial palace: while this hardly gave him a claim to 
technical expertise, access to the Court gave important opportunities both for 
appreciating the importance of languages and for learning them.  
The sons of the low- and middle-ranking civil servants at the government 
bureaus were especially likely to possess some advanced learning. Their fathers were 
better able to appreciate its importance due to their own experience in the service. 
Timofei Klishin, a clerk at the College of Foreign Affairs, actually paid from his own 
pocket to teach his son not only French and German, but also Latin (though not 
                                                     
538 Bolotov, Zapiski, Vol.I, 25-39, 380-389. 
 
266 
 
geometry).539 Characteristically, Petr and Ivan Surmin, sons of a mid-ranking 
(titularnyi sovetnik, equivalent of a captain) and poor (40 m.s.) civil servant already 
studied some German, French, and Latin by the age of eleven. Nikolai Titov, who 
entered the Corps the same year, was son of a wealthy, but low-ranking military 
officer. Although he was already fifteen, he mastered nothing more than basic 
literacy. Similarly, Aleksey Kozhin, son of a NCO with 1150 m.s. was barely literate, 
while Ivan Rogachev was studying arithmetic, German, and French. Rogachev’s 
father had no serfs, yet he was a secretary at the Senate.540  
*  *  * 
 Not surprisingly, at the end, educational choices and preferences of a noble 
family took form within the framework of its social connections, both immediate, like 
the father’s position and pervious experiences, and more distant, like its network of 
relatives and patrons.  
Here is how Ivan Kuz’min described the circumstances that brought him to the 
Cadet Corps:  
In the year 1733, following the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel von Shtenhof, 
who supported my father out of gratitude for saving his life during the 
Swedish war, my father decided it would be good to launch me on my studies, 
and thus, being thirteen year old, I left my family and went to St.Petersburg 
with the said Lieutenant-Colonel von Stenhof. 
In the capital Kuz’min’s benefactor bought him “dress and all other 
necessities” and guided him through the enrollment procedures. It probably helped 
that in the late 1720s von Stenhof had served directly under Field Marshal von 
                                                     
539 RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2197, ll. 191-192. 
 
540 RGVIA f. 314, op. 1, d. 2197; d. 1632, ll. 134, 196. 
 
267 
 
Münnich at the construction of the Ladoga Canal. Until Kuz’min was accepted, he 
lived at the house of von Stenhof, who meanwhile taught his charge “some German.” 
In 1734 Kuz’min’s father was killed in action in Poland, so von Stenhof, in Kuz’min’s 
words, “looked after me and trained me in fortification, gave me books to read, and 
afterward examined me.”541 
Alternatively, the choices could be shaped by small, nearly imperceptible 
factors.  Ivan Kharlamov was fifteen years old in 1733, and he was already enlisted in 
the Ingermanlandskii Infantry Regiment as a private where his brother and namesake, 
Ivan Kharlamov, was a corporal. Yet he applied to be transferred to the Corps. During 
the wars of Peter I, their father, Andrei Kharlamov, served in the gentry militia 
squadrons (vybornye roty) under the old Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev, and was 
later retired to the civil service; he had estates in the Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda 
districts, although the young Ivan did not even remember exactly how many serfs 
their father had. One of the boy’s uncles was in the navy, another served in the capital 
(as an ensign in the St.Petersburg Garrison Regiment). Importantly, Ivan’s cousin, 
Egor Golovtsyn, was already a cadet in the Corps. Even more importantly, Ivan’s 
elder brother Grigory, to whose supervision he was entrusted the capital, was an NCO 
in the Corps of Engineers. Taken together, these circumstances could probably 
account both for his decision to go into the Corps, and for the fact that he knew a 
“little arithmetic,” in addition to grammar.542  
The final case-study is focused on Nikolai Radishchev who was slightly over 
fourteen years old when he came to St.Petersburg in 1733 to seek a place at the 
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recently established Noble Cadet Corps. Things went smoothly for him. Until a place 
at the Corps was obtained, Nikolai stayed in the capital with his well-to-do relative, a 
retired Captain Grigorii Abliazov, who had a house on the Vasilievskii Island, 4th 
Line. Abliazov helped his young charge to find his way around the capital’s bureaus 
and offices. Nikolai signed up for the Corps at the office of Field-Marshal von 
Münnich, and his candidacy was duly confirmed by the Senate. Finally, the Heraldry 
Department forwarded his papers to the Corps, where he joined his only sibling, 
Mikhail, as well as their cousins Petr Shepelev and Vasilii Radishchev.543 
Nikolai Radishchev did not leave any records indicating why and how the 
decision was made to send him (and his brother) to the Noble Cadet Corps. Based on 
what Nikolai Radishchev reported to officials at the Heraldry, one could conclude that 
he came from a family highly typical of that stratum of the nobility that supplied the 
Corps with the students. His was a family of very good standing, though not quite 
aristocratic: both of his grandfathers, Vasilii Radishchev and Grigorii Iakushkin, had 
the rank of stol’nik, that is, belonged to the upper-middle stratum of the old elite. 
About his great-grandfather Nikolai could not report anything besides his name, 
Konstantin; such a low level of genealogical awareness, however, was fairly typical 
for the cadets joining the Corps in the 1730s (although that would change in later 
decades). Nikolai’s father, Avdei Radishchev, ended his service as a prokuror in 
Smolensk and had 270 m.s. in the Maloiaroslavl and Viazma districts in Moscow 
province. Nikolai did not have any uncles, although he mentioned that one of his 
father’s cousins, Afanasii Radishchev, was a retired colonel and a customs supervisor 
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A.N.Radishchev. Materialy i issledovaniia (Moscow, 1935), 301-331. 
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in the Ukraine, and another, Gleb Radishchev, a governor in Klin in Moscow 
province. In short, here is an old and established family that survived the Petrine 
revolution quite well, but it probably could be said to have lost some social standing. 
On a relative scale, the office of Smolensk prokuror in the new Russia was way below 
the rank of stolnik in the pre-Petrine world. 
The details not mentioned by young Nikolai Radishchev at the Heraldry give 
the family story an additional twist. The family was not quite that old: Nikolai’s great-
grandfather Konstantin in the late seventeenth century was, in fact, the first 
Radishchev to serve in Moscow (“on the Moscow list”). Afanasii and Gleb 
Radishchev, the cousins of Nikolai’s father, were not his only kinsmen: his relatives 
in general were fairly well entrenched in mid-level administrative positions. Abram 
Radishchev was a major in Smolensk garrison in 1726, Tit Radishchev was a 
kommisar  in Riga province in 1716, and in 1728 Terentii Radishchev was appointed 
governor (voevoda) of a tiny Borovsk in the Moscow province.  
Yet Nikolai evoked the names of only two of his relatives, and both of them 
cut quite interesting figures. One of them, Gleb Radishchev, entered the service before 
the Petrine reforms as a zhilets; he travelled to Europe with the Great Embassy of 
1697 and was known to have even brought back a foreign valet. At the end of the 
Northern War he was a regimental quartermaster, and in the early 1730s he 
transferred to the civil service. In 1730, during the accession crisis, he was one of the 
signatories of the so-called “proposal of 364.”  
Another uncle, Afanasy Radishchev was even more noteworthy. He started his 
service as a private (although his grandchildren later claimed that he had the honor of 
being one of Peter the Great’s valets) in the very beginning of the century, and moved 
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up the ranks, switching back and forth between the infantry and the dragoons, fighting 
in the Baltic provinces, Poland, Germany, Ukraine, and on the Caspian. In 1716 he 
was under criminal investigation for pillaging. In 1726 he, a lieutenant-colonel, joined 
the Cavalier Guards, and in this capacity witnessed the crisis of 1730, also signing one 
of the petitions. After the crisis, Afanasii was ordered to retire from the military and 
was sent to the Ukraine as a member of the High Court there. His sons, Nikolai’s 
second cousins, studied “Latin, French, German, and Polish, and knew some theology 
and history”; Aleksandr Radishchev, the famous late eighteenth-century radical 
author, was his grandson.  
In this context the decision to send young Nikolai Radishchev and his brother 
Mikhail to the Cadet Corps makes a lot of sense. Their father was wealthy enough to 
give his boys some basic home education, but nothing fancy. At the same time, each 
of them could hope to inherit only about a hundred male serfs. Nikolai’s father and his 
cousins were well-positioned provincial bureaucrats, but they were not prominent 
enough to guarantee good starting positions for the next generation of the family. Two 
of Nikolai’s closest relatives had some degree of exposure to the West, and Afanasii 
Radishchev appreciated the value of education enough to use to the fullest the 
opportunities for educating his sons that were available in the Ukraine. These 
opportunities, however, became accessible for him thanks to his service assignment 
only. Also, both of these uncles were evidently conscious enough of their place in 
society to take an active position in the 1730 crisis. Finally, sending the sons to the 
Cadets Corps was becoming an accepted pattern in the Radishchevs’ clan, and there 
was a relative in the capital who could somewhat facilitate the process of enrollment. 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no single formula to explain how the various 
factors interplayed in shaping family choices. Indeed, it would have been excessively 
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reductionist to assume that such a formula is possible, and a certain feature of family 
background – a certain rank, a certain number of serfs, certain education received by 
the father – could ever “determine” one’s choice. On the contrary, the decisions were 
made by individual families in individual circumstances. These decisions were, it 
appears, not ideologically driven – i.e. they did not necessarily require any specific 
“worldview” or mentality, much less “class consciousness.” Nor should they be 
interpreted as an explicit or implicit statement regarding the abstract value of Western 
education and/or Petrine project: the nobles remained adamantly mute on the subject. 
What I am trying to demonstrate here is that Westernization project was driven, in 
fact, by nobles who were not necessarily terribly Westernized themselves; who lived 
within very traditional networks of clan and service connections; and who acted out of 
very pragmatic concerns and in response to very mundane incentives. Yet, taken 
together, their collective choices carried the Petrine project forward and turned the 
“Western” education that Peter so desperately tried to force upon them into valuable 
cultural capital. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The data in these chapters demonstrate that the post-Petrine nobles, 
surprisingly, had significant control over their lives and careers. They were not free, 
in the sense that they could not completely disregard the service and educational rules 
set by the government. At the same time, for reasons discussed in Part II, the 
government in the 1730s really did abandon the Petrine policy of forced 
Westernization, and focused its efforts on those who were willing to participate in the 
project. Moreover, thanks to the imprecise and uncertain nature of these rules and 
regulations, and to their weak enforcement, the nobles might have been able to use 
various strategies to navigate the routine of these rules. In many cases these rules were 
not so much bent by the nobles as disregarded by “the state” itself, because enforcing 
them literally would have been highly impractical. Taken together these factors gave 
the post-Petrine nobles ample space to exercise their career and educational 
preferences. That, however, does not mean that “the state” was weak, or that there 
was room for “negotiation.” Rather, the government for the most part did not care, for 
when it did (for example, when there was a particular need, like supplying the Naval 
Academy with the necessary number of students), it was perfectly capable of cruel 
and arbitrary decisiveness. Facing these unpredictable outbursts of government 
activism, the nobles were especially and emphatically unfree. 
The nobles did use the opportunities and made meaningful choices. For the 
vast majority of them, it turns out, “Western” education remained alien even in the 
1740s-1750s. Not only were they not interested in educational opportunities as a 
vehicle of upward mobility, but on the contrary, nobles made efforts to avoid it. The 
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government did not set any limits to the admission of poorer nobles; in practice these 
nobles themselves believed that the Corps was not intended for them. “I do not have a 
wish to study at that Corps, for I do not have any peasants registered in my name” –
Ivan Grekov wrote in 1732 in an, admittedly uniquely bland petition, asking to be 
transferred instead to the Novoladozhskii Infantry Regiment.544  
In a period of big cultural shift, such as the one Russia was going through in 
the early eighteenth century, institutionalized opportunities to acquire the new cultural 
norms were few, while the very nature of these norms (and also the benefits they 
could potentially bring) was uncertain. Of course, it also means that for those who 
happened to possess the necessary skills, prescribed by the new cultural paradigm, the 
premium could be especially large. On a practical level that means that the nobles 
were acting within the framework of constraints and opportunities shaped by 
resources available to a particular family. The question was whether the family was 
able to appreciate the importance of study for the son’s future career, which in itself 
was an important resource; whether it had access to educated nobles and to examples 
of Westernized everyday life; whether the father was able to choose the subjects of 
study and the teachers competently, or, perhaps, to teach himself; whether it was 
aware of educational opportunities existing in the Empire and be able to navigate 
bureaucratic channels so as to utilize these opportunities. To put it differently, I argue 
that the educational and career choices and preferences exercised by the nobles are 
best understood if considered within a wider context of social capital (in this case, 
various types of networks) and cultural capital (in this case, specific types of skills, 
knowledge, and cultural experiences and exposures) accumulated in their families. 
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A number of recent works emphasize the importance of informal networks, be 
they clan and kinship, patronage, or blat in early modern (as well as modern and post-
Soviet) Russian politics and political culture. Most of these authors, however, 
conceptualize these networks in terms of power structure – as an alternative to the 
Weberian vision of the abstract bureaucratic state, they present a picture of the state 
based on personalized relationships and informal power hierarchies. These 
relationships and hierarchies are viewed as elements of the “old,” traditional political 
culture. In most cases, the argument is also driven by the desire to prove that the state 
was not as totalitarian as the historians of the older school would have us believe. I, 
however, propose to approach these networks from a different angle. Rather than 
focusing on the power relations, I attempt to present these networks as the sum total 
of resources and opportunities subtly guiding individual choices. In a way, then, I 
view them as a constructive force and as a mechanism of change. I would argue that 
these choices, shaped by individual resources and opportunities, drove the 
“Westernization” of Russia in the mid-eighteenth century, and constituted the process 
through which the elite reconfigured and reinvented itself and the country. 
 
 
 
 
Epilogue: 
Politics of Education in the Reign of Elizabeth 
This dissertation focuses on the campaign to create a “true nobility” through 
education, initiated by the government of Empress Anna in the 1730s. In the relevant 
chapters, I argue that the establishment of the Cadet Corps was a result of determined 
efforts by Field-Marshall von Münnich, a leading minister of Anna’s reign, and as 
such should be analyzed within the broader context of views on governing and human 
nature shared by him and some of the other top dignitaries, Count Ostermann in 
particular. In 1741, however, Anna’s successor, the infant emperor Ivan VI and the 
government of his mother, Princess Regent Anna, were overthrown. Tsarevna 
Elizabeth became the empress, and both von Münnich and Ostermann found 
themselves dispatched to Siberia for assisting the alleged “usurpation” of the throne 
by Ivan VI. What was the fate, then, of von Münnich’s disciplinarian project after his 
downfall?  As an epilogue, I briefly outline in this concluding chapter the trajectory of 
educational policy-making in the 1740s-1750s. The goal of this chapter is identify the 
factors that determined this trajectory, once the two influential ministers, who shaped 
it during Anna’s reign, were removed from the picture.  
Broadly speaking, despite the misfortune that befell its founder, the Cadet 
Corps continued to function along the same lines. Actually, von Münnich resigned all 
his offices on March 3, 1741, well before the coup that brought Elizabeth to the 
throne. Three weeks later Prince Anton-Ulrich Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel-Bevern, the 
father of the infant emperor, assumed the position of the Corps’ high commander. 
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After the coup of November 25, 1741, he in turn was replaced by Prince von Hessen-
Homburg, von Münnich’s old rival. Friedrich von Tettau, director of the Corps, also 
lost his position a week after the coup. Otherwise, however, no officers or professors 
seem to have been purged. In fact, from January 1742 to December 1756 the Corps 
was run by the acting director, Lieutenant-Colonel von Zigheim, one of von 
Münnich’s appointees.545 
Both Prince von Hessen-Homburg (high commander from December 1741 to 
March 1745) and his replacement, Prince V.N. Repnin (high commander from August 
1745 to August 1748; the father of Prince N.V. Repnin, of the “Panin party”) did not 
make much impact on the Corps.546 Despite his rivalry with von Münnich, von 
Hessen-Homburg in particular seems to have shared the same basic approach to 
education. He initiated a program for training a group of young nobles at the Corps 
for civil service, emphasizing the need to select them on the basis of their 
“inclination” for such a career. At the same time, he is described by V.N. Stroev, the 
author of the early twentieth-century institutional history of the Artillery school, as 
especially prone to ruthlessly practice the “sorting out” of cadets and dispatching the 
academically unsuccessful to the army.547 Finally, from February 1750 to February 
1759 the office of high commander of the Corps was occupied by Prince B.G. 
Iusupov. On the one hand, Iusupov was a graduate of the Toulon garde de marine 
school, and thus completely “bought into” the educational ideas and practices 
introduced in the 1730s. On the other, he was another advocate of strengthening the 
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nobility as a way of strengthening the state, penning a project to this effect sometime 
during that decade.548 
Overall, Empress Elizabeth appears not to have taken much interest in the 
affairs of the Corps. She was very much aware of its existence, of course, and plays 
written and performed by its graduates became a usual feature of court life. At the 
same time, Elizabeth displayed no interest whatsoever in reforming, improving, or 
adjusting either the design of the Corps, or its management. While in the 1730s one or 
more imperial decrees regarding the Corps were issued almost every year, Elizabeth 
did not issue any at all throughout the two decades of her reign. When appointing 
Prince Iusupov the high commander of the Corps, the only instruction she could give 
him was “Act in everything according to the existing arrangements.” And yet, despite 
her indifference towards the Corps, the model was multiplying during her reign: in the 
1750s the Naval Academy and the artillery and engineering schools were reorganized 
as a Naval Cadet Corps and Artillery Cadets Corps, respectively.  
It makes sense, therefore, to focus briefly on these two cases. The first to be 
reorganized into a Cadet Corps was the Naval Academy.549 The old Academy was 
focused on practical training in navigation. In the 1750s, however, the newly-
established Naval Cadet Corps, according to its charter, was to have, besides the 
teachers of navigation, mathematics, etc., two instructors to teach “geography, 
genealogy, … rhetoric, politics … morals, heraldry, and other noble sciences [i 
prochikh shliakhetskikh nauk].” On top of that, there were to be teachers of drawing, 
fencing, and dancing. Previously, as mentioned in earlier chapters, the Naval 
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Academy had to share its premises (which were unsatisfactory in any case) with other 
naval departments. Now, finally, it got its own separate, sufficiently spacious 
compound (ironically, it was the mansion built originally by Ostermann, sold by him 
to von Münnich, and confiscated from the latter in 1741). The new Corps also had an 
in-house church and a hospital.550  
Absent a more detailed study, it is hard to establish with certainty whether the 
naval officers appreciated the disciplinary implications of the model they were 
following. Thus, the materials in the existing institutional history of the Naval 
Academy give us grounds to suspect that housing the Naval Corps in a single 
compound, for example, was conceptualized by them more as a matter of improving 
the accommodations, and not necessarily as a way of creating a disciplinary 
environment. The proposal, presented by the navy to the Senate, referred to the 
desirability of housing all the students and teachers in a single building. Yet, when 
such a building was actually obtained, many officers and even some of the cadets 
continued to be housed elsewhere. 
What we know, however, is that the reform itself was a result of persistent 
lobbying by the naval authorities, who resented the preferential treatment given their 
army colleagues. This lobbying began already in the late 1730s. In December 1740 a 
proposal for constructing a new building for the Naval Academy presented by the 
Admiralty College was rejected by the Senate, which ordered it to prepare a new 
design. (The Admiralty was now headed by Ostermann himself, who in his 1740 
memo to Princess Regent Anna mentioned that he had earlier begun composing a 
project for a “new arrangement” of the Naval Academy.) A new plan was presented in 
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October 1741, but the Senate again decided to “postpone this construction until 
further consideration.” Most importantly, however, by the early 1750s the navy 
adopted in its lobbying efforts the language of “encouragement.” According to the 
Admiralty, the naval students were “left without encouragement [bezkurazhny 
ostaiutsia] when they observe their peers at the Cadet Corps, who are employed in 
much easier studies, and yet are maintained to their complete satisfaction.” Likewise, 
the abolition of gardemariny as an intermediary service category between the 
graduation from the Corps and active service was explained by the fear of 
“discouraging” young sailors by postponing their commissioning. 551 The significance 
of this case is twofold. First, the Corps as a model and the rhetoric of 
“encouragement” are employed here within the context of bureaucratic lobbying 
(lobbying is done via reference to them). Second, it is this lobbying that contributed to 
advancement and entrenchment of the model and the rhetoric, while the sovereign was 
largely neutral in the matter.  
The story of the establishment of the Artillery Cadet Corps is different in that 
it had a powerful and committed patron pushing the project forward. They are broadly 
similar, however, in that the idea became a vehicle for political lobbing, but by using 
it for lobbying the politics helped to perpetuate and reproduce the idea. Creation of 
this institution was driven largely by the political concerns of its author, Count P.I. 
Shuvalov (1710-1762).552 A member of Elizabeth’s entourage from her youth and a 
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cousin of I.I. Shuvalov, her last favorite, P.I. Shuvalov became in the 1750s the 
leading minister of the realm and authored numerous projects on diverse subjects, 
mostly having to do with economic improvement (on banking, on tariff, on forestry, 
on runaway serfs, on “preserving the population,” etc.) . Shuvalov did not receive 
particularly notable education; or rather, we do not know much about his education 
and reading.  
We do know, however, that he, not unexpectedly, believed the nobility to be the 
“main member of the state,” and that strengthening its positions and improving the 
morals and education of the nobility was a key step towards improvement of Russia in 
general.553 According to him, nobles “besides having necessary talents, [ought to] 
prove their worth by living decent and moderate lives.” At the same time, he was 
concerned with finding a way to motivate the nobles to display proper eagerness to 
serve. According to Shuvalov, nobles had to possess “zeal for service [revnost’ k 
sluzhbe].” Elsewhere, he was expressing apprehension that the availability of loans 
from the newly created bank for nobles did not “distract them, or at least decrease 
their zeal for service, due to them by nature, and did not limit their desire to acquire 
glory for themselves through meritorious service.”554 The ideas that governing was to 
be done by stimulating “zeal” in those governed applied not only to the nobility, but 
to the army and the state in general. According to his 1753 project for a “school of 
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military science,” among the 160 questions to be studied and researched were the 
following: 
[151] Which qualities should a general possess? 
[152] By what means can a general make himself beloved by the army? 
[privesti seb’a u armii v l’ubov’] 
[155] Which virtues should an officer be endowed with, without which he 
could be useful neither to the Fatherland, nor to the monarch, but could cause 
only harm? 
[157] How should an officer maintain his character? [Kak ofitser svoi 
kharakter nabl’udat’ dolzhen?] 
[158] How ought an officer live? [Kak ofitseru zhit’ nadlezhit?] 
[159] What principles [printsipii] should an officer possess if he wants to 
become an important person?555   
Overall, his credo is summarized in another educational project in the 
following way:  
I search for means of preventing [all potential harm to the common good] 
without causing the extermination of human life, that is, by removing the 
opportunities [for doing such harm], thus preserving the lives even of those 
who became accustomed to such [objectionable] behavior  <…>.  To my 
mind, the evil, if it is rooted in a large number of people, could not be 
uprooted completely through any coercive measure.556  
He, therefore, calls for going to the root causes of evil (whatever they might 
be) and removing them, instead of trying to fight the outward manifestation of evil 
through coercion.  
Shuvalov’s educational projects, however, appeared in the 1750s in a very 
specific context. Originally, he was a courtier without any military experience or 
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credentials whatsoever. He built his career in Elizabeth’s entourage, which he joined 
back in the late 1720s as a very young man. With her accession to the throne, he was 
given high military rank, of course, without ever performing any active service. 
Finally, in 1751 he was promoted to a full general and got his first military command, 
an entire division. Eager to establish his authority as a military man, Shuvalov 
proceeded to point out a deplorable lack of uniformity in the drilling of his regiments, 
and to invent a new method to overcome this deficiency. (He brought in one soldier 
from every company, drilled them personally as a single unit, and then sent them back 
as instructors).557 Justifiably or not, his drilling campaign was recognized as a success, 
and in 1753-1758 he presented three proposals to reform the Cadet Corps by adding to 
it a “school of military sciences” – an additional class for senior (already 
commissioned) students who would study military “theory.” In those years Shuvalov 
presented a number of projects on various issues, so these particular ones are a part of 
this broader pattern of activity, which contemporaries recognized as his peculiarity. 
Yet, it is also important to note that Shuvalov, as he himself explains in one of the 
projects, “got an opportunity, due to a gracious appointment by <…> Her Majesty to 
the army, to enter military affairs.”558 His appointment and apparent success with a 
newly invented method of drilling emboldened him to attempt a bureaucratic 
encroachment onto new turf. Predictably, when appointed the head of artillery in 
1756, Shuvalov turned his attention toward this area. Already in April of 1758 he 
presented a project for reforming the schools along the lines of the Cadet Corps.559 
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By this point Shuvalov, working on his project, could already borrow directly 
from existing practices and models. During his work he consulted, for example, what 
appears to be German-language materials on the Berlin Cadet Corps from the 
1730s.560 He could also use other sources: Shuvalov’s long discussion of the 
importance of history as a source of moral example appears to be lifted more or less 
directly from a work by Mikhail Lomonosov, a German-educated academician 
patronized by Shuvalov’s cousin.561  
As a result, Shuvalov’s project contained the entire arsenal of disciplinary 
measures: the cadets were to be “kept under severe restraints” [soderzhat’… ves’ma 
strogo], and there was to be a pubic examination, so that if “among graduating cadets 
there are some who, due to their special sharpness and diligence, give further hopes 
for significant enlightenment through studies,” they were to study longer. Those 
cadets, however, who “would spend their time in laziness, displaying not the slightest 
desire [okhoty] for studies,” were to be put under arrest, whipped, made to wear a 
dunce cup, and “if nothing helps,” dispatched as privates into the army. Even before 
the reform was approved, Shuvalov introduced at the Artillery and Engineering 
schools registers for recording transgressions and punishments. Monthly and weekly 
reports on the students’ progress and diligence were to be supplied to him personally, 
and only the “well-behaved” among them were to be allowed to go to town. While 
outside of their schools they were to observe decorum, to salute officers, and – 
characteristically – not to attend the popular entertainment designed for the lower 
classes [narodnoe gulianie]. This last innovation is especially significant in light of 
the other measure introduced by Shuvalov. He established a special hospital for the 
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artillery and engineering students so that they not “acquire habits inappropriate to 
well-born people” from “socializing with soldiers” at the ordinary hospital where they 
were previously treated.562  
Here one sees a subtle evolution, though. Shuvalov surely dispatched the lazy 
and the dim-witted ones into the army – but at the same time, he used the word “well-
born” [blagorodnye], which would seem to indicate that the nobility was based, after 
all, on birth. Indeed, one get the impression that his focus is not so much on creating 
the nobles, as on making sure that the nobles acquire appropriate skills and learning. 
There is no room here for the slight ambiguity on the connection between birth and 
virtue, found in the governmental practices of the 1730s. One’s education was 
supposed to fit one’s assigned social role, not to determine it. Characteristically, all 
three Cadet Corpses also acquired in the late 1750s-early 1760s special schools for 
commoners set up to train future NCO’s, craftsmen, technicians, etc. for their 
respective branches of service563  
I would skip here the history of intensive debates on education and nobility in 
the late 1750s and 1760s within the Elizabethan Codification Commission and 
Catherine’s Legislative Commission, not to mention rapidly multiplying magazines, 
as well as the thorough reform of the Noble Cadet Corps along Rousseavian lines 
implemented by Catherine II and I.I. Betskoi in the 1760s. Betskoi was, in many 
ways, unique in his radical Rousseaism, insisting that the “moral education 
[vospitanie] is the root of all good and all evil” and working to create a “new breed of 
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fathers and mothers.” 564 It is important to note, however, that Rousseau advocated 
raising children up individually, within the context of a family. So, when the states 
took it upon themselves to carry out the mission of creating a new breed of citizens, 
they had to invent the methods of institutionalized “Rousseavian” schooling 
themselves. In Russia, it appears, most of the disciplinary measures employed in the 
1760s by Betskoi were already perfected by his predecessors. Institutionally, his 
innovation really was to apply them to children as young as five years old, and to 
carry these methods to their logical conclusion (for example, prohibiting the students 
from venturing into the outside world whatsoever). 
When Betskoi fell from grace, some of his most radical reforms were reversed, 
and Petr Melissino, a Cadet Corps graduate, was appointed to set the Artillery Cadet 
Corps straight. His detailed instructions and regulations followed those of von 
Münnich in great detail. Among the more creative disciplinary measures introduced at 
the Artillery Cadet Corps in the late 1780s was a special sign designed to visibly mark 
the best cadets , that is, a gilded medal worn on a special chain. At any given moment 
no more than twenty cadets were to wear such medals, and a special brochure was 
published describing the privileges due to those awarded such a medal. These 
privileges included dining at a separate table, free access in their free time to the 
offices of the director and senior officers, and a right to go to town without asking for 
a permission to do so. As to the medal itself, on the one side there was the Imperial 
monogram “EII” in laurel and palm branches, while the motto on the reverse side 
read: “For diligence and good behavior.”565  
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We see, finally, how the moral education project is completely and 
unequivocally blended here with the methods of disciplining that we recognize as 
purely military. This blending, of course, was a result of the evolution not only of 
educational methods. The military, too, was enhancing its disciplinary techniques 
throughout the eighteenth century, as we have seen in the case of P.I. Shuvalov. In 
many ways, the little medal awarded at the Artillery Corps in the late 1780s was a 
direct precursor of the extreme militarization of Russian life attempted during the 
short reign of Paul I militarization that was conceptualized by the hapless Emperor as 
a way of disciplining society. Paul I saw his disciplinary campaign as a return to true 
Petrine principles and a rejection of everything associated with his mother’s 
supposedly morally lax reign. On this latter point historians and contemporaries tend 
to agree with him. It might be suggested, however, that in many ways Paul’s program 
was directly building on that of his mother. His hasty and seemingly random way of 
introducing disciplinary measures was clearly inimical to Catherine’s approach, but 
his basic impulses were not necessarily so.  
      Even more so, however, the blending of the moral and the military 
embodied in a little medal granted for “Diligence and good behavior” gives us a 
foretaste of the next century. One of the first to receive for his diligence the medal 
with Catherine’s monogram on it was Cadet Arakcheev, the scion of a poverty-
stricken Novgorod noble family. According to legend, the boy was so captivated by 
the red-and-black uniforms of the artillery cadets, the sons of a neighboring landlord, 
that he persuaded his father to enroll him in the Artillery Cadet Corps. Due to the red 
tape and indifference of bureaucrats the enrollment process took much longer than 
expected, and the family means were so limited that Arakcheev’s father had actually 
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to beg in the streets of St.Petersburg.566 A few decades later General Arakcheev would 
become the most powerful minister of the last, gloomy years of Alexander I’s reign, 
widely regarded as a hated symbol of reaction, petty oppression, and inhumane 
attempts to impose military discipline on the entire society. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of post-Petrine 
Russia in a number of ways. First, I challenge the conventional picture of the nobility 
gradually wresling its “freedoms” from the state. At least as far as the 1730s are 
concerned, this assumption is not backed up by evidence. On the contrary, I argue that 
in their actions the leading ministers of Anna’s government were motivated by the 
notions of human nature and governing that were substantially different from those of 
Peter. These notions led them to focus on social disciplining and on the creation of a 
“true nobility” defined by its possession of true virtue. Furthermore, I reconsider 
through the prism of these notions such specific policy measures implemented in the 
1730s as the creation of the Cadet Corps and, briefly, the reform of noble service in 
1736-1737. I argue that far from being a concession to the nobility, as most of the 
existing historiography maintains, these were meant to discipline the elite and to 
transform it into a “true nobility.” Finally, I attempt to view this paradigm shift within 
its political and social context. Rather than juxtaposing “ideal” and pragmatic factors, 
I argue that ideas were formulated and advanced within an essentially political 
context: specific actors – both ministers and ordinary nobles – formulated, accepted, 
and promoted them as a way of furthering their practical goals. In the following 
paragraphs I outline these three points in more detail. 
First, I attempt in this dissertation to reconstruct the theory of governing 
implicit in a number of policies pursued by Anna’s ministers. There is no denying, of 
course, the reality of fiscal and other constrains and their importance for determining 
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the policies of the 1730s. Nor should we, however, remain oblivious to the notions of 
the human nature and of the mechanics of governing shared by such key dignitaries as 
von Münnich and Ostermann. This is all the more important since, as I argue, these 
notions represent a radical departure from those of Peter. The key to my argument 
here is the distinction between two stages in absolutist thinking – one prevalent in the 
seventeenth century and the one that replaced it beginning somewhere around the 
years 1700-1710. To put it in the simplest way possible, the former was based on the 
essentially mechanistic view of the state and of human nature. Such monarchs as Peter 
or Louis XIV were perfectly satisfied with regulating the actions of their subjects, and 
with securing their outward “rational” conformity with rules and norms. Already by 
the last decades of the seventeenth century, however, this approach to regulating 
society was increasingly found to be lacking by Western European theorists, who 
placed emphasis on the need to achieve, in our modern parlance, internalization of 
prescribed values by those being governed. These writers (and, increasingly, rulers) 
called for a search for “true” virtues, for “true” religiosity and morality, for “true” 
civilization. At the end, the subjects were supposed to want to obey, to want to be 
moral, and to want to serve.  
These sensibilities lead to a number of conclusions as far as the role of the 
government and the art of governing are concerned. It meant the discovery of the 
mind as an object of governing and disciplining. Therefore, it was not enough simply 
to issue regulations, as Peter would have done, in the hope that rational subjects 
would rationally follow them. Now techniques were employed and perfected that 
were supposed to enable such disciplining (constant monitoring, creation of an 
artificially Westernized environment, removal of harmful influences, regular 
assessments, etc.). It also meant that the government had to “encourage” subjects to 
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display more “zeal” by assessing them in a public and transparent way, recognizing 
their achievements, and justly rewarding the worthy ones. It also meant that the 
differences in “inclinations” and génie were to be acknowledged, identified, and taken 
into account when making appointments, as a way of “encouraging” subjects by 
giving them an opportunity to show their best; but this also meant recognizing certain 
limitations imposed on the state’s ability to discipline by the differences in human 
“nature.” While Peter’s policies are not the focus of this dissertation, I argue in 
chapter 3 that these concerns were alien to him. By introducing the distinction 
between the two stages of absolutist thinking I question whether Peter was able to 
conceptualize the “transformation” of society and creation of “new men” at all. In 
many ways, it is this lack of conceptual differentiating between body and mind as 
objects of disciplining that shaped his policies. 
Second, I argue that the policies of Anna’s government towards the nobility 
should be understood in light of these concepts of governing and human nature, and 
not as result of any pressure from the nobility. In chapters 5 and 9, I focus on the 
decision-making process that led to the creation of the Noble Cadet Corps in 1731 and 
the reform of noble service in 1736-1737 (which, among other things, limited the term 
of obligatory service for the nobility to 25 years). I found no evidence that the 
demands put forward by the nobles in 1730 were in any way taken into consideration 
by the government. At the same time, these measures – both the rhetoric of the 
relevant decrees and the operational language of officials actually implementing them 
– fit rather well the conceptual framework outlined above. Far from being a 
concession to the nobility, these measures represented quite conscious steps towards 
the construction of instinnoe shl’akhetsvo out of the existing elite.  
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This goal reflected a vague consensus among the leading representatives of the 
elite, all of whom, naturally, believed the maintenance of the proper nobility in Russia 
to be an issue of paramount, indeed, “constitutional” importance. As I show in chapter 
4, in the 1710s-1720s many of Peter’s lieutenants were increasingly acquainted with 
contemporary notions of education, human nature, and morality, as reflected in the 
writing of such diverse authors as Christian Wolff, John Locke, and Abbé Fénelon. 
The strong presence in Russia of the Halle Pietists was an especially important 
channel for importation of these ideas into Russia. As a result, by 1730 the creation of 
a proper nobility imbued with proper values was viewed as quite necessary by both 
the Supreme Privy Council and its opponents, such as V.N. Tatishchev. What was 
different, however, in the thinking of Field-Marshal von Münnich, the founder of the 
Cadet Corps, is the emphasis on the consistent and quite ruthless use of disciplinary 
practices and, at the same time, the focus on the need to discern and take into account 
individual “inclination” and “abilities.” I maintain that it was these sensibilities, and 
not the pressure from the nobility, that motivated von Münnich and Ostermann to 
supply the Cadet Corps with students on a voluntary basis and to give them the 
opportunity to choose their branch of service – at the same time as the students were 
subjected to constant monitoring and regular public examinations. The 1737 system of 
noble service, which combined such “liberal” elements as opportunities for choosing a 
career and way of schooling with a rigid sequence of examinations, fits the same 
pattern. At the end, this approach allows me to move away from imposing the 
ahistorical dichotomy between “emancipatory” and “conservative” on the eighteenth-
century thinking and to attempt to treat it on its own terms. 
Finally, this dissertation addresses the reaction of the nobility to the 
educational policies of Anna’ government. On the one hand, the vast majority of 
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nobles were not interested in the educational opportunities at the Noble Cadet Corps; 
this further confirms the point that the establishment of this institution could not be 
viewed as a “concession” to the nobility in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, 
there existed a numerically small, but important (in terms of its wealth and ranks) 
stratum of the nobility that was ready to willingly enroll in the new school. These 
nobles were not necessarily moved by any theoretical notions regarding the value of 
this new, institutionalized Western education. Rather, as I show in Part III, their 
choices were subtly shaped by a variety of factors, including insecurity of their family 
in terms of their service status and wealth; exposure to the West; family and service 
connections; access to educational resources (for example, to colleagues willing to 
teach their sons), etc. Theirs were meaningful individual choices, nevertheless; at the 
same time, taken together, these individual choices were beginning to form patterns of 
behavior “appropriate” for the nobility. It is this process that made Petrine projects 
sustainable, allowing the government to announce in 1762 that the need to employ 
coercion, in order to force nobles to study and serve, disappeared: the nobility 
internalized the prescribed values and was now willing to serve out of its “love for 
honor.”  
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